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Abstract
This research investigated search methods for enumerating networked devices on o↵-
link 64 bit Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) subnetworks. IPv6 host enumeration is an
emerging research area involving strategies to enable detection of networked devices on
IPv6 networks. Host enumeration is an integral component in vulnerability assessments
(VAs), and can be used to strengthen the security profile of a system. Recently, host
enumeration has been applied to Internet-wide VAs in an e↵ort to detect devices that
are vulnerable to specific threats. These host enumeration exercises rely on the fact
that the existing Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) can be exhaustively enumerated in
less than an hour. The same is not true for IPv6, which would take over 584,940 years
to enumerate a single network. As such, research is required to determine appropriate
host enumeration search methods for IPv6, given that the protocol is seeing increase
global usage.
For this study, a survey of Internet resources was conducted to gather information
about the nature of IPv6 usage in real-world scenarios. The collected survey data
revealed patterns in the usage of IPv6 that influenced search techniques. The research
tested the e cacy of various searching algorithms against IPv6 datasets through the
use of simulation.
Multiple algorithms were devised to test di↵erent approaches to host enumeration
against 64 bit IPv6 subnetworks. Of these, a novel adaptive heuristic search algorithm,
a genetic algorithm and a stripe search algorithm were chosen to conduct o↵-link IPv6
host enumeration. The suitability of a linear algorithm, a Monte Carlo algorithm and
a pattern heuristics algorithm were also tested for their suitability in searching o↵ link
IPv6 networks. These algorithms were applied to two test IPv6 address datasets, one
comprised of unique IPv6 data observed during the survey phase, and one comprised of
unique IPv6 data generated using pseudorandom number generators. Searching against
the two unique datasets was performed in order to determine appropriate strategies for
o↵-link host enumeration under circumstances where networked devices were configured
with addresses that represented real-word IPv6 addresses, and where device addresses
were configured through some randomisation function.
i
Whilst the outcomes of this research support that an exhaustive enumeration of
an IPv6 network is infeasible, it has been demonstrated that devices on IPv6 networks
can be enumerated. In particular, it was identified that the linear search technique and
the variants tested in this study (pattern search and stripe search), remained the most
consistent means of enumerating an IPv6 network. Machine learning methods were
also successfully applied to the problem. It was determined that the novel adaptive
heuristic search algorithm was an appropriate candidate for search operations. The
adaptive heuristic search algorithm successfully enumerated over 24% of the available
devices on the dataset that was crafted from surveyed IPv6 address data. Moreover,
it was confirmed that stochastic address generation can reduce the e↵ectiveness of
enumeration strategies, as all of the algorithms failed to enumerate more than 1% of
hosts against a pseudorandomly generated dataset.
This research highlights a requirement for e↵ective IPv6 host enumeration al-
gorithms, and presents and validates appropriate methods. The methods presented
in this thesis can help to influence the tools and utilities that are used to conduct host
enumeration exercises.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It is increasingly commonplace for devices with varying purposes, such as computers,
cars, mobile phones, even lightbulbs and fridges, to incorporate some access to the
Internet. These devices depend on access to ever-decreasing network layer address
resources. The current network communications protocol providing these addresses,
Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4), has almost exhausted its address supplies; with
APNIC allocating its final 8 bit address block in 2014 (APNIC, 2015). Various systems,
such as RFC-1918 private addresses (Rekhter, Moskowitz, Karrenberg, de Groot &
Lear, 1996), and forms of Network Address Translation (NAT) have been introduced
to assist in combatting the exhaustion problem. However, ultimately these measures
serve to temporarily ameliorate the problem, rather than solve it. In 1994, a new
protocol was approved to resolve the pending address exhaustion crisis; the Internet
Protocol version 6 (IPv6).
IPv6 introduces a larger address space than its predecessor, IPv4. The increase is
not insignificant, in fact the 128 bit IPv6 address space is 296 times larger than that
of IPv4. This increase in address space will provide the Internet with enough address
resources to facilitate its expansion for the foreseeable future.
However, the increased address space introduces complications in locating nodes on
a distant network using existing host enumeration techniques. In IPv6 there are enough
potential unique addresses for 264 nodes to exist on a subnetwork. Enumerating all
hosts on a network by simply probing each possible address, as is commonplace with
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IPv4, is no longer a feasible activity. With exhaustive searching currently infeasible,
e↵orts must turn to more informed methods of enumeration.
1.1 Background to the problem
Host enumeration, also known as network discovery, host discovery or network scanning,
is the act of identifying live nodes on a computer network. Host enumeration generally
involves sending a probe, or series of probes to potential hosts on a network and
measuring responses. Host enumeration has existed for a number of years as a means
for agents to locate computers on networks. On a small network, such as a standard
24 bit IPv4 subnetwork, it may take an agent a matter of seconds to perform an
exhaustive search of the address space and enumerate all of the hosts that are active
on the network. In regards to an IPv6 network, where the recommended subnetwork
size is 64 bits long (Hinden & Deering, 2006), a similar exercise would take many years,
given current network bandwidth. To put this di↵erence in perspective, at a rate of
1,000,000 probes per second, it would take less than a second to enumerate a 24 bit
IPv4 network, whilst it would take approximately 584,942.42 years against a single 64
bit IPv6 network.
Enumerating host devices on computer networks can be scoped as either o↵-link or
on-link enumeration. On-link discovery is when a device performs host enumeration
against directly connected networks. In contrast, o↵-link refers to performing host
enumeration against a network that is not directly connected. Specifically, this occurs
when the agent performing host enumeration is on a separate link-layer broadcast do-
main to the host enumeration subject(s). O↵-link host discovery is more commonplace
across public networks, where it is often used as a tool for troubleshooting networks
problems, locating and taking census of network resources, researching vulnerabilities,
and attacking computer networks.
Host enumeration forms an important stage in vulnerability assessments (VAs) and
network security assessments. VAs serve to identify potential security vulnerabilities
in a system or group of systems by testing systems for their vulnerability to known
threats. They are routinely conducted to assess the security profile of a network or
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organisation. VAs can be performed proactively as a defence strengthening measure, or
reactively to determine exposure to specific vulnerabilities. Common VA methodologies
generally involve a phase dedicated to conducting host enumeration to identify devices
in a network address space that are active (Braunton, 2005; McNab, 2007). A list of live
nodes serves to restrict the scope of any further e↵orts in a vulnerability assessment
to improve e ciency. Braunton (2005) provides a security assessment methodology
that includes a phase dedicated to host enumeration. Braunton (2005) stresses the
importance of conducting a thorough and well-documented host enumeration exercise
as the foundation to a successful network security assessment.
Host enumeration techniques, and VAs also provide research opportunities. In 2014
a number of vulnerabilities were discovered in ubiquitous software packages, such as
OpenSSL, bash and schannel. The Heartbleed, ShellShock and POODLE vulnerabil-
ities were all publicly disclosed in 2014, and resulted in independent research e↵orts
conducted to determine the exposure of each vulnerability. These e↵orts provided
insight into the nature of the vulnerabilities, including longitudinal data of a↵ected
systems and remedial patching cycles.
Host enumeration techniques are often used in network support and troubleshoot-
ing. Network engineers and systems administrators commonly use network discovery
tools and techniques to determine hosts that are active on their own computer net-
works. A computer network can experience frequent connections and disconnections
of client devices. This is especially true in situations where bring your own device
(BYOD) policies are unrestrictive or in the case of Internet of Things (IoT) systems.
BYOD and IoT systems can host a large quantity of unmanaged devices. In such
situations host enumeration can be used to take a census of the devices on computer
network segments. Since host enumeration is a tool that is used to locate networked
devices it is also often leveraged by malicious agents.
Malicious agents have used host discovery for many years (G. F. Lyon, 2009) to
determine live nodes on networks when conducting penetration tests or unsolicited
VAs. Once initial discovery is complete, an agent may target those machines and
conduct an unauthorised vulnerability assessment in order to enumerate a system’s
vulnerabilities. They can then use other tools to exploit vulnerabilities to achieve their
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goals in the attack. As an example, the aforementioned Heartbleed and ShellShock
vulnerabilities could be enumerated by performing an exhaustive search of the IPv4
Internet (or a subset thereof) using specially crafted payloads, and then recording the
response. These enumerated systems that have been confirmed to be vulnerable could
then be further exploited to gain control of those systems.
Malware developers have also used host enumeration strategies in the past to cre-
ate self-propagating worms such as the Conficker worm (Savagaonkar, Sahita, Nagab-
hushan, Rajagopal & Durham, 2005; Porras, Saidi & Yegneswaran, 2009). In such cases
an infected computer will enumerate other potentially vulnerable hosts on a network
and then attempt to transfer malware to them. These forms of worms were devastating
to IPv4 computer networks before anti-virus software saw widespread adoption. Due
to the IPv4 address space size, CPU processing power, and distributed enumeration
worms could propagate very quickly.
Due to its large address space IPv6 has earned the reputation of being infeasible
to enumerate using o↵-link host enumeration. An address space can be defined as a
range of discrete addresses. In the context of the research problem, the address space is
measured in bits. For IPv4 the address space of the entire protocol is 32 bits (approx-
imately 4.3 billion addresses), while the IPv6 address space is 128 bits (approximately
340 undecillion addresses). The address space commonly used in subnetworks in IPv4
are substantially lower than that of IPv6. Common networks in IPv4 use 24 bits for
the network portion and contain 256 possible addresses per subnet. IPv6 uses 64 bits
for the network portion of the address which provides approximately 18 quintillion
addresses per subnet. It is important to note the distinction between address types in
IPv4 and IPv6. Both protocols have portions of the address space that are designated
for public or global usage, and portions that are not for public usage. Henceforth,
unless otherwise specified the IPv6 address range under consideration in this research
is the global unicast address range (2000::/3). All publicly routable address ranges
were considered when referring to IPv4.
On-link host enumeration is trivial to conduct in both IPv4 and IPv6 domains,
since both protocols include provisions for hosts to discover their neighbours. Such
facilities are required for communications between hosts to occur at all. In IPv4 the
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Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), allows devices to query neighbours using link-
layer broadcast frames. In IPv6, the Internet Control Message Protocol version 6
(ICMPv6), similarly to ARP, allows devices to discover their on-link neighbours. On-
link discovery is usually achieved by querying common multicast addresses, for which
each IPv6 enabled device is a member (such as the all-nodes address ff02::1). These
methods do not apply to devices on di↵erent broadcast domains since such addresses
are not routable outside their network. The ramifications of this protocol design means
that devices attempting to perform host discovery from another network must employ
di↵ering tactics.
In contrast to on-link scanning, o↵-link scanning cannot simply be accomplished
through queries to local broadcast or multicast address scopes. In such circumstances,
agents seeking to discover hosts on neighbouring networks must employ network layer
and above host discovery. O↵-link discovery methods commonly used against IPv4
systems typically include an exhaustive linear search for small target sizes (e.g. for
searching a single, 24 bit network). An exhaustive linear search is also possible (and
commonplace) when searching the wider IPv4 Internet. Target randomisation tech-
niques are often used instead to distribute the searching load evenly across the search
space. Search distribution is employed to ensure the endpoints of the search attempt do
not get overloaded with probes in the event that a single entity manages a contiguous
address block. Utilities such as nmap (G. F. Lyon, 2009) and masscan (Graham, 2013c)
employ randomisation functions to permute the entire address space randomly, rather
than sequentially.
Current methods of o↵-link host enumeration in the IPv6 domain rely upon either
performing a linear search of a subset of the address space, or targeting addresses that
are commonly used in IPv6 deployments. A number of tools have been developed
to accomplish the task of host enumeration against IPv6 networks using the limited
algorithms discussed. These tools include the hacker’s choice IPv6 suite’s alive6
program and the Chiron suite’s IPv6 scanner. These applications both attempt to
enumerate IPv6 networks through a hybrid approach of address pattern generation
and linear searching.
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1.2 Purpose of the Study
This research aims to fill the gap in knowledge that exists surrounding IPv6 host
enumeration strategies. From the literature surrounding the topic it is evident that
the problem of enumerating nodes on an o↵-link IPv6 network is considered infeasible.
Currently there is minimal literature that provides methods for conducting o↵-link IPv6
host enumeration. Furthermore, no formal testing or validation of host enumeration
methods that do exist have been performed. This study seeks to validate existing
approaches to host enumeration, including those used against IPv4 and IPv6 networks.
The study also seeks to devise and present new, e cient strategies that address the
problem.
The literature in the domain does suggest that the protocol’s implementation may
assist with the formulation of searching methods that target areas of the address space
e ciently. These methods may use heuristics to determine behaviour patterns in ad-
dress allocation and exploit them to improve enumeration rates. Additionally, thus far
machine learning methods have not been applied to the problem. Machine learning may
provide another potential avenue for host enumeration search methods that have yet
to be explored. Conventional search methods rely on generating static or deterministic
target address lists. The adaptive nature of machine learning systems may improve
the e↵ectiveness of o↵-link host enumeration search methods for IPv6.
By exploring new methods to conduct o↵-link IPv6 host enumeration and test-
ing the e↵ectiveness of existing methods, this research aims to contribute validated
methods of IPv6 host enumeration. These methods serve to aid in the e↵orts of fu-
ture enumeration endeavours against IPv6 networks. It is an intended outcome of this
research that the findings and discoveries will assist in improving the landscape for
IPv6-related research e↵orts.
1.3 Research questions
The purpose of this research was to determine e↵ective means to conduct host enumer-
ation against IPv6 networks. The research questions were:
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RQ1 Can networking devices be enumerated on 64 bit IPv6 subnetworks using host
discovery techniques?
RQ2 Are stochastic searching methods more e cient than deterministic searching meth-
ods when enumerating IPv6 hosts within a single 64 bit subnetwork?
RQ3 Do stochastic address allocation schemes within a single 64 bit subnetwork inhibit
IPv6 host enumeration strategies?
RQ4 Can machine learning search methods be used to enumerate devices on a 64 bit
IPv6 subnetwork?
RQ5 Are machine learning searching methods more e cient than non-machine learn-
ing based methods when enumerating IPv6 hosts within a single 64 bit subnet-
works?
1.4 Hypotheses
In order to answer the above research questions, hypotheses were formed. The primary
hypotheses underpinning the research were:
H1 “Search techniques are unable to enumerate networked devices on 64 bit IPv6
subnetworks.”
H2 ‘Methods that employ random sampling do not perform better than methods that
do not employ random sampling for IPv6 host enumeration.”
H3 “Randomly generated interface identifiers do not a↵ect the performance of IPv6
host enumeration search algorithms.”
H4 “Search methods that employ machine learning are unable to enumerate networked
devices on 64 bit IPv6 subnetworks.”
H5 “Search methods that employ machine learning do not perform better than search
methods that do not employ machine learning for IPv6 host enumeration.”
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1.5 Research design
A quantitative study was designed and undertaken in an attempt to address the re-
search hypotheses and provide answers to the research questions. Laboratory experi-
mentation was chosen as an appropriate mode of inquiry for the research process.
The research was designed into five phases, involving:
1. Survey IPv6 usage: A survey into the real-world usage of IPv6 was conducted
as a precursor to the study, and involved conducting a DNS enumeration against
public IPv6 domain names. The survey data were used to influence the types of
algorithms that were developed. The datasets used as the target networks in the
research experiments were constructed in this phase of the research.
2. Generate search algorithms: The algorithms that would form the research’s inde-
pendent variables were designed in this phase. These algorithms drew influence
from existing host enumeration algorithms, as well as algorithms that have not
been previously applied to the problem.
3. Develop instruments and experiments, and perform pilot studies: The computer
programs that would realise the testing and measuring of the research variables
were constructed and tested in this phase.
4. Perform experiments: The research involved conducting experiments that applied
algorithms to IPv6 address datasets. Each experiment consisted of two sub-
experiments that exposed the subject algorithm to a di↵erent IPv6 dataset of
valid addresses representing a configured IPv6 network. These sub-experiments
were comprised of a number of simulations.
5. Data processing and analysis: The data collected from the experiments were
collated and processed. Analyses were performed to test the research hypotheses
using the observed results.
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1.6 Assumptions
The author has made the assumption that the target hypothetical networks tested
in this study are statically set for the duration of search attempts. This means that
the networks do not have hosts connecting to or disconnecting from them. This dis-
tinction is important given that networks in real-world scenarios are often dynamic in
nature, especially in networks that contain user devices (such as smartphones, laptop
computers, workstations or tablets). Devices in these networks may connect and dis-
connect intermittently or sometimes permanently. This consideration was out scope for
this research, and thus convergence rates of the algorithms are not considered within
scope of this research. The datasets created to replicate IPv6 networks represent net-
works where all of the hosts are static. In real-world situations, the dynamic nature of
computer networks would warrant investigation into optimisation of algorithm conver-
gence rates. Such research could be undertaken in followup to this study.
It was also assumed that nodes on the hypothetical networks must respond to
probing attempts if they exist. E↵ectively this means that if an address is included
in the dataset, it is a live node. If an address is not included in the dataset, then it
is not a live node, and no further consideration should be taken for it. Again, in a
real-world situation there are a number of reasons why a node might not respond to a
probe request. For example, the probe may be lost during transmission, it might get
blocked by a firewall rule, or there could be unforeseen routing issues. However, these
situations were not considered to be within the scope of the research.
This research was concerned only with Global Unicast IPv6 addresses, since they
represent the publicly contactable address type o↵ered by the IPv6 protocol under
Hinden and Deering (2006), and are therefore a logical candidate for o↵-link host
enumeration. Although other address types exist, some of which are publicly accessible,
the global unicast address range are the most general type and most commonly used
within the public Internet. Other specialty address types (such as the well known
prefix, etc.) have nuances that would require specific handling (such as an increased
network mask and static network bits), and have been excluded from the scope of this
research. Additionally, the target IPv6 network(s) that experiments were conducted
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against were 64 bit subnetworks (i.e. networks with a 64 bit network mask). 64 bits
is the recommended subnetwork size by Hinden and Deering (2006) for global unicast
networks, and was accepted as the standard size for this research.
For the purposes of the research it was assumed that the target network is bound by
a one gigabit per second network connection, and that the source of the search attempt
was bound by the same connection speed. Where appropriate for comparisons, a con-
stant transmission rate of 1,000,000 generic probes per second has been declared. The
rate of 1 million packets per second has been at least observed in Durumeric, Wustrow
and Halderman (2013b) where the authors achieved a rate of 1.4 million packets per
second, and in Graham (2013c) where 29 million packets per second were observed.
The type of probe delivery method, or the probe payload, were not considered, since
the search algorithms were the focus of the study.
1.7 Thesis structure
The remainder of the thesis is set out as follows:
Chapter Two, the Literature Review, reviews the research-oriented literature on
host enumeration within IP networks. It contextualises this literature in terms of the
problem of host enumeration across large address spaces, such as those that are greater
than 32 bits. Outcomes from the review shaped the research questions by identifying
gaps in knowledge.
Chapter Three, the Research Methodology and Design discusses the research meth-
ods and approaches used to perform the research. The main modes of inquiry are
described, along with the epistemological backing for the research. The experimental
process is discussed as well as the algorithms used to perform the host enumeration.
Chapter Four, the Results, presents the results gathered from the experiments that
were conducted during the study and the outcomes of hypothesis testing. Of particular
interest was the results of the linear search algorithms and the adaptive-heuristic search
algorithms, which displayed strong results in their search operations against networks
configured with real-world addresses.
Chapter Five, the Analysis and Discussion, explores the results gathered during the
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research. In particular, the relationships between the results, their impact on testing
the research hypotheses, and ultimately how they serve to answer the research questions
is explored in this chapter.
Chapter Six, the Conclusions, summarises the contributions to knowledge made by
the work explored in this thesis. Finally, this chapter suggests potential avenues for
future research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 TCP/IP
2.1.1 Overview
The TCP/IP suite (also known as the Internet protocol suite) was developed in 1974
(Cerf, Dalal & Sunshine, 1974) when the need for globally interconnected networks was
first realised. The first iterations of the Internet Protocol included the internetwork
transmission control program which was described in RFC-675 by Cerf et al. (1974).
The fourth version of the TCP/IP family was ratified in 1981 in RFC-791 (Postel,
1981).
TCP/IP gained traction after being named the protocol of the ARPANet by the
US Department of Defence (DoD), a 500 node computer network, and the predecessor
to the modern Internet in 1972, and securing military adoption in the 1980s. TCP/IP
eventually became the de-facto standard networking protocol (Kessler, 2014). IPv4 is
ubiquitous and is supported on nearly every network-aware device worldwide.
The TCP/IP protocol suite is based upon the TCP/IP model (formally known as
DoD model (Kessler, 2014)) that uses four layers to describe communications between
nodes. These four layers are;
• The Link layer, where protocols such as Ethernet and Token Ring provide a
physical connection between devices on a network;
• The Internet layer, where protocols such as IPv4, IPv6 and IPSec allow devices
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to communicate with each other beyond their physically connected network;
• The Transport layer, protocols such as TCP and UDP operate at this layer to
provide end-to-end connectivity between nodes, and;
• The Application layer, where protocols transmit arbitrary data between each
other. Protocols such as hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) and simple message
transmission protocol (SMTP) exist at the application layer (Kessler, 2014).
These four layers interoperate to complete the TCP/IP model, and provide the
basis for computer networking.
The TCP/IP model is not the only framework for describing network communica-
tions. The four-layered TCP/IP model can be mapped to the Open Systems Intercon-
nection’s (OSI) seven layered networking model, as displayed in Figure 2-1. In the OSI
model there are seven layers of abstraction defined for networking communications;
• The Physical layer, where electrical signals are transferred over a medium;
• The Data link layer, which, when paired with the Physical layer, is analogous to
the Link layer in the TCP/IP model;
• The Network layer, which is synonymous to the Internet layer in the TCP/IP
model;
• The Transport layer, which is synonymous to its TCP/IP counterpart;
• Finally, the Session, Presentation and Application layers, which are all concerned
with processing arbitrary data streams, are combined to form the Application
layer’s counterpart in the TCP/IP model.
As previously stated, IPv4 and IPv6 operate at the Internet layer (layer two) of
the TCP/IP model. These protocols provide a means for abstract communications to
occur between devices over discontiguous physical networks (‘Information technology
– Open Systems Interconnection – Basic Reference Model: The Basic Model’, 1994).
IP networks are separated by boundaries known as subnetworks, which occur when
an IP network is divided into smaller IP networks through the use of a subnet mask.
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Figure 2-1: The seven layers of the OSI model (left) are comparable with the four layers of the TCP/IP model
(right). The OSI Physical and Data link layers (layers 1 and 2, respectively), converge to form the layer 1 Link
layer in the TCP/IP model, whilst the OSI Network layer (layer 3) is synonymous with TCP/IP Internet layer
(layer 2). The transport layer is a direct translation from OSI layer 4 to TCP/IP layer 3. Finally OSI layers 5
to 7 (the Session, Presentation and Application layers) combine to form the TCP/IP model’s Application layer
(layer 4).
Subnet masks are binary streams that are applied to an IP address or network address
in order to determine a start and end point of an IP network. Subnet masks are
typically set to the binary value of one for all of the higher order bits from bit 0 until
bit n   1 (where n is the number of network bits). The lower order bits (i.e. from
bit n to bit 31) are set to the binary value of zero. As an example, in IPv4 a typical
network size is 24 bits long. In this instance, the network’s subnet mask would be
represented as 255.255.255.0 (or 11111111.11111111.11111111.00000000 in dot-
separated binary). When applied to an IP address, using a bitwise and operation, the
result provides the network address (e.g. applying a bitwise and operation against an
IP address 192.168.1.34 and the subnet mask 255.255.255.0 results in the network
address of 192.168.1.0) (Kessler, 2014). The binary masking system allows devices
to determine the boundaries of networks in IP systems.
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2.1.2 Address types
Devices participating in IP communications must have at least one unique IP address.
IPv4 addresses are 32 bit values while IPv6 addresses are 128 bit values. In common
presentation these values can be represented textually in many ways. It is especially
true for IPv6, whose larger address space has necessitated compression techniques in
order to reduce the size of represented addresses. IPv4 addresses can be represented as
their unsigned integer value (a discrete number between 0 and 232), or by the represent-
ation standard noted in RFC-1123 (Braden, 1989) which dictates that an IPv4 address
should be reduced to a string containing four chunks (octets), each which represents
an eight bit unsigned integer, separated by periods.
IPv6 is less straightforward. The integer representation is similar to that of IPv4,
with the only di↵erence being the number of bits that comprise the address. Whilst
the common representation for IPv6 addresses has undergone some reassessment since
it was devised in RFC-2460 by Deering and Hinden (1998), the fundamental represent-
ation has not changed. IPv6 addresses should be represented as strings separated into
eight chunks (hextets or quartets), each comprising a 16 bit hexadecimal string, sep-
arated by colons (e.g 2001:db8b:ccdd:eeff:1122:3344:5566:7777). According to
Kawamura and Kawashima (2010), leading zeroes must be dropped from each quartet,
and a collapsing scheme can be used to compress multiple quartets of consecutive zeroes.
As an example 1000:0:0:0:0:0:0:0001 would become 1::1. In order to prevent am-
biguities the collapsed notation can only appear once within an address. In cases where
there are discontiguous quartets of zeroes, collapsing will occur at the largest consec-
utive number of zero value quartets. In the case of a deadlock, the highest order set of
consecutive zeroes will be collapsed. For example 1000:0:0:1:0:0:0:1 would become
1000:0:0:1::1, and 1000:0:0:1:1:0:0:1 would become 1000::1:1:0:0:1 (Hinden,
Deering & Nordmark, 2003; Hinden & Deering, 2006; Kawamura & Kawashima, 2010).
It has been established that IPv6 addresses are discrete numbers between 0 and 2128,
and that when participating in IP networking, a node must have at least one unique
address. It is not entirely true that there are 2128 possible public IPv6 addresses. In
practice the address space has been partitioned to allow for future expansion of the
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protocol, and reassessment of the addressing schemes. Under the current specifications
detailed in Hinden and Deering (2006), IANA (2013) and IANA (2014b) the global
unicast address space is 2000::/3, which equates to 2125 possible addresses. The
current major address space allocations for the IPv6 protocol are included in Table 2.1.
This research is concerned only with addresses in the global unicast address space, since
that is the address range that is publicly accessible, and most appropriate for o↵-link
host discovery. From this point onwards, unless otherwise specified, references to IPv6
addresses or networks will relate to subjects of the global unicast IPv6 address space.
When using IPv6 there are a number of ways that assigning unique addresses to
hosts can be achieved. A node can be configured with an IPv6 address either statefully
or statelessly. A device can be provided with an address through means that require
third party intervention (stateful addressing) or by autoconfiguring an address without
requiring third party intervention (stateless addressing). It is important to reiterate
that there are three components to an IPv6 address as defined in RFC-2460 by Deer-
ing and Hinden (1998). These components include the distinction between the global
routing prefix of the address. The global routing prefix represents the higher order
bits of an address, and can be further deconstructed to reveal the hierarchy of the
address. Internet registries exist that allocate Internet resources to clients, including
other Internet registers, and Internet service providers (ISP). There is also the distinc-
tion made for the subnet id (m) which denotes the subnetwork that an IPv6 address
is a member of. The subnet id is a subset of the network portion of an IPv6 address.
If following RFC-4291 (Hinden & Deering, 2006), the subnet id can be calculated by
64   n. Finally, there is the Interface Identifier which is made up of the lower order
bits of the address (see Figure 2-2) calculated by 128  n m.
The common stateful addressing schemes for IPv6 include the dynamic host con-
figuration protocol version 6 (DHCPv6) and static addressing. DHCPv6 is similar to
DHCPv4 to the extent that a server provides clients with unique addresses and other
network resources defined in DHCP option fields (such as nameservers, time servers,
etc.). Under DHCPv6 schemes, address allocation can happen using pools or through
stochastic generation. For completeness, it is worth mentioning that there is also the
Stateless DHCPv6 scheme. However, under this scheme DHCP is only used to deliver
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Figure 2-2: Global Unicast IPv6 address representation modified from RFC-3587 (Hinden, Deering & Nord-
mark, 2003) displaying the breakdown of the distinct portions of an IPv6 address. The global routing prefix
(n bits) are the highest order bits of the IPv6 address. This can further be deconstructed to reveal the Inter-
net service provider (ISP) prefix, and any Internet registry prefixes. The subnet ID (m bits) determines the
subnetwork that an address is a part of. Finally, the Interface ID, the lowest order bits in the address, can be
calculated by 128  n m.
Table 2.1: The currently allocated IPv6 address ranges as specified by IANA (2013)
IPv6 Prefix Prefix Allocation Notes
0000::/8 Reserved by IETF • ::1/128 is the IPv6 Loopback Address (equivalent to IPv4’s 127.0.0.1)
• ::/128 reserved for Unspecified Address
• ::↵↵:0:0/96 reserved for IPv4-mapped Address
• 0000::/96 deprecated by RFC-4291 (Hinden & Deering, 2006).
Formerly defined as the ‘IPv4-compatible IPv6 address’ prefix.
• The ‘Well Known Prefix’ (64:↵9b::/96) is used to map IPv4 addresses
to IPv6 addresses
0100::/8 Reserved by IETF • 0100::/64 reserved for Discard-Only Address Block
0200::/7 Reserved by IETF • Formerly OSI NSAP-mapped prefix, deprecated as of December 2004.
2000::/3 Global Unicast • Publicly routable IPv6 addresses
fc00::/7 Unique Local Unicast • Private IPv6 addresses, not publicly routable in the global Internet
fe80::/10 Link-Scoped Unicast • Addresses used by nodes to communicate with devices on-link. Not
routable outside origin link
fec0::/10 Reserved by IETF Formerly site-local address range. Deprecated in September 2004.
↵00::/8 Multicast • IPv6 addresses used to communicate with members of multicast
groups
information pertaining to network resources, and not address assignment itself. Nodes
participating in stateless DHCPv6 must have configured a valid IPv6 address though
some other means (Droms, 2004). As a result, this scheme has been deemed irrelevant
to the topic.
If DHCPv6 is used to lease addresses from an address pool (a range of addresses that
a server is able to provide to clients), the addresses assigned to clients will be spatially
close together (i.e. low entropy). The result of doing so reduces the entropy of the
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leased addresses, and can, therefore provide a valid precursor to search attempts. This
situation can also occur with manual addressing, where an administrator manually
assigns an IPv6 address to a host. Whilst it is possible to do so using randomly
generated addresses, or high entropy address allocation schemes, the likelihood is that
a human is going to address hosts in a memorable fashion. This has been witnessed and
cited as a problem in works such as Narten, Draves and Krishnan (2007), where the
author makes specific recommendations against the usage of predictable addressing
schemes, instead advocating for the use of stochastic methods. Again, the entropy
of such an address scheme may be significantly lower than using stochastic address
generation methods.
Additionally, due to the standard hexadecimal string representation of IPv6 ad-
dresses it is possible to inject words comprised of hexadecimal characters into an IPv6
address. This substitution technique uses the hexadecimal characters a-f and the
numbers 0-9 to represent words natively, and via hexadecimal word substitutions. For
example, the hexadecimal string 0xcafe can be used to represent the word ‘cafe’. An
address could be constructed using the hexadecimal strings 0xdead, 0xbeef, 0xcafe
and 0xface to resemble ::dead:beef:cafe:face. This type of address construction
has been observed in real world situations, and has been used to influence search tech-
niques such as those used by THC-IPv6 (Hauser, 2014) and Chiron (Atlasis, 2014).
These techniques will be discussed in further detail in Section 2.2.
RFC-4291 (Hinden & Deering, 2006) and RFC-5952 (Kawamura & Kawashima,
2010) discuss the addressing architecture for IPv6. The subsequent changes to the
protocol expressed in RFC-5952 (Kawamura & Kawashima, 2010) alleviate some of the
concerns with the flexible approach to representing IPv6 addresses in text. Originally
there was no formal standard to how leading zeros in IPv6 quartets were represented,
and likewise, collapsing consecutive quartets was at the discretion of those using the
protocol. In particular, RFC-4291 (Hinden & Deering, 2006) provided discretion on
representation with respect to hexadecimal character’s case, inclusion of leading zeroes,
and address compression using double colon notation. As an example, under RFC-4291
(Hinden & Deering, 2006), the IPv6 address a001:77:0:77::cafe/64 could be legally
represented in, but not limited to, the following ways:
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• a001:77:0:77::cafe/64
• a001:0077:0:77::cafe/64
• a001:077:0:77::CAFE/64
• A001:77:0:77::caFE/64
• a001:77:0:77:0:0:0:cafe/64
• A001:0077:0000:0077:0000:0000:0000:cafe/64
• a001:77::77:0000:0000:0000:cafe/64
These loose guidelines presented problems for systems that handled the textual
representation of IPv6 addresses. In particular, having loosely defined constraints to
displaying and conveying addresses caused problems with superficial parsing systems,
such as text-based search and regular expressions (Kawamura & Kawashima, 2010).
Due to the number of potential combinations of legal representations of a single ad-
dress, it was di cult to apply pattern recognition that did not present false positive
or false negatives on edge-case addresses. The case of incorrectly handling IPv6 ad-
dress representations is not dissimilar to the problems that are still occurring with
correct handling of email addresses (Klensin, 2001, 2004). RFC-5952 (Kawamura &
Kawashima, 2010) enforced stricter control in order to reduce ambiguities with these
representations. Referring to the previous example, according to RFC-5952 (Kawamura
& Kawashima, 2010), a001:77:0:77::cafe/64 is the only legal string representation
of that address. The outcome of Kawamura and Kawashima (2010) is that there are
far fewer permutations of possible legal representations of IPv6 addresses.
The string representation of an IPv6 address in a 64 bit subnetwork has character
space in the IID for 16 hexadecimal characters. This representation uses colons to
separate groups of four hexadecimal characters (see Figure 2-2). The standard IPv4
address representation uses four period separated portions (commonly referred to as
dotted-quad or dot-separated decimal notation) containing an integer value between
0 and 255. Another method that could be used as a means by which to construct
IIDs is to embed an existing IPv4 address into an IID. The author has named the
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approach IPv4-converted-IIDs. IPv4-converted-IIDs can be achieved by substituting
the period delimited integer representation into the colon delimited string notation of
IPv6 such that the complete IPv4 address becomes the complete IPv6 IID (for example
the 32 bit IPv4 address 192.168.1.1 would become the 64 bit IID ::192:168:1:1).
At present no o cial documentation on this approach has been published. However,
it is not inconceivable to expect to observe such addresses in IPv6 implementations,
especially throughout the transition stages from IPv4 to IPv6. IPv4-converted-IIDs
would simplify the locating of hosts that are IPv4 and IPv6 enabled, since the host
address would be e↵ectively the same.
A transition mechanism for injecting IPv4 addresses into IPv6 addresses, named
IPv4-mapped-IPv6 addresses, also provides another way to represent addresses. Under
this scheme, which is described in RFC-6052 by Bao, Huitema, Bagnulo, Boucadair and
Li (2010), the last 32 bits of the address would be replaced with a 32 bit IPv4 address.
The string representation also reflected this change, with the last two quartets being
changed to the IPv4 period separation scheme. This particular IPv6 address format
uses a specific prefix, and does not fall within the global unicast IPv6 address range.
IPv4-mapped-IPv6 addresses, therefore, have not been considered during this research.
There are also techniques that involve using the full 32 bit IPv4 address as a portion
of the 128 bit IPv6 address. With respect to 64 bit networks, RFC-6052 (Bao et al.,
2010) defines the following format for embedding IPv4-embedded IPv6 addresses:
1. Place the complete binary IPv4 address from bits 72 to 103 of the IPv6 address.
2. Ensure the bits from 64 to 71 and from 104 to 127 are set to ‘0’.
3. Prepend the 64 bit network prefix at bits 0 to 63.
An example IPv4 address 192.168.1.1 would be converted into a valid IPv4-
embedded IPv6 address with the 64 bit IPv6 network prefix 7777:7:7:7::/64 as
follows:
1. Convert IPv4 address 192.168.1.1 into hexadecimal: c0a80101.
2. Insert address into bits 72 to 103 of the 128 IPv6 address, keeping the bits 64 to
71 and from 104 to 127 are set to ‘0’: ::c0a8:101:0.
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3. Prepend the 64 bit network prefix 7777:7:7:7::/64 at bits 0 to 63 to complete
the address: 7777:7:7:7:c0a8:101::/64).
IPv4-mapped-IPv6 style addresses were not specifically addressed in this thesis since
at the time of writing RFC-6052 (Bao et al., 2010) was still in the proposed standard
status. This means that the standard has not been completely ratified, or accepted.
If RFC-6052 is ratified the proposed IPv4-mapped-IPv6 addresses could form a valid
feature for influencing search heuristics.
In addition to the stateful methods expressed above, host configuration can also
be conducted statelessly. The principle method used to statelessly configure IPv6 ad-
dresses is through Stateless Address Auto-configuration (SLAAC). SLAAC was defined
in Thomson and Narten (1998) and later updated in Thomson, Narten and Jinmei
(2007), where it was introduced as a facility for nodes to engage in IPv6 communica-
tions without requiring any intervention. SLAAC uses a technique to generate an IID
known as Modified EUI-64 (64 bit extended unique identifier - hereafter referred to as
EUI-64) which adapts the IEEE MAC-48 (48 bit media access control) address of the
node’s network interface into a 64 bit IID (IEEE Standards Association, n.d. Narten
et al., 2007). EUI-64 defines a standard approach to converting EUI numbers to IIDs.
Common EUIs include;
• The IEEE MAC-48 which are used commonly as hardware MAC addresses on
network interface cards;
• EUI-48, which are used as identifiers for software products; and
• EUI-64, which are typically used as Ethernet addresses in newer protocols (such
as IEEE 802.15.4) (IEEE Standards Association, n.d. Carpene & Woodward,
2012).
Carpene and Woodward (2012) demonstrates the process for creating EUI-64 IIDs
using MAC-48 addresses and standard IEEE EUI-64 addresses. The following example
conveys how a standard MAC-48 can be converted into a EUI-64 compliant SLAAC
IPv6 IID:
1. 00:aa:12:34:56:fe - Commence with a standard MAC-48 address.
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2. 02:aa:12:34:56:fe - Flip the universal/local bit of MAC-48 (7th bit of the
highest order byte).
3. 02aa:12<-->34:56fe - Split 48 bit address at 24th bit.
4. 02aa:12ff:fe34:56fe - Pad 16 bits using 1s, with the least significant bit set to
0 (0xfffe) between bits 24 and 40 (Carpene & Woodward, 2012).
An EUI-64 address can be reverse engineered to derive the originating MAC address by
flipping the universal/local bit and then removing the 0xfffe padding. This reverses
the EUI-64 process, revealing the original source MAC-48 identifier. The process for
generating a modified EUI-64 address out of a standard IEEE EUI-64 address is simpler
still:
1. 00aa:1234:56fe:aa56 - Standard EUI-64 address
2. 02aa:1234:56fe:aa56 - Flip the universal/local bit of EUI-64 (7th bit of the
highest order byte) (Carpene & Woodward, 2012)
The resulting IID from either EUI-64 conversion method can then be su xed to a
64 bit network prefix to complete a valid IPv6 address.
Potential privacy issues with the SLAAC IPv6 address generation process were ex-
pressed in Groat, Dunlop, Marchany and Tront (2010), Groat, Dunlop, Marchany and
Tront (2011) and Dunlop, Groat, Marchany and Tront (2011). Research was conducted
into the nature of IPv6 addressing strategies, and how those strategies can be used to
identify individual users on a network. Groat et al. (2010) and Groat et al. (2011) con-
cluded in their research that the use of permanent or semi-permanent addressing can
violate a user’s privacy, since an IID may remain static when crossing di↵erent network
boundaries. This means that users may be trackable as they participate in IPv6 com-
munications even though their network prefix might di↵er. Groat et al. (2011) validate
this theory by tracking a device throughout a university campus network through its
IPv6 IID.
In order to remediate the privacy issues exposed in Groat et al. (2010) and Groat
et al. (2011), a mitigation strategy was realised using an IPv6 address proxy system
23
known as moving target IPv6 defence (MT6D) in Dunlop, Groat, Urbanski, Marchany
and Tront (2011). MT6D is a system designed to dynamically allocate host addresses
to clients. These addresses are stochastically generated using a shared session key,
timestamp and a hashing algorithm (Dunlop, Groat, Urbanski et al., 2011). From an
outside perspective, the addresses generated from this method would be indiscernible
from the Cryptographically Generated Address defined in RFC-3972 (Aura, 2005) or
other stochastically generated addresses. From the perspective of this research, the
MT6D address construction mechanism is recognised insofar as they conform to ran-
domly generated address types.
RFC-7217 (Gont, 2014) also provides a method to address privacy issues with the
SLAAC generation method described in RFC-2462 (Thomson & Narten, 1998) and
RFC-4941 (Narten et al., 2007). The method described by Thomson and Narten (1998)
uses the following algorithm to derive a random (but stable) identifier (RID):
RID = F (Prefix,Net Iface,Network ID,DAD Counter, secret key) (2.1)
Where F () is some pseudorandom function, Prefix is the network prefix, Net Iface
is some identifier for the network interface for which the address is being computed,
Network ID an optional parameter that describes some network identifier (an example
is given as the service set identifier (SSID) for 802.11 networks), DAD Counter a
counter which is initialised as 0 and increments for each time the duplicate address
detection mechanism is triggered, and finally, a secret key of at least 128 bits that
must be initialised as a pseudorandom number (Gont, 2014).
Although Gont (2014) adheres to the recommendation of RFC-4291 (Hinden &
Deering, 2006) and expects that any address other than that beginning with binary
digits 000 to have a 64 bit network mask, the algorithm allows for arbitrarily sized
IID s to be generated by taking 128   n bits, where n is the network size, from the
RID to use as the IID. Bits are taken from the RID starting from the least significant
bit (Gont, 2014). This results in semi-permanent addresses, that change per network
prefix, are persistent and therefore do not expire with each network prefix. This is in
contrary to the privacy extensions defined by Narten et al. (2007) in RFC-4941 which
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are temporary addresses that are designed to be disposed of after a period interval or
conclusion of a network session. According to RFC-7217 (Gont, 2014), this address
construction method generates high entropy IIDs.
Other high entropy address construction schemes exist. Most notably are the CGAs
mentioned above, that were defined in RFC-3972 (Aura, 2005). These addresses are
constructed using the upper order bits of a device’s public key. RFC-5535 (Bagnulo,
2009) proposes a standard for Hash-Based Addresses (HBAs), which proposes that
IIDs should be constructed through cryptographic hashing. The commonality with the
cryptographically generated IIDs and those that are generated through a randomisation
function is that they all exhibit high entropy, seemingly random structures. From
an outside perspective it would seem as though this style of address would provide
resistance or protection from host enumeration strategies. However, it would depend
on the seed and algorithm used to generate the address, and with a great enough sample
size, a threat actor may be able to predict IID generation.
For the purpose of this research, any address construction types that generate high
entropy addresses are classified as stochastically generated. From the perspective of
a casual observer, there is no way to categorically determine the exact method of
construction of high entropy IIDs, since they appear to be, for all intents, random.
2.2 Host enumeration search algorithms
Host enumeration refers to the locating of networked nodes (i.e. network enabled
devices) on computer networks. Enumeration is often undertaken to determine pre-
cisely what devices are connected or communicating on a computer network. It is
important to understand the search algorithms that underpin common host enumera-
tion strategies. Although host discovery has existed for many years, with the first tools
to conduct host discovery dating back to Schemers (2012)’s fping in 1992 (currently
maintained by Schemers and Schweikert (2014)), there are few search techniques that
have been tested. The major search techniques that have historically been used for
this purpose are linear searching and randomised searching.
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2.2.1 Linear search
The linear search algorithm (otherwise known as sequential search, brute force, or
exhaustive search) is a simple and commonly used technique for searching through
arbitrary, discrete address spaces. A linear search generally commences from the first
item in an address space, and then continues to increment until either the search
condition has been met, or the address space is exhausted. A linear search has a
worst-case performance of O(n), meaning that it scales linearly depending upon the
size of n. For large address spaces, therefore, exhaustive linear scans are ine cient. In
such situations heuristics can be introduced in order to reduce the scope of the linear
search. This method is used by tools such as Hauser (2006)’s alive6 to restrict the
search scope to target addresses that have a higher probability of being assigned to
networked devices.
Linear searching is a popular choice for o↵-link host discovery, especially against
IPv4 networks. Most of the common tools used for host discovery implement some form
of linear search (the exception being masscan and ZMap). A likely explanation for this
is due to the simplicity of the algorithm. Linear search algorithms are uncomplicated to
implement into computer programs. Also, linear searching generally does not require
maintaining large state tables to determine where the algorithm has searched. This
information can be inferred by assessing the current address that is being searched. The
most notable examples of network enumeration tools that employ linear searching are
nmap, fping, ARP-scan, alive6 and chiron. These tools generally provide a means
for users to search a range, or multiple ranges of addresses which will be searched
sequentially.
Atlasis (2014) introduces an open source tool called the Chiron IPv6 suite con-
taining a program used to scan IPv6 addresses and networks. This scanning program
uses two main methods to enumerate IPv6 nodes; first, the program attempts to per-
form linear searches of user-specified address ranges; second, the program conducts
“smart” scanning by testing addresses using permutations of wordy su xes, such as
face, b00c, beef, etc. (Atlasis, 2014) in a similar fashion to Hauser (2014) (see
Section 2.2.3).
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Sequential searches can be combined within a single host enumeration attempt. In
such cases an agent may choose to target networks sequentially. Whilst only searching
specific host addresses in those networks. This strategy has been termed reverse IP-
sequential searching by Leonard and Loguinov (2010). As an example, when performed
against some IPv4 networks, an agent may choose to only target addresses one to
ten in every standard 24 bit subnetwork (so *.*.*.1-10). Such sequential search
patterns are o↵ered by tools such as nmap. A similar search in IPv6 might resemble
aaaa:1:1:0-ffff::0-ffff, which would enumerate every host address from 0 to ffff
in every network from aaaa:1:1::/64 to aaaa:1:1:ffff::/64.
Binary search (also referred to as bisectional search or logarithmic) is an algorithm
that can e ciently locate an indexed item in a sorted array of values. Binary search
has a worst case performance of O(log n) and is e cient at searching an ordered list or
array for a particular value (Knuth, 1998, pp. 409-417). A cursory consideration would
suggest that binary search would be a viable approach to performing IPv6 host enu-
meration as an alternative to sequential searching, but the nature of the problem defies
the algorithm. Binary search techniques are inappropriate for usage in host enumera-
tion problems because the targets are functionally independent. Performing a greater
than or less than comparison between functionally independent discrete addresses is
not logical. Consequently this algorithm was ruled out for testing in this research, as
it isn’t suited to the task of host enumeration.
2.2.2 Randomised search
Randomised searching became a desirable strategy once Internet-wide searching be-
came viable. With randomised searching, randomisation algorithms are employed to
shu✏e the order of the targets in the address space. Performing host enumeration in
this fashion has some real-world benefits. Primarily by distributing probes over the
entire address space, rather than sequentially probing hosts, the initiator of the host
enumeration exercise can avoid overloading target networks that operate sequential
resources with probes (Graham, 2013c; Durumeric, Wustrow & Halderman, 2013a),
preventing accidental denial of service (DoS) attacks. Likewise, it may also allow the
enumeration to remain covert, avoiding detection from intrusion detection systems.
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There are also disadvantages to employing randomisation functions to host discov-
ery. A search requiring randomisation is generally going to be more computationally
expensive than a linear search. Depending on the randomisation function used, the
computational overhead could be significant. Simple randomisation techniques such as
encoding values may not add significant overhead. However, employing cryptographic
algorithms may. Additionally, with randomisation, maintaining state is an important
consideration to prevent duplication of probes, which amount to wasted probes. Again,
this problem can be solved algorithmically using permutation-based approaches (see
Section 2.2.2.1 or Section 2.2.2.4 for examples of randomised search algorithms that
require maintaining minimal state).
Finally, randomisation functions make it di cult to target arbitrary address ranges,
or exclude addresses from search attempts. These are also mostly solved problems as
well. Excluding addresses from search e↵orts can be achieved by simply performing a
blacklist lookup prior to probing (e.g. checking that the target to be probed does not
exist in the blacklist). Targeting arbitrary ranges of addresses is more complicated and
must be specifically designed into the algorithm if it is to be achievable.
The coming sections detail the randomisation functions that have been utilised in
major host enumeration tools.
2.2.2.1 Generalised-Feistel cipher randomisation algorithm
masscan (Graham, 2013b, 2013c) is a network discovery application that is capable
of transmitting up to 25 million IPv4 packets per second (pps) on a 10 gigabits per
second (gbps) network connection Graham (2013c). Currently masscan only supports
searching the IPv4 address space, and does not support IPv6. masscan gains its per-
formance advantage by using asynchronous sending and receiving of probes, which is
to say, it will continuously send a probe (e.g. TCP SYN segments for a half-open scan)
and handle the responses (e.g. the TCP SYN/ACK segments) as they arrive. This is
contrary to how applications such as nmap operate, in that they will send a probe and
wait for a response, or the appropriate timeout period before sending the next probe.
In addition to asynchronous probing, masscan gains a performance improvement
over other utilities (such as nmap) by bypassing the underlying kernel of the operating
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system, and delivering packets directly to the network hardware. Part of the success
of masscan comes from its reimplementation of the IP and TCP protocol stacks, from
within the application, rather than relying on the OS implementation of these pro-
tocols. By operating entirely through raw sockets, the application is able to reduce
the overhead used by these protocols by processing only packets relevant to the search
exercise and ignoring other superfluous data streams. These techniques aren’t neces-
sarily relevant to the research topic, but may influence future research strategies used
for conducting host enumeration against live IPv6 networks.
Of particular interest and relevant to this thesis is masscan’s (Graham, 2013c)
randomisation function. In order to reduce the load on target networks, masscan per-
forms an exhaustive search using a randomisation function. The function masscan
uses to randomise the order of target IPv4 addresses is based upon the cryptographic
‘Generalised-Feistel Cipher’ detailed in Black and Rogaway (2002). The modified ver-
sion of the Generalised-Feistel cipher that was used in Graham (2013b) has been re-
ferred to as the “BlackRock” algorithm. The Generalised-Feistel cipher applies a form
of encryption to indices in a range of addresses, and then applies a modulus operation
to ensure that the result is within the bounds of the address space.
The Generalised-Feistel cipher is broken into two separate algorithms; the encryp-
tion (encipher) algorithm, which is depicted in Algorithm 1 and the decryption (de-
cipher) algorithm, which is displayed in Algorithm 2. In Graham (2013b), the author
chooses to use a modified data encryption standard (DES) operation as the crypto-
graphic algorithm.
The algorithm works by performing a sequential search of the address space, but
rather than probing each address, an encryption function, outlined in Black and Rogaway
(2002) (see Algorithm 1), is applied. A set of numbers (M) between 0 and k represents
the number of targets to be probed. For each target address (m) in M , the encryption
function is applied. The resulting randomised address (c) is then checked to ensure it
exists within the address space that is being searched. If it does not exist within the
appropriate address space, the iteration continues. Otherwise the resulting encrypted
address (c), is treated as the target for the search operation, and probing is conducted.
In addition, this operation provides a cost e↵ective method of resuming a search op-
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Algorithm Fe[r, a, b]K(m);
c  fe[r, a, b]K(m);
if c 2M then
return c;
else
return Fe[r, a, b]K(c);
end
Algorithm fe[r, a, b]K(m);
L  m mod a;
R  m/a;
for j  1 to r do
if (j is odd) then
tmp  (L+ Fj(R)) mod a;
else
tmp  (L+ Fj(R)) mod b;
end
end
L  R;
R  tmp;
if (r is odd) then
return aL+R;
else
return aR+ L;
end
Algorithm 1: Generalised-Feistel Cipher adapted from Black and Rogaway (2002).
For this cipher (Fe[r, a, b]), m represents a set [0, k   1], r is the number of rounds
used within the Feistel network, and a and b are positive numbers such that ab = k
(Black & Rogaway, 2002). These functions implement the encipher operation on the
data.
eration, provided that the last searched address is recorded along with the encryption
key. Resumption can be then accomplished by performing the deciphering operation
described in Black and Rogaway (2002) (see Algorithm 2). This operation will return
the index value that was used as the last target.
2.2.2.2 Linear congruential generator randomisation algorithm
A linear congruential generator (LCG) is a method that can be used to generate pseu-
dorandom numbers in pseudorandom number generators (PRNG). LCGs have the po-
tential to be full cycle algorithms, which is to say that they can generate every valid
discrete number between 0 and n, where n is the size of the generator.
nmap (G. F. Lyon, 2009) uses an LCG to create a range of target IP addresses,
in order to randomise the order of probing. This randomisation function is executed
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Algorithm Fe[r, a, b] 1K (m);
c  fe[r, a, b] 1K (m);
if c 2M then
return c;
else
return Fe[r, a, b] 1K (c);
end
Algorithm fe[r, a, b] 1K (m);
if (r is odd) then
R m mod a;
L m/a;
else
L m mod a;
R m/a;
end
for j  r to 1 do
if (j is odd) then
tmp  (L  Fj(R)) mod a;
else
tmp  (L  Fj(R)) mod b;
end
end
R  L;
L  tmp;
return aR+ L;
Algorithm 2: Generalised-Feistel Cipher adapted from Black and Rogaway (2002).
For this cipher (Fe[r, a, b]), m represents a set [0, k   1], r is the number of rounds
used within the Feistel network, and a and b are positive numbers such that ab = k
(Black & Rogaway, 2002). These functions implement the decipher operation on the
data.
when the program is invoked with the -iR switch. This LCG (which is visible in
the program’s source code in the file nbase/nbase_rnd.c (G. Lyon, 2015)) has been
adapted and is included in Algorithm 3. The magic numbers used within the source
code are explained to be constants from the Numeric Recipes book, as well as constants
from glibc and Quick C/C++ (G. Lyon, 2015). The algorithm only requires that five
variables are persistent between calls to the function in order to complete the LCG
cycle. This enables the algorithm to resume state between runtimes, provided the
State, Tweak1, Tweak2, Tweak3 variables are recorded, and the StateInit flag is set
to a boolean True value (i.e. 1).
A similar technique was used in the Witty worm’s propagation which a↵ected over
12,000 computers in 75 minutes in 2004 (Kumar, Paxson & Weaver, 2005). According
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Data: State, Tweak1, Tweak2, Tweak3
Result: A random unsigned integer 0  n < 232
StaticStateInit 0;
// If State hasn’t been initialised, initialise it to a random 32
bit integer, along with the other tweak modifiers.
if !StateInit then
State Rand(0, 232);
Tweak1 Rand(0, 232);
Tweak2 Rand(0, 232);
Tweak3 Rand(0, 232);
// Set flag to ensure this routine is not called again
StateInit 1;
end
Output State;
State (((State⇤1664525)&0xFFFFFFFF )+1013904223)&0xFFFFFFFF ;
// Round 1: rotate Output and XOR against Tweak1 modifier
Output ((Output << 7)|(Output >> (32  7)));
Output Output⌦ Tweak1;
// Round 2: rotate Output, subject it to an affine transform and
finally XOR against Tweak2 modifier
Output 
(((Output ⇤ 1103515245)&0xFFFFFFFF ) + 12345)&0xFFFFFFFF ;
Output ((Output << 15)|(Output >> (32  15)));
Output Output⌦ Tweak2;
// Round 3: rotate Output and XOR against Tweak3 modifier
Output (((Output ⇤ 214013)&0xFFFFFFFF ) + 2531011)&0xFFFFFFFF ;
Output ((Output << 5)|(Output >> (32  5)));
Output Output⌦ Tweak3;
return Output;
Algorithm 3: The linear congruent generator used in the nmap program (specifically
in the file nbase/nbase_rnd.c) (G. Lyon, 2015; G. F. Lyon, 2009). The randomisa-
tion function makes use of magic numbers to ensure that output is random, unique
and that the LCG comes full cycle.
to Kumar et al. (2005), Shannon and Moore (2004) and Graham (2012) this randomisa-
tion technique contained a fundamental flaw in the way the LCG was used. The error
was introduced when, rather than generating a random number using 32 bits, which
would be required to guarantee the LCG would permute the entire IPv4 address space,
the authors of Witty performed a concatenation operation on two 16 bit integers. The
two 16 bit integers were acquired by taking the most significant 16 bits returned from
a PRNG function. The flaw is evident in Step 3 of the derived pseudocode for the
reverse engineered program (Kumar et al., 2005), reproduced in Equation 2.2.
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3.dest ip rand()[0···15]||rand()[0···15]; (2.2)
By generating the randomised target IP address thusly, the authors inadvertently
reduced the address space to be targeted, and introduced duplication to the algorithm.
It can be seen from this example that care must be taken when designing and imple-
menting randomisation functions to ensure that the algorithm functions correctly.
2.2.2.3 RC4 cipher randomisation algorithm
nmap also utilises another randomisation function which involves an RC4 cipher when
the program is executed with the –randomize-hosts switch. The fourth Rivest cipher
(RC4), named after its creator Ronald L. Rivest (Rivest & Schuldt, 2014), is a cryp-
tographic stream cipher that is typically used to encrypt and decrypt arbitrary data
streams.
With this particular implementation, an array is shu✏ed in memory using the
cryptographic cipher, altering the positions of the elements. The algorithm achieves a
randomised distribution of the target addresses stored in the array. The execution of
this approach in nmap has limitations, since the randomised array of IP addresses is
maintained in resident memory throughout the runtime of the application. According
to Graham (2013a) the function that is used only allows the checking of 16,384 hosts
at a time. This approach has been criticised by Graham (2013a) and Graham (2013c)
as being inflexible and memory intensive. According to G. Lyon (2015) this algorithm
is also subject to the ‘Birthday Paradox’ which means it is susceptible to producing
duplicate addresses and that the probability of a duplication will increase with every
address checked.
2.2.2.4 ZMap’s randomisation algorithm
ZMap (Durumeric et al., 2013a, 2013b) is another high performance host discovery pro-
gram. Similarly to masscan, ZMap currently only supports searching the IPv4 protocol’s
address space. To gain a performance advantage ZMap uses raw sockets for probe gen-
eration and delivery. Using raw sockets is preferred in this case because it allows ZMap
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to bypass the OS kernel, and prevents unnecessary lookups and checks from being
conducted. Also similarly to masscan, ZMap relies upon a randomisation function to
determine the order of address probing. The function ZMap uses relies upon the nature
of multiplicative groups and modulus arithmetic operations to achieve an exhaustive,
deterministic, non-sequential and cyclical permutation of the target address space. In
e↵ect this means that the algorithm will generate a target address list that covers every
address in the 32 bit target address space, except address 0 (ip address 0.0.0.0), in a
pseudorandom fashion.
ZMap’s randomisation algorithm can be deconstructed into the following stages:
1. Choose a prime number, slightly larger than the address space. In the case of
Durumeric et al. (2013a) the authors pick p = 232+15 as the first prime number
above 232 (which represents the size of the IPv4 address space).
2. Calculate and select a primitive root for the prime number p using a method such
as that which is described in Weisstein (n.d.).
3. Begin with a random address in the address space. Starting from a random
point in the address space is not essential. However, when initialised with di↵er-
ent primitive roots, a randomised starting position allows for di↵erent sequence
permutations of the address space.
4. If the target address is less than the size of the address space, then probe the
target address.
5. Update the target such that Target = (Target ⇤ PrimitiveRoot) mod p.
6. If the updated target address is equal to the first address that was tested, then
the algorithm has completed a cycle and can be concluded, or the cycle can
commence again.
A modified version of the algorithm used in Durumeric et al. (2013a) is included in
Algorithm 4.
This algorithm is less computationally expensive than the Generalised Feistel al-
gorithm described in Graham (2013b), Black and Rogaway (2002). The ZMap ran-
domisation algorithm performed six times faster than the Feistel algorithm in a sample
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Data: AddressRange, PrimitiveRoot, p, FirstTarget
Result: A cyclical, deterministic, non-sequential permutation of the address
space to be searched
AddressRange (264)  1;
// AddressRange refers to the end address in the target address
space that is the subject of the search effort. E.g. if it is
intended to search between address 0 and address 264 exclusive,
the AddressRange would equal 264
p NextPrime(AddressRange);
PrimitiveRoot GetPrimitiveRoots(p);
FirstTarget Rand(1, AddressRange);
Target FirstTarget;
while True do
if Target  AddressRange then
Probe(Target);
end
Target ((Target ⇤ PrimitiveRoot) mod p);
if Target == FirstTarget then
Break;
end
end
Algorithm 4: Adaptation of the algorithm used for the cyclical permutation al-
gorithm in Durumeric, Wustrow and Halderman (2013a). The algorithm provides a
means to randomly traverse a target address space without probing any addresses
more than a single time.
test conducted by the author, using Python-based implementations of each algorithm.
In these tests it was determined that 1000 address mutations were performed in 0.005
and 0.030 seconds for the ZMap algorithm and the Generalised Feistel algorithm re-
spectively. Similarly to the LCG and the Generalised Feistel algorithm, the algorithm
also provides a means to resume search operations that requires recording only the
FirstTarget, Target, p and PrimitiveRoot variables.
2.2.3 IPv6 IID pattern search techniques
The common hexadecimal string representation of IPv6 addresses introduces a vector
for potential patterns to occur in addresses. As mentioned in Section 8, the hexadecimal
characters 0-9 and a-f can be manipulated to create natural language words. For
example, the hexadecimal words 0xbeef and 0xb00c can be used to resemble the
words ‘beef’ and ‘book’ respectively. It has been noted that these patterns are actively
being used in address construction in real-world IPv6 deployments. Specifically these
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patterns were identified in Carpene and Woodward (2012), where it was shown that
organisations were using these hexadecimal word substitutions in their IPv6 addressing
scheme.
The Hacker’s Choice IPv6 toolkit (THC-IPv6) is an application suite geared towards
malicious usage of the IPv6 protocol stack. In this suite a utility called alive6 can be
used to search an IPv6 network (Hauser, 2006). alive6 uses a combination of searching
common hexadecimal word substitution patterns and low range incrementation of IIDs
to significantly reduce the target address space. Also, as previously mentioned, in
conjunction with a linear search, chiron (Atlasis, 2014) also performs a ‘smart scan’
whereby it will attempt to address devices using hexadecimal word substitutions. The
search mode will take a list of hexadecimal ‘word’ strings and perform a multi-choose to
construct addresses using them. For example, if the hexadecimal words face, b00c,
beef, cafe were included it would generate IPv6 addresses of all 256 combinations of
the hexadecimal words as partially depicted below:
• ::face:face:face:face
• ::face:face:face:b00c
• ::face:face:face:beef
• ::face:face:face:cafe
• ::face:face:b00c:face
• ::face:face:b00c:b00c
• ...
• ::cafe:cafe:cafe:beef
• ::cafe:cafe:cafe:cafe
These addresses form the target list for the search attempt, and are then exhausted
sequentially. This approach to searching has not undergone rigorous testing, but shows
promise as a heuristic search method for IPv6.
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2.3 Host enumeration methods
With an understanding of the common search strategies used within host enumeration
strategies, discussion can move to focus on the methods themselves. Host enumeration
methods can be classified into two major categories; active enumeration and passive
enumeration. Active enumeration (or direct enumeration) involves the explicit probing
of target systems, and recording responses to enumerate devices. Examples of strategies
used for direct enumeration include ping sweeps, ARP scans, Neighbour Discovery
Protocol scanning, TCP SYN scanning, etc.
Passive enumeration (or indirect enumeration) involves enumerating devices through
means that do not require the direct probing of target systems. As an example, us-
ing passive reconnaissance strategies to listen for network communications between
devices, or through querying Domain Name System (DNS) or SNMP about poten-
tial hosts. This research is primarily focused on active enumeration. However, for
completeness, passive enumeration methods are also discussed.
The two categories of enumeration, along with the components of each, and common
methods used are included in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: A dissection of the major categories of host enumeration, active and passive enumeration, including
the components and common methods used for each.
Active enumeration Passive enumeration
Description Probes target system(s) directly,
recording responses to enumerate
devices.
Harvests information from ancil-
lary sources to enumerate devices
Components • Target address space
• Probe target
• Search algorithm
• Protocol
• Payload
• Reconnaissance subject
• Reconnaissance object
• Protocol
• Payload
Major methods ARP scanning, ICMP echo prob-
ing, ICMP NIQs, TCP port scan-
ning
Passive network monitoring, Web-
site scraping, DNS enumeration,
SNMP querying, Reconnaissance
from network services
2.3.1 Active enumeration methods
A framework describing the components of active host enumeration exercises is, thus
far, absent from the literature. This thesis o↵ers a five component model for classifying
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active host enumeration methods. These five components to conducting active host
enumeration exercise are:
1. The target address space. The target address space is the range (or ranges) of
addresses that are valid targets for the host enumeration exercise. In the case
of this research, the target address space is a single 64 bit IPv6 subnetwork (i.e.
the network ::/64). In other host discovery e↵orts, such as those against IPv4
networks, the target address space may be di↵erent. Note that the target address
space determines whether the e↵ort is on-link or o↵-link.
2. Probe targets. Elements in the target address space range. Not to be confused
with the target address space, this refers to the delivery address of probes. The
distinction is made, since the target address may di↵er from the target address
space in cases that involve leveraging special addresses (such as the on-link meth-
ods discussed below).
3. The search algorithm. The search algorithm is the feature of the host enumera-
tion exercise that determines the order in which targets are probed. The search
algorithm can be deterministic in nature or stochastic. The commonly used al-
gorithms, such as linear searching and randomised searching, were discussed in
Section 2.2. Algorithms with potential for the task that have yet to be tested
will be discussed in Section 2.3.4.
4. The protocol. The protocol relates to the actual protocol used to deliver the
probe and receipt a response. Examples of protocols for probing include ICMP
Echo Requests, TCP SYN segments, ARP requests, etc.
5. The probe payload. Probe payload refers to the contents of the probe. In some
cases a generic payload may be used, in other cases specifically crafted payloads
may be used. The payload can be used to test for specific vulnerabilities in
services, or trigger specific responses from devices to ascertain whether a host
is alive. Examples of payloads include randomised data or specifically crafted
HTTP GET requests.
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2.3.1.1 Address resolution protocol scanning
As previously mentioned, on-link host enumeration refers to host discovery that is
performed on a single link layer network and broadcast domain. Consequently, on-link
strategies have access to techniques that are not available to o↵-link actors. Whilst
it is feasible for on-link actors to utilise o↵-link strategies as well, there are generally
more e cient options.
ARP is a protocol that resides at layer 1 of the TCP/IP model. It is used to map
link layer addresses to network layer addresses for communications between devices par-
ticipating in IPv4. Since link layer broadcast addresses instruct link layer networking
equipment (such as network switches) to deliver frames to all connected nodes within
a broadcast domain, this facility can be leveraged to deliver probes to all devices on a
network.
An ARP ping is an example of a technique that leverages link layer broadcasts.
Typically this method will involve a device broadcasting an ARP request query for a
target network layer address. A device who owns the requested IP address will reply to
the query with their MAC address. These replies can then be recorded to enumerate
devices. By sending consecutive ARP requests that exhaust every possible IP address
on the network, an agent can enumerate devices. The ARP ping strategy is employed
in the tool arping (Habets, 2009).
2.3.1.2 Neighbour discovery protocol scanning
NDP replaces ARP in IPv6 and provides similar facilities for determining alive nodes
on a local network, using ICMPv6 to transfer messages. Similarly to ARP, an IPv6
enabled device can solicit other devices on a network to determine who has a particular
address. In IPv6 this is accomplished through the use of ICMPv6 messages.
In particular neighbour solicitation (NS) requests can be sent by nodes to the link-
local all-nodes multicast group (ff02::1). IPv6-enabled devices will then respond
with their link-layer address. This enumeration method is one of the common methods
that the literature suggests using for on-link IPv6 host enumeration, and is utilised in
the chiron suite (Atlasis, 2014), nmap (G. F. Lyon, 2009), and THC-IPv6 suite’s alive6
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(Hauser, 2014). There are also other multicast group addresses used by NDP that are
interesting for an agent to probe, such as the all-routers address (ff02::2), or the
all-dhcp-agents address (ff02::1:2). A full taxonomy of the link-local multicast
groups reserved by IANA for IPv6 is included in IANA (2015).
2.3.1.3 ICMP echo probing
ICMP defines a standard for probing hosts using echoes. Except where relevant to
di↵erentiate, ICMP will refer to both the ICMPv6 protocol and the Internet Control
Message Protocol version 4 (ICMPv4) protocol hereafter. By employing this strategy,
a device can send another device an echo request, and wait for the corresponding echo
reply. If the response is received in a timely fashion the device is said to be active.
Applications, such as the ping and traceroute utilities, employ this strategy to assist
in diagnostic processes. It should be noted that in real-world situations ICMP echo
probing is a relatively naive method of determining a node’s status. ICMP echo prob-
ing is considered to be unreliable due to the fact that, in some cases, ICMP packets are
outright denied by network policies which result in false negatives. Network adminis-
trators may choose to filter ICMP tra c as a security through obscurity measure in
an attempt to hide devices on their network. Additionally, edge or perimeter devices,
such as routers and firewalls, might respond to ICMP echoes on behalf of devices on
their network, thus creating false positives. This technique is another example of se-
curity through obscurity. Finally ICMP might be rate-limited on any intermediary
device between the source and destination network nodes, providing erroneous latency
results, or causing erroneous timeouts.
One common host discovery technique that uses ICMP is the ping sweep. A ping
sweep involves sending ICMP Echo requests to a range of IP address on a network seg-
ment and recording the responses. The ICMP ping sweep (amongst other techniques)
is used in the network mapping utility nmap (G. F. Lyon, 2009). Another common
method for on-link discovery involves the network layer IPv4 broadcast address. In
IPv4 the last IP address in a network (where the host bits are all set to 1) is a reserved
address known as the broadcast address. The broadcast address delivers packets to all
addresses on a subnetwork. By sending a request to the broadcast address there is the
40
possibility that a number of, if not all of the devices on an IPv4 network will reply.
As previously mentioned, in IPv6, the all-nodes group includes all IPv6 enabled
nodes on a network. An agent can exploit this by sending probes to the multicast group
address, using for example ICMPv6 echo requests, to which each node should respond
with an echo reply. There are also other standard groups for link-local devices; the
all-routers, which can be probed in a similar fashion. These methods are utilised in
tools such as THC-IPv6’s alive6, and nmap to conduct on-link enumeration of IPv6
network nodes, and are the most e cient means of enumeration for on-link devices.
2.3.1.4 ICMP node information queries (NIQs)
Additionally, ICMPv6 includes IPv6 NIQs which are defined in RFC-4620 (Crawford
& Haberman, 2006)) that allow on-link IPv6 devices to discover their neighbours.
The protocol could be extended to respond to public NIQs. However, it is explicitly
stated by Crawford and Haberman (2006) that this functionality should be disabled
by default. The recommendation is made due to the security implications of exposing
a potential reconnaissance interface to public IPv6 networks. The complexity of host
enumeration e↵orts would be reduced if NIQ were permitted from public networks.
As an example, an agent could send specifically crafted queries to routing devices and
record the responses of connected devices.
2.3.1.5 TCP port probing
Another technique commonly used to determine whether or not a node is alive on a
network is through service probing. Service probing refers to the act of initiating a
TCP connection (using a SYN segment) with an IPv4/6 address and a port number
and listening for SYN/ACK segments. By querying commonly used service ports (such
as the HTTP port 80, or the HTTPS port 443), or ranges of ports on a particular host
(e.g. ports 1 to 1024), an actor can increase the likelihood of discovering a live device
(Kim & Solomon, 2010).
Completing a TCP three-way handshake is not required for an agent to determine
whether a port is open or not. As a result, the final stage of the three-way handshake
(returning an ACK segment) is generally omitted. This strategy is known as SYN
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scanning or half-open scanning (Kim & Solomon, 2010). TCP port probing o↵ers an
alternative to ICMP ping scanning when a node doesn’t respond to ping requests,
or where the intention of the enumeration attempt is to determine whether or not
devices are listening for certain services. TCP SYN probing has been successfully used
in research projects, such as those detailed in Section 2.4.2. It is commonplace for
host enumeration and VA tools to provide a facility to conduct TCP port probing.
Applications such as nmap, ZMap, masscan, and nessus allow users to perform TCP
port probing as a probing mechanism.
An agent can also perform enumeration of TCP ports on a host in an e↵ort to
determine the ports it has open or is listening on. By probing a series of ports on a
single host an agent can enumerate all of the TCP ports that are listening for connection
attempts. TCP port enumeration, whilst outside the scope of this research, is an
important component of vulnerability assessments.
2.3.2 Passive enumeration methods
Passive enumeration methods are those that do not probe the target systems them-
selves, but rather employ other means to enumerate devices. This literature review has
identified four major components to passive enumeration strategies. These components
are:
1. The reconnaissance subject. The reconnaissance subject is the systems that are
being enumerated for information. The reconnaissance subject could be a net-
work, IP address, domain name, website etc. As an example, for this research
the reconnaissance subject is the IPv6 address space ::/64.
2. The reconnaissance object. The reconnaissance object is the device or system that
is being interacted with to gain information about the reconnaissance subject.
This could be an Ethernet switch on a computer network, a DNS server, a website,
etc.
3. The protocol. The protocol relates to the actual protocol that is used or examined
to gather information about the reconnaissance subject. The protocol could be
DNS, SNMP, HTTP, or Ethernet frames or IP(v4/v6) packets.
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4. Payload. The payload is the data that is either sent or examined from communic-
ations to gather information. For example, in a DNS enumeration, the payload
may be a list of subdomains in a query. The response payload may be the answers
from the DNS server (the A or AAAA record depending on the reconnaissance
subject). In a passive network monitoring enumeration, the payload would be
the data held within packets that are interesting to the observer.
Generally, passive enumerations strategies rely on utilising third party systems. For
example, by querying DNS servers for potential subdomains, or by passively monit-
oring network transmissions. These strategies can be used to enumerate more than
just device IP addresses or available services. Zalewski (2005) postulates that passive
enumeration could be employed to enumerate subdomains, MAC addresses, website
resources, interface names/numbers etc. According to Glassman and Kang (2012),
passive enumeration that uses only publicly available information sources to enumer-
ate information about a target is referred to as open source intelligence (OSINT).
2.3.2.1 Domain name system enumeration
DNS is used to map human readable names to computer and network resources. That is
to say that a DNS server is used to convert domain names to IP(v4/v6) addresses. DNS
uses a server-client model to provide name resolution. Under the system, a client that
knows a particular domain name for an Internet resource can query a server which will
conduct a series of lookups (potentially involving referring the request to other servers)
and return the IP number associated with that name resource. The client can then use
the IP number to make a network connection as necessary.
This name resolution mechanism can be leveraged to enumerate network resources.
If an organisation’s network devices have been named and published to public DNS,
an agent can query the public DNS for potential host records and record the responses.
The DNS enumeration strategy is made less complex when administrators use predict-
able subdomain names for their network resources (e.g. www.domain.name for a website
or mail.domain.name for a mail server).
Another method of conducting DNS enumeration relies on requesting the zone file
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from a DNS server in the form of a zone transfer. DNS zones are files on a DNS server
that contain the DNS records (including A records for IPv4, AAAA records for IPv6,
TXT records, SRV records, etc.) for all known members of a domain. DNS allows
clients to request copies of DNS zones from servers, which, if successful, allows clients
to copy all of the DNS records a server contains about a domain.
2.3.2.2 SNMP
The simple network management protocol (SNMP) is a protocol that is used to monitor
and manage networking equipment in a computer network. SNMP provides an inter-
face for administrators to request information from devices and also issue commands to
devices. SNMP can be leveraged to enumerate devices by querying SNMP-enabled net-
work devices for information such as the device’s ARP table, which contains the known
IPv4 address to MAC address mappings. For IPv6, an agent could query a device for
the items contained in the Table ipv6IfTable (registered OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.55.1.5)
which contains information about a device’s IPv6 interfaces, including their addresses
(Net-SNMP, 2011). Furthermore, the items contained in Table ipv6NetToMediaTable
(registered OID 1.3.6.1.2.1.55.1.12) include information about network addresses
to link layer addresses for IPv6 (Net-SNMP, 2011).
2.3.2.3 Website enumeration
If an organisation has a website, information can be gathered from the website to de-
termine other nodes on the organisation’s network. As an example, by extracting any
universal resource locators (URLs) from a company’s website, an agent might discover
other subdomains or domains belonging to the company. Subdomain information can
then be used in a DNS enumeration to obtain the IP numbers for the resources. Like-
wise, any exposed database connections, or asset locations on a website could provide
further information for the agent conducting the enumeration.
2.3.2.4 Passive network monitoring
Monitoring network transmissions for unique host addresses is another form of passive
host enumeration. Passive network monitoring may be used by network administrators
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who are performing census style surveys on their network usage, rather than actors
who wish to determine the live nodes on their networks. Polca´k (2014) discusses the
use of passive means to gather information about unique hosts, and will be further
detailed in 2.4.3.
On-link network enumeration can be conducted by passively monitoring network
transmissions on a broadcast domain. Unique IP address details can be collected from
the payload of network transmissions (such as from ARP requests), or from the source
or destination addresses of communications. Passive monitoring is an appropriate
enumeration strategy against IPv4 networks. Broadcast packets, which are delivered
to all nodes in a broadcast domain, are utilised by IPv4. IPv6 is more complicated.
With IPv6, heavy usage is made of multicast groups, since the protocol does not allow
broadcasting. Subsequently, less tra c is generated that is intended to reach all clients.
In any case, passive network monitoring is still a viable method of passive enumeration
against IPv6 networks.
Alternatively, an agent may also be able to infer nodes on a network by passively
monitoring the network communications that ingress and egress a network segment.
These network communications will contain a source and destination address corres-
ponding to a device on the local network and potentially an o↵-link device or another
on-link device. By recording the unique addresses observed, an agent can eventually
determine the live devices on a network.
A functional network requires a variety of protocols to interoperate in order to
facilitate e cient communications. Services such as DHCP and DNS can not only
provide network resources to client devices, but also act as potential information sources
to aid in enumeration attempts. As an example, DHCP is used to provide network
resources (including network address configuration) to clients. These messages may
be listened to by an agent to discover which addresses have been allocated to clients.
Protocols such as the Cisco discovery protocol (CDP), network time protocol (NTP),
etc., may also contain information about host devices within their payload, whether
that be the addresses of servers or clients. An agent that can eavesdrop on these
messages for a period of time may be able to infer a large amount of information about
the network design and the active nodes within it.
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This enumeration strategy requires the actor to obtain a network vantage point
that positions them between the network of interest (i.e. the reconnaissance subject)
and an egress point. A vantage point could be acquired by connecting a wire tap, an
ethernet hub, or a computer, to the computer network, or it could involve hijacking
an intermediary device on the network. Specialised devices are also available that can
perform passive network monitoring for the purpose of host discovery and identification,
vulnerability monitoring and networked device profiles and usage baselines.
2.3.2.5 Open source intelligence (OSINT)
Public information repositories also exist to catalogue website addresses, vulnerable
hosts on the Internet, and even some popular IPv4/IPv6 addresses. These online
services can also be used as a means to garner information. Some examples of such
services include the passive DNS project, WHOIS, and ShodanHQ. Toolkits such as
Maltego can be used to gather open source information from a variety of sources, in
order to enumerate network devices, as well as other information about a reconnaissance
subject (such as email addresses, phone numbers, websites, other network services,
etc.).
2.3.3 Comparison between IPv4 and IPv6 o↵-link host enumeration
At present there exists a number of methods by which to enumerate hosts within an
o↵-link IPv4 network, such as those described in Graham (2013c), Durumeric et al.
(2013a), and G. F. Lyon (2009). Leonard and Loguinov (2010) also discuss many of
the common search methods used for host enumeration in IPv4 and identify the linear
search, randomised search, and the reverse ip-sequential search as methods used to
enumerate IPv4 networks.
Of the methods available to IPv4 host enumeration, the literature suggests that the
linear search has been applied to the IPv6 realm in Hauser (2006) and Atlasis (2014),
but has yet to be validated. In addition to the linear search, IPv6 tools are available
that abuse the nature of hexadecimal numbers to search possible IPv6 addresses that
may contain hexadecimal words. Little other literature exists that addresses methods
that may apply to o↵-link IPv6 host enumeration, and the literature that is available
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suggests that such e↵orts are futile.
These claims are discussed in Chown (2008) and Durumeric et al. (2013a). Chown
(2008) proposes that since the address space for IPv6 is so vast, it is infeasible to at-
tempt host enumeration. Durumeric et al. (2013a), elaborate further, and make specific
mention of the notion that IPv6 searching methodologies are not currently available
or mature enough to facilitate Internet-wide scanning against the IPv6 protocol. The
authors make the assumption that the strategies used in ZMap to enumerate the IPv4
address space would not su ce when applied to the IPv6 address space.
Leonard and Loguinov (2010) also conducted research into finding the most e cient
delivery methods for performing enumerations across the entire 32 bit address space.
With this study, the authors take into consideration known information about the
allocation of IPv4 addresses by the governing number allocation authority (IANA)
published in IANA (2014a). This allows them to eliminate areas of the address space
that are either unallocated or unused for public purposes, and create a subset of the
address space that encompasses the most appropriate target addresses. Since IPv4
does not provide the same clear distinction between the host portion of an IP address
and the network portion that IPv6 does, any host in the remaining subset is a potential
valid target. Leonard and Loguinov (2010) address two of the major problems with
host enumeration techniques; reducing the scope of the address space; and choosing
the transport medium for probes.
This study di↵erentiates significantly from the research conducted by Leonard and
Loguinov (2010) since this research is concerned with the host portion of the IPv6
address space. The IPv6 address space is not governed by the same address assignment
policies as IPv4 is. Consequently, in a single 64 bit subnet, any discrete address could
be a valid host. If the research was concerned with enumeration of IPv6 networks,
or the entire IPv6 Internet, Leonard and Loguinov (2010)’s work provides a valid
foundation for conducting the research. Secondly this research is not concerned with the
transmission mechanism for delivering probes. This research aims to provide methods
for performing host enumeration or searching large discrete spaces. The protocol or
payload used to probe or test hosts is not considered within the scope of the research.
It is apparent from the available literature on the topic that conventional approaches
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are not appropriate for IPv6 host enumeration. Exhaustive searching (of either subnet-
works or the entire address space), as is popular and commonplace with IPv4 host enu-
meration tools and strategies, is simply not possible with current computing resources.
Any strategies that have been developed to address the problem must consider this
limitation. Hauser (2014) and Atlasis (2014) accepted this limitation, and reduced the
scope of their search e↵orts through searching a subset of the address space. Translating
IPv4 host enumeration strategies provides one such means of addressing the problem.
However, perhaps a di↵erent approach and perspective is required. Machine learning
systems may provide some recourse for IPv6 host enumeration strategies. Thus far,
learning or decision making systems have not been tested in this problem domain.
2.3.4 Machine learning and host enumeration
Machine learning systems refer to systems that learn from input data, and use this
acquired knowledge to make decisions about supplementary data. Machine learning
can be achieved using either supervised or unsupervised learning methods (scikit-learn
developers, n.d.). Under supervised learning a machine learning system is provided with
a sample of pre-classified training data, which is used to train the learning system. The
system can then be used to test against unclassified data. Unsupervised learning by
contrast, attempts to discover features in an unknown dataset, and does not require
training (Hastie, Tibshirani & Friedman, 2013).
There are four main problem domains that machine learning systems seek to as-
sist with; classification, regression, clustering and dimensionality reduction (Hastie et
al., 2013). Classification problems involve attempting to classify data into categor-
ies known in advance by features. Classification problems require supervised learning
strategies, and the outputs are discrete values. Regression problems also require su-
pervised learning strategies. Regression strategies do not output a discrete value, but
rather a continuous value. Clustering problems are akin to classification problems
in that they produce discrete outputs, except that they utilise unsupervised learning
techniques, and therefore do not require labelled data as inputs. Clustering methods
attempt to group data based on common features. Dimensionality reduction is an-
other unsupervised learning strategy that seeks to reduce the features of input data
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to a smaller set of artificial features that retains most of the original data’s variance
(scikit-learn developers, n.d.). Dimensionality reduction can be used for exploratory
research into datasets, in order to determine strong or useful features as candidates for
the independent variables of other machine learning projects. Table 2.3 shows the four
main categories of machine learning system.
Table 2.3: Comparison of four main categories of machine learning, their output types, their learning process,
and their major purposes.
Machine learning
category
Output type Learning type Purpose
Classification Discrete class la-
bel(s)
Supervised Classifying data into known classes, or
group membership. Often used in sys-
tems that classify data, such as spe-
cies testing, email spam classifiers, etc.
(Hastie, Tibshirani & Friedman, 2013).
Regression Continuous value(s) Supervised Approximate a response from data or
make a prediction about data. Of-
ten used in prediction systems, such as
weather, stock prices, age testing, etc.
Clustering Discrete group(s) Unsupervised Clusters features together into cat-
egories, determining group membership
from unknown data. As an example,
clustering techniques have been used in
medical imaging systems to di↵erentiate
between tissue and blood, and in social
networking analysis to group members
and networks of friends or interactions
(Hastie, Tibshirani & Friedman, 2013).
Dimensionality re-
duction
Set of new features Unsupervised Reduces data features to most promin-
ent features, in an e↵ort to improve fur-
ther analysis. Dimensionality reduction
is often used in facial recognition and
image analysis systems (OTB Develop-
ment Team, 2014, pp. 555-559).
From these problem domains, one can identify areas where machine learning may
be appropriate to host enumeration. Classification of IPv6 addresses and in particular,
IPv6 IIDs has been successfully carried out by Carpene, Johnstone and Woodward (IN
PRESS). In this research a classification system was developed to classify IPv6 IIDs
into three discrete classes; EUI-64, Privacy extensions, or Manually generated. These
classes aligned with the IID generation schemes defined in de Velde, Popoviciu, Chown,
Bonness and Hahn (2008). The research tested trained naive Bayesian classifiers and
artificial neural network (ANN) and successfully classified over 95% of addresses. The
classification system could assist in host enumeration by determining the type of a
detected IID and influencing decision making about appropriate search techniques.
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Machine learning processes could also aid in host enumeration by performing target
address generation for search algorithms.
Common machine learning systems include the ANNs, naive Bayes classifiers (NBC),
and evolutionary algorithms (EA). These systems are discussed in the coming sections.
2.3.4.1 Artificial neural networks
ANNs create a network of nodes (neurons) that correspond to the pathways in the brain
(Brownlee, 2011). In a typical Feed-Forward ANN, a number of nodes are designated
as input nodes, where data ingresses the neural network, and a number are designated
as output nodes. The output nodes represent the sink, or egress of the data after it
has traversed the neural network. The input and output nodes are then connected by
a series of weighted nodes known as the hidden layer (Yu & Tsai, 2011). These weights
are typically calculated randomly at first, and then optimised through the process of
learning.
With supervised learning, the learning process is completed by processing a known
dataset that has been correctly classified (i.e. the expected output is included with
each input), and then comparing the output data to the classification. Based upon the
di↵erences between the actual output data and the expected output data, an error value
is calculated. If the error value is acceptable, the system is considered to be trained
and can be used to test unknown datasets. If not, then the back-propagation process is
undertaken that involves retracing the steps through the neural network, and adjusting
the weights at each intermediary node until the output better reflects the expected
output (Brownlee, 2011). The network is recalculated and the error values reassessed
until satisfactory. The process of training is important in generating a useful ANN.
However, over training can also occur, and can result in potential false negatives when
testing real world datasets. Unsupervised learning uses a similar process, although
the training process varies since the network must discern input patterns without the
assistance of pre-classified data (Brownlee, 2011).
In this research, neural networks were used in a classification system that was
described in Carpene et al. (IN PRESS). Carpene et al. (IN PRESS) determined the
e cacy of classifying IPv6 IID data into construction categories. The feed-forward net-
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work was trained using supervised training and the back-propagation algorithm. The
ANN in Carpene et al. (IN PRESS) correctly classified 96.40% of the testing dataset,
although it took 29,398.108 seconds for the supervised training process to complete.
Once trained, testing data took 0.375 seconds. The results of the testing indicates that
the system is appropriate for classifying IPv6 IID data. The neural network classifica-
tion system has subsequently been adopted and utilised for this research.
2.3.4.2 Naive Bayesian classifiers (NBC)
NBCs use probability analysis to make decisions about data. The NBC is trained using
Bayes’ theorem, but di↵ers from conventional Bayes classifiers in that all identified
features are treated independently (Rish, 2001). As an example, classification may
reveal multiple features that comprise a result. NBCs have proven to be e↵ective
for usage in classification problems such as classifying text and diagnosing medical
conditions (Rish, 2001).
Rish (2001) conducted empirical testing on NBCs to determine the reason for ef-
ficacy. Rish (2001) determines that the characteristics of the NBC allows them to
be applied with reasonable success to problems of low noise (or low entropy), and
situations where classification classes can be reduced to a binary choice. In the real
world, NBCs have proven to be e↵ective in classification problems, most notably in
determining whether emails constitute spam (Schneider, 2003).
Carpene et al. (IN PRESS) implemented a classification system, using the multi-
nomial and Bernoulli NBCs, to classify IPv6 IIDs into classes representing their con-
struction types. The results of the classification was compared with that of an ANN.
Our prior research conclude that whilst the ANN performed classification more accur-
ately, the performance of the Bernoulli NBC was better, and the accuracy reasonably
high (94.94% accurate with a training time of 0.391 seconds and testing time of 0.449).
Although the NBC performed more e cient classification, NBCs were not utilised in
this research in favour of the more accurate ANN-based classifier.
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2.3.4.3 Evolutionary algorithms (EA)
Evolutionary algorithms (EA) are learning methods that are inspired by natural or-
ganic and biological processes (Yu & Tsai, 2011). A genetic algorithm (GA) is a form
of evolutionary algorithm that attempts to emulate the natural evolution of species by
performing mating, mutation and natural selection of data. The learning system begins
by accepting an initial population of members. Each member is tested for fitness by
some defined fitness function. The most fit members are then subjected to a mating
function to produce an o↵spring. The mating function generally involves a crossover
of parental attributes to produce an o↵spring candidate. A random mutation of the
o↵spring is applied. The o↵spring forms a new generation, and the process contin-
ues until some defined conclusion is met (e.g. the number of required generations is
exceeded).
EAs are often used to solve complex mathematical problems. Specifically, EAs such
as GAs have been successfully applied to many search-and-sort based problems such
as the one-max problem, the knapsack problem and the traveling salesman problem
(Brownlee, 2011). However, EAs have not been applied to the problem of host enumer-
ation. With o↵-link IPv6 host enumeration there is the potential that EAs might be
suitable for the problem. The unpredictability of EAs indicate that they may be able
to overcome some of the problems with host enumeration in such a vast address space.
That is to say that the introduction of random mutation may allow the searched target
addresses to maintain some semblance of closeness to one-another (e.g. not deviate too
far from the parent) whilst also allowing unpredictability to be introduced.
2.4 Host enumeration applicability and purposes
Host enumeration serves to aid in vulnerability assessments (VAs) as a means to locate
resources that can be checked for vulnerabilities. Beyond VA, host enumeration can be
used to locate nodes on a network for census purposes, or as an aid in troubleshooting
problems with networked devices. Additionally, host enumeration in a public scope
provides an avenue for research to be conducted. IPv4 host enumeration has generated
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a number of significant research e↵orts and contributions to knowledge. Some of these
e↵orts are discussed in the following sections.
2.4.1 Vulnerability assessments (VAs)
VAs are exercises that agents undertake to determine the vulnerability profile of a
system. In this context, a system could be, amongst other things, an application (such
as a web-based application), a single server (a mail server, web server or database
server), or an entire network.
Braunton (2005) defines four major components to vulnerability assessments:
1. Baseline: determine and document the normal operations of the system. The
baseline must include the network baseline, including a full enumeration of net-
work devices, services, bandwidth, usage times, etc. Of the four VA components
this component is the most relevant to the research. The baseline phase defines
the host enumeration exercise that is the subject of this research;
2. Audit and assess: This phase involves performing an audit of the known assets
gathered from the baselining phase. The audit and assess phase has the assessor
detect and document discrepancies from the baseline expectations. Various tools
are available to assist with detecting, identifying and even exploiting vulnerabil-
ities in systems, some of which are included in Table 2.4;
3. Secure the environment: The secure the environment phase sees the assessor(s)
making security changes to the system in order to mitigate the detected vulner-
abilities, based upon some cost/benefit and risk analysis; and
4. Evaluate and educate: The evaluate and educate phase requires the assessor to
ensure security changes that are due to be applied are not further exposing the
system to threats. An emphasis on the education of users and administrators
is also placed. Education might include user training, lesson learned meetings,
VA debriefing or other engagement activities where stakeholders can be informed
about aspects of the VA proceedings (Braunton, 2005).
53
The first ‘baseline’ stage of the B.A.S.E (Braunton, 2005) VA methodology discusses
the use of host enumeration in an attempt to enumerate and catalogue assets. The
author places emphasis on conducting a thorough network enumeration, since rogue and
uncatalogued devices present a security threat to the owner of the network (Braunton,
2005). As can be seen from the B.A.S.E VA framework, host enumeration provides
a foundation for the entire assessment. A successful enumeration will provide the
assessment with a more complete picture of the network’s vulnerability profile.
2.4.2 Internet research
Although research surrounding IPv6 host enumeration e↵orts are not apparent in the
literature, IPv4 host enumeration has been used for a variety of research e↵orts. Spe-
cifically, recently IPv4 host enumeration has been conducted in the wake of the release
of major software vulnerabilities in common computer programs. The Heartbleed bug
that a↵ected the secure sockets layer (SSL) library OpenSSL in April, 2014, was sub-
ject to widespread scrutiny from the Internet community. Once the vulnerability was
discovered Internet-wide scans were performed to determine which hosts were vulner-
able (Durumeric et al., 2014). These findings have been published in Durumeric et al.
(2014) and reveal that approximately 55% of the Alexa top one million websites (Alexa
Internet, Inc., 2014) were vulnerable to exploitation using malformed OpenSSL heart-
beats. The author explains that the method they used to search for the Heartbleed
vulnerability was to modify the ZMap program to send the vulnerable heartbeat probe
to target devices, and then record the response (Durumeric et al., 2014). The under-
lying search technique was based upon a combination of ZMap’s randomising function
(see Section 2.2.2.4) which was used to query approximately one percent of the glob-
ally routable public IPv4 address space, as well as the Alexa top one million hosts
(Durumeric et al., 2014).
Similarly, Heninger, Durumeric, Wustrow and Halderman (2012) conducted re-
search where they performed an Internet-wide VA of weak RSA and DSA public keys.
Heninger et al. (2012) study assessed the entropy of RSA and DSA public keys, to
determine if the ostensibly random prime numbers used as seeds to the key generation
process could be factored. To conduct this research they enumerated live hosts on
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the Internet, which they extracted the public keys from. The authors used TCP SYN
probing to determine networked devices that were communicating on either port 22
(SSH) or 443 (HTTPS). Heninger et al. (2012) used a very simple nmap search to check
the hosts. The nature of the search algorithm used for the enumeration is not discussed
in the text, so it is possible either the sequential search or one of nmap’s randomisation
functions were used during the research.
Host enumeration has also been the subject of research e↵orts to conduct censuses
of, or enumerate networked devices connected to the Internet. Previously, Heidemann
et al. (2008) conducted a complete census of the available public IPv4 address space in
2008, and was able to identify approximately 103 million live hosts. The methodology
used to scan the address space involved probing all possible addresses in a pseudoran-
dom fashion using ICMP echo probes. Similar research was conducted in 2012 with
the anonymous Internet Census (‘Internet Census 2012’, 2013).
In this census the authors identified 450 million live nodes on the IPv4 Internet.
The census was conducted using nmap and its scripting engine, and illegally exploited
vulnerable nodes on the Internet in order to continue the census. The compromised
systems were configured to execute a small binary program that helped contribute to
the scanning e↵orts. Although unpublished o cially, the results and outcomes of this
research highlighted vulnerabilities in embedded devices operating on public networks.
Unfortunately, the ethical aspects and validity of the research are highly questionable,
even excusing the illegalities of the wide scale unauthorised computer use. Setting
those social, ethical and legal issues aside, the host enumeration strategy used in this
research involved using a distributed, exhaustive linear search across the entire IPv4
address space. The search was then repeated periodically to gain longitudinal data
about the target systems. The delivery method of probing used a combined approach
of correlating SYN scans on various common ports, such as 25, 80, 443, and sending
ICMP echo requests, and ICMP timestamp requests (‘Internet Census 2012’, 2013).
The distributed search strategy used in ‘Internet Census 2012’ (2013) could be
applied to widespread IPv6 host discovery. The strategy may not be practical when
enumerating a single subnetwork, since there might be a bottleneck at the ingress
point to that network. A bottleneck might get saturated under probing load from
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distributed hosts. In any case, for the purpose of this research the assumption has been
made that the receiving target in the search attempt is connected to a gigabit WAN
connection. This assumption renders distributed search techniques to be impractical,
since it is possible for a single node to send and receive at that rate. Distributed search
techniques would be important in situations where multiple networks are targets for
search e↵orts, such as when searching the wider IPv6 Internet. In such a situation, the
combined bandwidth usage of the source nodes could be distributed over the target
networks, reducing the probability of saturating target connections. This thesis aims
to provide host enumeration strategies that can enable similar research to be conducted
against IPv6 networks.
2.4.3 Network device identification
Wei-hua, Wei-hua and Jun (2003) discussed using ICMP for host enumeration in the
context of IPv4. The paper’s focus is on analysing ICMP echo replies for OS finger-
printing purposes. The research presented in Wei-hua et al. (2003) varies from the
research conducted in this study, since this study is not concerned with the probing
mechanism, nor the information that can be inferred from successful probes beyond
an indication that a node is live on a network. Interestingly, Wei-hua et al. (2003)
made a number of assertions about host operating systems and their implementation
of the ICMP protocol. In particular, the authors stated that if the TTL on a packet
is set to 255, then that indicates the packet originated from ULTRIX and OpenVMS
OSs, whilst if the TTL is set to 128, then the OSs are Windows 95, 98, 98SE, or
NT. However, the paper does not provide any indication of where these conclusions
were derived from. The ICMP protocol isn’t the only means by which to enumerate
and identify devices. With IPv6 the IIDs assigned to a host, can form permanent or
semi-permanent unique identifiers.
With the introduction of Privacy Extensions for SLAAC in RFC-4941 (Narten
et al., 2007), networked nodes are able to automatically assume new IPv6 addresses
at the commencement of a network session or after a specified time interval. These
randomly generated addresses help to preserve the privacy of the networked device,
since they’re disposable, dynamically generated using stochastic methods, and only
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temporarily active. Random address generation poses an administrative problem since
administrators may want to catalogue unique devices on their networks.
Related work by Polca´k (2014) explored the problem of trying to identify all poten-
tial IPv6 addresses on a network and correlate them to unique nodes and ultimately, the
user(s) of the devices. Since a single host device participating in IPv6 communications
can assume many unique IPv6 addresses, identifying unique hosts is a management
problem that is di cult to overcome. The author postulates that a single method is
unsuited to the task, since there are a variety of attributes that can be correlated in
order to draw a conclusion about an IPv6 address’ host identity (Polca´k, 2014). Polca´k
(2014) proposes a number of approaches to identifying nodes on a network, including:
• Link-ability of identities: devices can be identified by credentials extracted from
RADIUS associated with an IPv6 address to MAC address, DHCPv6, NAT or
SLAAC records to link a user account to an IPv6 address;
• Local monitoring: Type 1 identity management systems (IMSt1s) are recom-
mended for tracking user identities on a local network; Polca´k (2014) described
a plugin framework for IMSt1s that would enable extraction of identity inform-
ation upon request from a client. Local monitoring would also involve tracking
local network tra c, such as ICMPv6 requests, in order to correlate data more
conclusively; and
• Remote monitoring: For remote users (e.g. VPN users, remote access users, etc.)
Polca´k (2014) recommends firstly extracting the MAC address from the IPv6
address (if possible). Analysing clock skew, and HTTP headers can also help to
fingerprint devices (Polca´k, 2014).
Polca´k (2014) di↵ers from our research since the research conducted in this study
is concerned with enumerating all active hosts on a network. Unlike Polca´k (2014),
this research considers each unique IPv6 address to be a separate host. This assertion
is made due to it being impossible to state categorically, from an outside observer’s
perspective, whether an IPv6 address belongs to a single host or multiple hosts. From
a di↵erent vantage point (such as having assumed control of the underlying network
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infrastructure), this information can be gleaned by recording a mapping of MAC ad-
dress and unique IPv6 address pairs, or through the other methods described in Polca´k
(2014). However, such information is not available to o↵-link actors.
2.5 Conclusion
From the review of the available literature it has been determined that o↵-link IPv6
host enumeration has been scarcely researched. The available literature pertaining to
published host enumeration exercises relate, almost exclusively to IPv4 host enumera-
tion. The apparent consensus is that o↵-link host enumeration against IPv6 networks
cannot be performed successfully due to the large address space.
There is a wealth of prior research that focuses on developing and implementing
complete host enumeration strategies for IPv4, and to a lesser degree, IPv6. Very little
of the prior research focuses specifically on the search algorithms being employed.
There are validated approaches to enumerating devices on o↵-link IPv4 networks,
including through linear searching and randomised searching of the target address
space. These approaches have not been validated for usage against IPv6 networks.
This research aims to remedy this by testing the approaches against IPv6 networks.
Machine learning as an approach to host enumeration, either against IPv4 or IPv6
networks, has thus far not been applied. Machine learning has proven to be e↵ect-
ive in optimisation problems, such as the travelling salesman problem, classification
problems, and in situations where there are known-unknowns such as with clustering
problems. These attributes imply that the approaches could be used to assist with host
enumeration search operations.
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Chapter 3
Research Methodology and
Design
3.1 Appropriateness of the design
In order to validate the appropriateness of the research design and methodology chosen,
it is necessary to understand the world views that underpin scientific research. Creswell
(2009) identifies five main philosophical paradigms that influence the way research is
designed and conducted; positivism and post-positivism, constructivism, transformat-
ive, and pragmatism. Table 3.1 illustrates a modified taxonomy of paradigms from
Creswell (2009) that summarises the relationship between these five philosophical per-
spectives.
Associated with each of these paradigms is the ontological perspective, which ex-
plores the nature of truth, existence and reality, as well as the epistemological perspect-
ive which is concerned with how knowledge is actually created. Table 3.2 provides a
summary of the relationships between the aforementioned research paradigms, truth,
knowledge and general modes of inquiry.
Empirical research suggests that knowledge can be created from observations of
phenomena (Graziano & Raulin, 2004; Jackson, 2009). Although all empirical research
holds this foundational belief, there are subtle di↵erences between how the positiv-
ist and post-positivist research paradigms interpret this understanding. Positivists
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Table 3.1: Table of the five major world views that influence contemporary research design (Creswell, 2009,
pp. 6).
Research paradigm (world view) Major elements of world view
Positivism • Determination
• Reductionism
• Empirical observation and measurement
• Theory verification
Constructivism • Understanding
• Multiple participant meanings
• Social and historical construction
• Theory generation
Transformative • Political
• Empowerment issue orientated
• Collaborative
• Change-orientated
Pragmatism • Consequence of actions
• Problem-centered
• Pluralistic
• Real-world practice orientated
believe that it is possible to create objective knowledge through carefully controlled
experimentation. This belief is contrary to the post-positivistic perspective which ac-
knowledges that, while the aim is to gain objective knowledge, the results may not
be free from potential bias even with careful control. However, both positivist and
post-positivist paradigms hold that there is a distinct relationship between cause and
e↵ect (Creswell, 2009). As a result the modes of inquiry used in such research rely on
comparing research subjects exposed to varying conditions (Graziano & Raulin, 2004).
Typically, empirical research involves the use of experimental processes to invoke and
observe phenomena, however survey techniques can also be applied.
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Social constructivists hold the opinion that knowledge is dependent on individual
and social human experiences. The underlying epistemology of constructivism is that
knowledge is subjective, and that the relationship between the researcher and the
object of enquiry is what drives the generation of knowledge. Constructivist studies
generally involves human participants as the subjects of the research. As a consequence
of this belief framework, constructivist research is well suited to qualitative studies.
Research conducted may make usage of a number of modes of inquiry in order to address
a particular research problem. A study may employ surveys, interviews, document
review, observations, or visual data analysis as a means to address the research problem.
The transformative paradigm is a world view that has a social justice focus (Donna
M Mertens, 2010). The paradigm arose in response to deficiencies in social constructiv-
ism’s ability to address problems of a social or political nature. The paradigm provides a
framework for research undertakings that address problems of inequality and injustice
within societies (Donna M. Mertens, 2007). With the dynamic nature of research
problems that transformative research is posed with, a mixed methods approach is
appropriate.
A pragmatic world view assumes no single methodology or mode of inquiry is ap-
propriate in generating all knowledge. A pragmatic approach views research as inde-
pendent undertakings that should consider and utilise any approaches that best address
the primary research problem. Consequently, pragmatic research generally employs a
mixed-methods approach, combining the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative
methodologies wherever necessary.
This research was carried out from a post-positivist perspective for the development
of knowledge. It was assumed that knowledge can be inferred and acquired through the
process of experimentation and observation. Coming from a post-positivistic philosoph-
ical perspective, it was appropriate to view knowledge generation empirically. With
this epistemological backing, a quantitative research methodology was chosen to ad-
dress the research goals. The research questions could not be appropriately answered
using qualitative means, therefore the research was conducted using quantitative meth-
ods.
Experimental methods were chosen to address the research goals. Experimental
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research involves constructing and performing experiments that invoke the occurrence
of phenomena. Changes in variables are recorded in order to produce results. From
these results, inferences and conclusions can be drawn about the nature with which
the experimental variables interact with each other. Experimental research was chosen
for the study because it was the most suitable way to address the primary research
questions of the study. In particular, this research involved applying algorithms to
solve the problem of IPv6 address space enumeration and then testing new methods
against existing methods. This distinction of measuring numerical changes necessitates
the usage of quantitative research techniques.
This research began with the following research questions:
RQ1 Can networking devices be enumerated on 64 bit IPv6 subnetworks using host
discovery techniques?
RQ2 Are stochastic searching methods more e cient than deterministic searching meth-
ods when enumerating IPv6 hosts within a single 64 bit subnetwork?
RQ3 Do stochastic address allocation schemes within a single 64 bit subnetwork inhibit
IPv6 host enumeration strategies?
RQ4 Can machine learning search methods be used to enumerate devices on a 64 bit
IPv6 subnetwork?
RQ5 Are machine learning searching methods more e cient than non-machine learn-
ing based methods when enumerating IPv6 hosts within a single 64 bit subnet-
works?
After considering the literature surrounding the research topic, the following hypo-
theses were then formulated. These hypotheses aim to provide answers to the research
questions posed:
H1 “Search techniques are unable to enumerate networked devices on 64 bit IPv6
subnetworks.” (answers RQ1)
H2 “Methods that employ random sampling do not perform better than methods that
do not employ random sampling for IPv6 host enumeration.” (answers RQ2)
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H3 “Randomly generated interface identifiers do not a↵ect the performance of IPv6
host enumeration search algorithms.” (answers RQ3)
H4 “Search methods that employ machine learning techniques cannot be used to enu-
merate devices on 64 bit IPv6 subnetworks.” (answers RQ4)
H5 “Search methods that employ machine learning do not perform better than search
methods that do not employ machine learning for IPv6 host enumeration.” (an-
swers RQ5)
In order to test the hypotheses and address the primary research questions, exper-
iments needed to be developed and conducted. During the development process, three
subcategories of experimental methods were considered: natural experiments, field
experiments, and laboratory experiments. Natural experiments require performing ex-
periments in a natural setting, unadulterated by the researcher. This form of research
inquiry was not appropriate for the study, since it would require testing against live
IPv6 networks not governed by the researcher, and where the specific configurations
are largely inferred or unknown. Field experiments are similar to natural experiments
in that they require the use of live, yet artificial, situations where not all variables
are under the control of the researcher. Field experiments were considered for this
project, and preliminary research involved using this mode of inquiry. However, it
was determined that since the experiments undertaken in this research required prob-
ing networked nodes, performing the experiments against live computer systems over a
live network would incur significant and unnecessary time penalties. Additionally, since
the independent variables were the algorithms that were being applied to the problem,
live testing would have introduced uncontrollable independent variables. This would
have impacted on the repeatability and validity of the results, without providing any
benefits to the testing of the enumeration algorithms.
Laboratory experimentation with computer simulations, therefore, was the most ap-
propriate option for experimenting. A laboratory setting allowed the author to control
more aspects of the experimentation process, which increased the internal validity of
the study (Williamson & Johanson, 2013). All experiments conducted throughout the
research were laboratory experiments, where the object of inquiry was the algorithm
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3. The developing of experiments and undertaking of pilot studies, which was con-
cerned with realising the designed algorithms into testable experiments and sub-
sequently trialling them.
4. The experimentation phase, where the experiments were conducted and the res-
ults recorded.
5. The analysis of results phase, where the data gathered in the experiments were
transformed and inspected until information was gathered.
3.2.1 Research variables
With the goal of assessing the e cacy of various IPv6 host enumeration search strategies
in mind, the variables for the experiments were set. The common variables that un-
derlined all of the experiments performed in this study are described in this section.
3.2.1.1 Dependent variables
In an e↵ort to test the research hypotheses and answer the research questions, relevant
data were gathered from the experimentation. To this end, the following variables were
measured in each experiment during the study:
• The time, in seconds, that each search exercise took to complete.
• The number of successful probes that each simulation yielded.
In addition to the primary dependent variables above, the following variables were
measured and recorded during the experiments:
• Each valid target IPv6 address that was probed.
• The total number of probes transmitted in each simulation.
3.2.1.2 Independent variables
The independent variables for the overarching research project were the algorithms that
were applied to the problem. These algorithms were designed to test the hypotheses
of the study in order to answer the research questions:
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• Linear search algorithm.
• Stripe search algorithm.
• Monte Carlo search algorithm.
• Pattern-based search algorithm.
• Genetic algorithm.
• Adaptive search algorithm.
3.2.1.3 Controlled variables
In order to maintain repeatability and isolate the changes in dependent variables, a
number of experimental variables were controlled. These controlled variables are as
followed:
• The surveyed list of valid IPv6 addresses that algorithms were tested against.
• The pseudo-randomly generated list of valid IPv6 addresses that the algorithms
were tested against.
• The computing equipment that were used to conduct the experiments.
• The software packages and software libraries that aided in developing instrument-
ation and performing the experiments (see Section 3.2.4.3).
• The search size for all algorithms (address 0 to address 264 exclusive).
• The maximum number of probes each search exercise could transmit. For the
purpose of this research, a ceiling on the maximum number of probes was set at
232 so as to conduct the search in an acceptable time frame. This reduced the
search space for each algorithm from 264 nodes down to 232 nodes. To put this in
perspective, at a conservative rate of 1,000,000 probes per second, searching a 232
address space would take approximately 71.6 minutes to complete. Performing
the same exhaustive search across a 264 bit address space would take 584,942.42
years. Note: for pilot studies the maximum number of probes each simulation
could transmit was limited to 10,000 probes.
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• The delivery of probes. In real-world scenarios a number of methods may be used
to probe a host and determine if it is alive. Techniques such as TCP connect scans,
TCP SYN scans (half-open scanning) or ICMP Echo probing, amongst others
may be applied to such situations. This study chose to use a local emulation of
probing a host. The probing was conducted by performing a membership test
to see if the target host address is contained within a list of known valid host
addresses. If the host was valid (i.e. it was a member of the set of valid hosts) it
would be added to an array of detected nodes.
• The number of simulations performed for each experiment.
3.2.1.4 Compound variables
Many of the experiments conducted made use of pseudo-random number generators
(PRNGs) to provide random influences where required. There are many variables that
can influence the results when experimenting using stochastic methods. In this study
the primary compound variables pertain to the stochastic and random elements of
each algorithm. To preserve repeatability and reproducibility, important aspects of
the PRNG were influenced and recorded at the commencement and conclusion of each
experiment. Each Python program’s PRNG was seeded with a randomly selected value
obtained via the operating system’s random number source (i.e. the /dev/urandom
device on Linux and Unix systems). In the case of programs written using C the
PRNG was seeded using four bytes from the arc4random function. The starting states
of the PRNGs were recorded immediately after seeding. Additionally, the final states
of all PRNGs were recorded at the conclusion of the experiment. With this information
it was possible to accurately recreate the experiments and validate the results.
3.2.2 Phase 1: Perform survey of IPv6 usage
In the first phase of the research a survey was conducted of IPv6 usage data in real
world situations. The intention of the survey was to assess real world usage habits of
the protocol, as well as to provide valid samples to be used as the experimentation
data.
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Figure 3-2: A breakdown of Phase 1: the survey phase of the research highlighting the subprocesses involved.
Phase 1 consisted of three major subprocesses; the gathering of IPv6 subdomains; querying the subdomains for
IPv6 AAAA host records in public DNS ; and recording the results from the DNS enumeration.
The survey was conducted over a period of 454 days. Data were collected through
the use of a passive enumeration of DNS. The DNS enumeration involved querying
public DNS servers for IPv6 AAAA host records. The requirements for the survey was
that a large number of potential subdomains were queried for AAAA records. These
subdomains were obtained from a number of sources (see Table 4.1 on page 111) over
a total of 969 intervals. The procedure used when conducting the survey is detailed
below.
1. Gather list of potential subdomains: the list of subdomains used for the DNS
enumeration attempt were first gathered from the lists of subdomains listed in
Table 4.1. Additionally, for each unique root domain name gathered, the fol-
lowing potential subdomains were also compiled into the list: ipv6.<domain>,
www.<domain>, mail.<domain>, intranet.<domain> and vpn.<domain>. These
prefixes were chosen since they are commonly used for public Internet services.
2. Each subdomain from the list was then queried for an AAAA IPv6 host record
using public DNS servers.
3. The results were gathered into a database of IPv6 addresses, along with the sub-
domain the address corresponded to, a timestamp and the source list of domains
the result originated from.
In addition to the surveyed IPv6 dataset, a randomly generated dataset was created
to test the e cacy of the algorithms against unpredictable data. The random dataset
was constructed by using a PRNG to produce random, non-unique, integer values,
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between 0 and 264, 50,000 times. From there a random number of IP addresses were
chosen for duplication. Duplication was performed to ensure that a subset of addresses
were not unique so weighted choices could be influenced by frequency of occurrence. A
random number of addresses between 0 and 1,000 were chosen for duplication. Each
selected address was then duplicated a random number of times between 0 and 1,000.
These datasets were used as the candidate target IPv6 networks for experimenta-
tion. The surveyed dataset represented a network with node addresses allocated in ways
representative of real world networks. The randomised dataset represented a network
where IPv6 addresses were assigned by taking advantage of high entropy allocation
schemes, such as SLAAC with privacy extensions, or CGAs.
3.2.3 Phase 2: Generate search algorithms
Figure 3-3: A breakdown of the the Phase 2: Generate search algorithms phase of research phase including
major processes involved. Phase 2 of the research involved designing and determining algorithms that would be
suitable for searching IPv6 networks. These algorithms were subsequently used within the research.
Based upon the results of the survey data, appropriate algorithms were designed
that formed the independent variables that would be tested. Each algorithm was the
subject of one or more experiments. Each experiment involved testing an algorithm
against target datasets of valid IPv6 addresses and recording the results. The al-
gorithms that were chosen to be tested during the study are now described.
3.2.3.1 Linear search algorithm
The linear search algorithm designed for the study was based upon a standard sequen-
tial search, although unlike an exhaustive search, the algorithm used in this study only
searches a limited address space. A diagrammatic representation of an example linear
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search across a hypothetical address space is presented in Figure 3-10(a).
Since the algorithm searches a reduced scope of addresses, the algorithm, which is
depicted in Figure 3-4, requires a starting point to begin the search. The process of
the linear search algorithm designed for this research is as follows:
1. Select a start and end point such that 0 <= start point <= (264  max probes)
where max probes is an integer representing the maximum number of probes to
deliver (in this case 232). The end point was realised such that end point =
start point+max probes
2. Probe each discrete address from start point to end point
3. Return results
The linear search algorithm can be initialised in three distinct ways; by starting
from address 0 in the address space; starting from a randomly chosen address in the
address space; or by starting from a point in the address space selected using a weighted
random choice, based upon existing weights for the entire address space (determined
in Section 3.2.5).
3.2.3.2 Stripe search algorithm
The stripe search algorithm is a modified linear search that chunks the search space
into evenly distributed searchable and unsearchable regions, an example of which is
portrayed in Figure 3-10(b). From there, a simple linear search is performed on each
chunk. The algorithm that was designed for the research is reflected in Figure 3-5.
This algorithm is loosely based upon the comb sort algorithm, which is in itself a slight
variation of the bubblesort algorithm (Lacey & Box, n.d.). Although a typical comb
sort operation would involve multiple passes over a single dataset (combing di↵erent
chunks over each pass), when translated to a search operation over the IPv6 address
space it was e cient and prudent to perform the comb a single time.
The algorithm also derives influence from the reverse IP-sequential approach de-
scribed in Leonard and Loguinov (2010) and discussed in Section 2.2.
The process of the stripe search algorithm is as follows:
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Figure 3-4: Flow chart depicting the major processes involved within the linear search algorithm that was
designed for this research.
74
1. Select a start and end point such that 0 <= start point <= (2bin size n probes)
where bin size is an integer 0 <= i <= 64 and n probes is an integer representing
the number of probes to send per interval (bin) such that 0 < i <= bin size. The
end point was realised such that end point = start point+ n probes
2. Probe each discrete address from start point to end point
3. Update start and end points such that start point = start point + 2bin size and
end point = end point+ 2bin size.
4. Repeat from step 2 until all bins have been combed.
5. Return results
3.2.3.3 Monte Carlo search algorithm
The Monte Carlo search algorithm (featured in Figure 3-6) was designed to perform
an e↵ectively random search of the entire 64 bit address space. The Monte Carlo
algorithm was designed in an attempt to test Hypothesis H2 by randomly sampling
addresses from the address space. The random sampling technique is similar to that
which has been applied to IPv4 host enumeration by applications such as masscan or
zmap described in Section 2.2.2. A diagrammatic representation of a potential spread
of probes is presented in Figure 3-10(c).
The algorithm designed for this research did not permute the sequential address
space (as is the case with the Generalised Feistel algorithm posed in Graham (2013c))
instead the targets were chosen by pseudorandom choice to reduce computational over-
heads. As a result it was required that the algorithm maintain a minimal state table
of valid addresses that had been checked.
The algorithm can be broken into four major steps.
1. Pick a pseudorandom integer between 0 and 264.
2. Probe address
3. Repeat from step 1 until maximum probes have been sent.
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Figure 3-5: Flow chart depicting the major processes involved within the stripe search algorithm that was
designed for this research.
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4. Return the results
In experiment 1, random sampling was carried out as per the progression of the
PRNG, without influence. In experiment 2 the random sampling was influenced by
weightings that were applied to the address space. Based upon the provided weights,
the random selection would be more likely to select addresses within the heavily
weighted regions of the space. The process for determining the weights used is de-
tailed in Section 3.2.5.
3.2.3.4 Genetic algorithm
The main objective of this experiment was to determine whether applying evolutionary
algorithms, in particular genetic algorithms, to the problem of IPv6 host enumeration
was an appropriate strategy. This algorithm was posed in an attempt to test Hypo-
thesis H4 and Hypothesis H5 . Machine learning algorithms have not yet been applied
to the problem of IPv6 o↵-link host enumeration. In doing so a genetic algorithm was
generated, along with associated fitness tests, which were then applied to the dataset.
The genetic algorithm (GA) had eight main operations.
1. Generate an initial population. The method of generating the initial population
varied depending on the experiment conditions. These methods were:
E1: For Experiment 1, the organisms in the initial population were initialised to
be zeroes, meaning every organism in the starting population was 0.
E2: For Experiment 2, the initial population were randomly chosen to be an
integer such that 0 <= i < 264).
E3: For Experiment 3, the starting population was constructed by taking in-
tegers in the search space and creating parent pairs from them. The method
used to obtain parent1 (p1) and parent2 (p2) involved p = random(0 <= i <
bin size), so that parent1 = p⇤2bin size and parent2 = ((p+1)⇤2bin size) 1
where bin size was an integer 0 <= i < 64. This ensured that the parents
were the start address and end address of a particular bin in the search
space.
77
Figure 3-6: Flow chart depicting the major processes involved within the Monte Carlo search algorithm that
was designed for this research.
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2. Generate a model organism. The model organism represents a set of alleles that
the algorithm considers perfect, and influenced how the fitness function scored an
organism. The model organism was generated pseudorandomly during the initial
population generation phase.
3. Probe each address in the population
4. Evaluate the address using a fitness function. A fitness function, described in
Algorithm 5, was used to determine the fitness score of each organism. This
fitness score influenced the likelihood that an organism would be chosen as a
candidate for breeding. The fitness function first considered the outcome of the
probing attempt.
• If the probe was successful, and the organism had not been probed before, a
fitness score of 64 was applied to the organism. This fitness score indicated
that each allele (bit) of the organism was ideal. If the organism had been
previously probed, a score of 64 ⇤ 0.9 was applied to the organism, which
indicated that most of the alleles were ideal but provoked further mutation.
This helped to discourage the algorithm from falling into a local maximum
in an e↵ort to prevent the same organism from being repeatedly created.
• If the probe failed, then each allele of the organism was compared to the cor-
responding allele of the simulation’s model organism. Where the organism’s
allele matched the model organism’s allele, the fitness score incremented by
1.
The fitness function described in Algorithm 5 accepted the following four variables
as input:
• BinaryIndividual: An array of 64 binary integer values representing the
binary digits of the IID;
• ModelOrganism: An array of 64 binary integer values representing the bin-
ary digits of the model IID;
• RealHosts: An array of unsigned 64 bit integer values representing the alive
nodes on the target network; and
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• ValidHits: An array of unsigned 64 bit integer values representing the net-
worked nodes that have been successfully probed.
5. Once evaluated, candidate parents were chosen to mate. Selecting of candidate
parents was conducted using a tournament-style selection process that was influ-
enced by the fitness value of each parent. The most fit parents were chosen for
breeding.
6. Next the candidate parents were mated. Mating consisted of taking two candidate
parents and performing a crossover of the binary representation of the parents at
a single pseudorandomly chosen interval between bit 0 and bit 63. The output
of this function represented new o↵spring. If 0 <= mutation <= random <= 1
a mutation function was performed against the o↵spring that would flip each bit
from bit0 to bit63 with a 2% probability per bit. This process was repeated until
the required number of o↵spring per generation was achieved.
7. Repeat from step 3. with the new o↵spring population until the desired number
of generations or total probes delivered has been reached.
8. Return the results.
3.2.3.5 Pattern-based algorithm
The pattern-based algorithm takes influence from Hauser (2006) and was designed
to test Hypothesis H2 . It incorporated the common methods of IID generation that
are implemented by humans that configure networking equipment. This algorithm
exploits this lack of entropy in address generation to enable host enumeration by using
heuristics to generate targets based upon a pre-existing understanding of common
IPv6 usage patterns. The following construction patterns are being targeted with the
pattern-based algorithm:
• Low range Incremental IIDs: This category includes addresses that begin at low
numbers in the address space (e.g. ::) and increment upward.
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Figure 3-7: Flow chart depicting the major processes involved within the GA search algorithm that was
designed for this research.
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Data: BinaryIndividual, ModelOrganism, RealHosts, ValidHits
Result: FitnessValue
Individual  BinaryArrayToInteger(BinaryInteger);
if Individual in RealHosts then
if Individual in ValidHosts then
// This node has been previously probed, return a lower
fitness value to discourage falling into a local maximum
FitnessValue  0.9 ⇤ 64;
else
// First time we have probed this node, and since the host is
alive, it is assigned a fitness value of 64
n  CountElemsInArray(ValidHosts);
ValidHosts[n]  Individual;
FitnessValue  64;
end
else
for i 0 to 63 do
if BinaryIndividual[i] ==ModelOrganism[i] then
FitnessValue  FitnessValue + 1;
end
end
end
return FitnessValue;
Algorithm 5: Pseudocode for the fitness function used within the genetic algorithm
to evaluate and score target host addresses. The function returns a continuous value
between 0 and 1 representing the fitness score of the address for each allele
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• IPv4-converted-IPv6 addresses: These addresses include the 232 possible ad-
dresses that can be constructed by colon-separating an IPv4 address (for ex-
ample, the 32 bit IPv4 address 192.168.1.1 could be converted into the 64 bit
IID ::192:168:1:1).
• Wordy addresses: This category includes IPv6 IIDs that have been constructed
using common hexadecimal word substitutions (e.g. ::dead:beef:cafe:face).
The pattern-based algorithm generated a target list using the methods mentioned
above, and then probed each of the addresses (as depicted in Figure 3-8). The pattern-
based algorithm designed for this research deviates from the one presented in Hauser
(2006) and the alive6 program by targeting di↵erent address construction methods
such as the IPv4-converted-IPv6 style addresses.
3.2.3.6 Adaptive heuristic search algorithm
The adaptive heuristic search algorithm represents a significant portion of the contri-
bution to knowledge made by this research. This algorithm (featured in Figure 3-9 on
page 87) was designed to test Hypothesis H4 and Hypothesis H5 . The algorithm util-
ised machine learning to influence its decision making about which addresses to target.
This approach is in contrary to existing algorithms, as it harnesses information that
is known about the valid addresses it probes (such as construction classification type).
Typically, host enumeration strategies, such as those discussed in Chapter 2, construct
a deterministic list of targets at runtime rather than adjusting the target list based
upon what address types are known-knowns. This algorithm is designed to adapt to
successful and unsuccessful probes, and alter its actions accordingly. An example of
a probing pattern of the Adaptive heuristic algorithm is included in Figure 3-10(d).
The algorithm uses both passive and active host enumeration in order to improve the
probability of successfully identifying nodes on a network.
The adaptive heuristic search algorithm’s operations can be deconstructed into five
steps.
1. First, a reconnaissance operation is conducted against the target network. This
reconnaissance operation constitutes the passive enumeration strategy, and looks
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Figure 3-8: Flow chart depicting the major processes involved within the heuristic pattern-based search
algorithm that was designed for this research.
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to public information sources to gather any additional hosts that are readily avail-
able. The motive behind the reconnaissance is twofold, firstly it lessens the initial
target address space and increases the probability of positive results. Second, the
gathering of known data is used to influence the progression of the algorithm into
more probable areas of the address space. In the study the author used a portion
of the known dataset as the ‘results’ of the reconnaissance data. This dataset was
attained by performing a random sampling of the input dataset of IPv6 addresses
at the commencement of the experiment. The reconnaissance data di↵ered per
experiment. When performed under stochastic conditions, the reconnaissance
data were acquired by random selection without weighting, whereas in the heur-
istic experiments the data were acquired through a weighted random choice. As
described in section 3.2.5, the input data were weighted based upon the occur-
rence count of each unique IID. The data gathered from the reconnaissance phase
was transferred into a list of targets.
2. Second, the IPv6 addresses in the target list are passed through a classification
system. The classification serves to distinguish the type of interface identifier the
target IPv6 address has. This was used to determine what IID construction tech-
nique was employed in an attempt to influence the proceedings of the algorithm.
The classifier used in the study was based upon an ANN classification system
modified from Carpene et al. (IN PRESS). This classifier takes the input ad-
dress in integer format and returns a classification of either EUI-64, Incremental
or Stochastic, representing the three distinct categories of address construction
relevant to the research.
3. Next, the classified addresses are sent to separate processing functions based upon
their classification. For EUI-64 address types, the MAC address is inferred from
the modified EUI-64 constructed address as per Carpene and Woodward (2012),
Groat et al. (2010), Thomson et al. (2007). A range of discrete addresses was then
constructed using integers sharing a common MAC OUI. As noted in Carpene and
Woodward (2012) fleets of workstations or servers in corporate environments or
data centres may use network interfaces derived from a common batch of devices.
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For incremental addresses, a simple range of discrete addresses about the target
was added to the list of hosts to test. Finally for stochastic addresses, firstly
a binary entropy test is conducted to determine if the classification is accurate,
and if it passes a number of randomly selected targets are added to the list of
hosts to test. If the binary entropy test failed, the address would be classified as
‘Unknown’ and would be passed to the same function that handled incremental
addresses.
4. Next a host address is taken from the list of hosts to probe, and the process of
probing is conducted.
5. Repeat from step 2 until the target host list has been exhausted or the maximum
number of probes to transmit has been reached. The results of the simulation
were then returned.
3.2.3.7 Algorithm classification
The host enumeration algorithms used in the research were designed to conduct search
e↵orts either stochastically or deterministically. With the exception of the adaptive
heuristic algorithm, any of the algorithms that involved random selection of targets
was classified as stochastic (as indicated in Table 3.3). Similarly, and again with the
exception of the adaptive heuristic algorithm, any algorithm that implemented a de-
terministic search pattern, was classified as deterministic (also shown in Table 3.3). The
adaptive heuristic algorithm was excluded from such classifications since it employed
both stochastic and deterministic search traits.
Table 3.3: Table of the algorithms designed for the study and their classification as stochastic or deterministic
in nature.
Stochastic Deterministic
MonteCarlo Linear
GA Stripe
Adaptive Pattern
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Figure 3-9: Flow chart depicting the major processes involved within the heuristic adaptive search algorithm
that was designed for this research.
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(a) Linear search algorithm. Searches the
entire search space, or part-thereof se-
quentially
(b) Stripe search algorithm. Chunks the
search space in the same fashion as a
comb, and linear searches each chunk.
(c) Monte Carlo stochastic search al-
gorithm. Randomly selects items in the
search space to test.
(d) Adaptive search algorithm. Uses
real-world IPv6 usage habits to influence
search patterns.
Figure 3-10: Diagrammatic representation of hypothetical search operations for selected algorithms tested in
the experiments. The y axes denote no delivered probe at y = 0 and a delivered probe at y = 1, the x axes
represent the address space for the search operation.
3.2.4 Phase 3: Develop instrumentation and experiments, and per-
form pilot studies
Development and pilot testing occupied the majority of the time spent during the
research process, and was revisited numerous times. The programs that were created
to run the experimentation were developed using primarily open source tools. Each
experiment consisted of a separate Python program which implemented the subject
algorithm that was being measured. The standardised data formats for the results of
the experiments were also developed in this phase. Where appropriate, validation of
experimental techniques was performed and recorded.
Standardisation of the data consisted of combining the outputted pickled pandas
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• hex_patterns.txt: This file contained newline separated, four character strings
representing possible hexadecimal values used to construct hex words in the
pattern-based heuristic algorithm.
• ip_data_random.csv: This CSV file contained a newline separated list of IPv6
addresses that were randomly generated by the author (Section 3.2.2 and Sec-
tion 4.2 explores the process undertaken to generate these random addresses).
This input file provided the initial dataset used within the randomised experi-
ments (the a sub-experiments).
• ip_data_surveyed_complete.csv: The data contained in this CSV file consisted
of the information gathered during the survey phase.
• ip_data_surveyed.csv: This CSV file contained the IPv6 addresses gathered in
the survey. These data were taken from the ip_data_surveyed_complete.csv
file by deleting the irrelevant columns (N.B. only the ip6_address column was
retained in this file). This input file provided the initial dataset used within the
surveyed experiments (the b sub-experiments).
3.2.4.2 Output data
In order to aid with the results analysis phase of the research, a standardised approach
to outputting data were chosen for all experiments. Each experiment generated a num-
ber of output files, including result files and auxiliary metadata files. The result files
served to store the results of individual simulations, and once collated, the experiment
as a whole. The metadata files were used to store information about each experiment
for documentation purposes. The output files created for each experiment included:
• A metadata file: This file was a plaintext file that included metadata surround-
ing the experiment. Metadata recorded included the input data filename used
by the program, whether the algorithm was influenced by weights or purely
stochastic, etc., all of the command line arguments used to execute the pro-
gram (i.e. sys.argv) and all of the optional parameters used to modify the
behaviour of the computer program (these were stored in a dictionary variable
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named options in each experiment program). This file was used to ensure that
important parameters of an experiment were recorded for repeatability.
• A series of pandas dataframes in pickled format: Pickling is the process of serial-
ising a python object into a file that can then be deserialised to its original form.
Every unique simulation stored a pickled dataframe on permanent storage upon
completion of the simulation. These dataframe objects stored the data gathered
from each simulation.
• A single pandas dataframe object in pickled format: Upon gathering data from
each simulation in an experiment, the dataframes were combined back into a
single entry to make analysis more convenient. This was performed during the
standardisation of data subprocess of the data analysis phase (see Figure 3-1).
During the development phase of the study the research computers were configured
to support the execution of the computer programs implementing the subject al-
gorithms. Throughout this phase, the programs used to execute experiments were
tested on the primary development computer, along with the compute cluster (out-
lined in Table 3.5). Figure 3-12 outlines the high level program design used in each
experiment. The major variations of each experiment occurred in the Perform Ex-
perimentation phase (Section 3.2.5), where the variables pertaining to each subject
algorithm are explored.
3.2.4.3 Materials and instrumentation
The Python programming language was chosen to develop the experiments, due to the
flexibility Python o↵ers for dealing with arbitrary data types, and also for the extensive
third-party libraries available. Attention was paid to the programmatic realisation of
the algorithms designed in Section 3.2.3. Third party libraries (such as numpy and
pandas) which utilise lower level compiled languages were implemented in order to
improve performance. Since Python uses hash tables for set and dictionary objects,
membership tests are performed in constant time (i.e. O(1)) regardless of the number of
elements in the table. Consequently, where possible, membership testing was performed
against either set or dictionary objects.
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Figure 3-12: Flow diagram depicting the high level procedure that each experiment adhered to.
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The computer program used to perform the search operations using the GA search
algorithm represents an exception to the above statements in that it was written using
the C programming language. This variation was required after conducting a pilot
study using an equivalent program that was written using the Python programming
language. The pilot study revealed that the Python-based GA program would not
be able to complete su cient enough generations in an appropriate timeframe for the
research. It was measured that the Python implementation operated in O(n2) time.
However, a C-based implementation maintained an average of O(n) complexity, and
was able to complete enough generations within the research timeframe to probe the
maximum number of addresses (i.e. 232 addresses).
Computer programs and third-party software libraries were used in the experiments.
Instrumentation used to measure the changes in experiments predominantly used com-
puter programs that made use of available open source software libraries. Common
equipment and instruments were used throughout the study. The common materials
and instruments used during the experiments are listed in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.5: Table of associated hardware materials used for experimentation.
Name Specifications Description
Computer • Supermicro H8QG6
• 4x AMD Opteron Processor 6274 (16
cores and 16 threads per CPU) = 64 CPU
cores total
• 16x Hyundai HMT31GR7BFR4C-H9
8Gib RAM = 128GiB RAM total
Computer used for development and test-
ing experiments.
Retina MacBook Pro • Model Name: MacBook Pro
• Model Identifier: MacBookPro11,1
• Processor Name: Intel Core i7
• Processor Speed: 2.8 GHz
• Number of Processors: 1
• Total Number of Cores: 2
• Memory: 16 GB
Primary computer used for development,
quality testing and documenting results.
Compute cluster • 534x 32 bit CPUs
• 135x Computer hosts
Primary computers used for experiments
During the perform experiments phase (phase 4) of the research, all of the Python-
based computer programs used to implement the subject algorithms were initiated in
the same way. The computer program screen was used to create a persistent terminal
session with a common name for the experiment. Then, the Python module scoop was
executed from a command line interface, to initialise the scalable computing program.
The experiment Python program and all associated arguments, were provided to scoop
as an argument, and would be launched accordingly. The screen session was then
detached to allow the process to continue execution in the background. During the
development phase, where multiprocessing capabilities were not required, the scoop
program was not always utilised. In such situations, the Python program would be
executed directly with its associated arguments. For C-based computer programs,
a similar process was observed. The computer program screen was used to create
a persistent terminal session with a common name for the experiment. A Python
program was used to execute the C program the required number of times with the
parameters for the subject experiment. This Python program managed the distribution
of processes across the available compute resources. The executed C program then ran
as a single process.
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Table 3.6: Table of instrumentation used throughout the study.
Name Version Description
pandas 0.13.1 Pandas library for Python2. Provides data storage and analysis capabilities
(McKinney, 2012).
random 2.7.6 Python2 built in random module. Provides pseudo-random number generation
capabilities.
time 2.7.6 Python2 built in time module. Provides access to system clock for timing tasks.
Used to measure the process time of experiments.
numpy.random 1.8.0 Numpy’s random module. Provides pseudo-random number generation capab-
ilities. (McKinney, 2012; Walt, Colbert & Varoquaux, 2011)
ipython notebook 2.0.0 IPython Notebook provides a persistent journal of Python activities (Pe´rez &
Granger, 2007). The notebooks were used for pilot studies, as well as validation
of experimental procedures and results.
matplotlib 1.3.1 Graphing library for Python. Used to create plots out of data and results
(Hunter, 2007).
scipy 0.13.3 Scientific programming toolkit for Python. Contains numerous packages used
for scientific computing including matplotlib, ipython, numpy and pandas
(McKinney, 2010).
Table 3.7: Table displaying the computer programs and auxiliary libraries created for the experiments and
utilised throughout the study.
Experiment Program Additional libraries used
Adaptive search algorithm heuristic.py • ann.py
• ip6mangle.py
Genetic Algorithm ga • N/A
Linear search algorithm linear.py • ip6mangle.py
Monte Carlo search algorithm monte_carlo.py • ip6mangle.py
Pattern-based search algorithm pattern.py • ip6mangle.py
Stripe search algorithm stripe.py • ip6mangle.py
3.2.4.4 Pilot studies
Throughout the development cycle, and at the completion of the development of an
experiment, pilot tests were performed. Pilot testing ensured that the algorithm and
associated computer programs functioned as expected. Additionally, the results of
the pilot test served to ensure that su cient data were being recorded and that the
experiments could be repeated.
Repeatability was ensured by running the experiment multiple times using the seed
values from the pilot test, and verifying the results were the same. This ensured that not
only could experiments be repeated, but also that if an experiment failed to conclude,
it could be resumed from a known state (reducing the overall time to completion).
Each pilot study tested the subject algorithm’s delivery of 10,000 probes in a single
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simulation, and recorded each probed address. The recorded addresses ensured the dis-
tribution of probes across the address space reflected the expectations for the algorithm
and was able to be plotted. The results of the final pilot studies for each experiment
have been included in their relevant sections in Chapter 4.
3.2.5 Phase 4: Perform experimentation
Figure 3-13: A breakdown of the the Phase 4: Perform experimentation phase of research phase including
major processes involved.
In this phase of the research the experiments were conducted and the results re-
corded. A computer simulation method was used to test and measure the subject
algorithms. Each experiment that was conducted involved applying the subject al-
gorithm against two datasets separately. The experiments were conducted using the
randomly generated IPv6 addresses as the valid target nodes once, and then again us-
ing the surveyed IPv6 addresses as the valid host nodes. In this fashion each algorithm
was tested against an unpredictable set of targets, as well as against an emulation of a
real world IPv6 network.
Although the algorithms varied, the computer programs used in the research fol-
lowed a common format, and stored information in a common fashion (see Figure 3-12).
Each program commenced by parsing command line input parameters and establishing
global variables. During the qualified experiments concurrent computing means were
utilised, in which case the broker process would distribute tasks to worker processes on
other computers (Hold-Geo↵roy, Gagnon & Parizeau, 2014). Each experiment there-
fore utilised a number of processors to complete. Simulations were queued and pushed
to available compute resources on the parallel computing cluster for execution.
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A number of variables were considered as constraints to the operations of the in-
dependent algorithms. The maximum total number of probes that it was deemed
acceptable or permissible for any algorithm to send was capped at 232. This number
was chosen since it represents the entirety of the IPv4 address space, which is viewed
as feasible to perform host discovery against (Graham, 2013c). Additionally, with the
exception of experiments applying the stripe search algorithm, the IPv6 host address
space (264 out of 2128) was partitioned into “buckets”, “bins” or “chunks” (these terms
are used interchangeably throughout this document) representing 232 buckets contain-
ing 232 unique addresses per bucket. The stripe search required the use of larger bins
(sized at 248 addresses per bucket or 216 buckets total), in order to allow for even
distribution of probes across the entire space, whilst still adhering to the 232 limit
on transmitted probes. Without adjusting the bucket size to suit, the stripe search
algorithm would only probe one address per bucket in the 64 bit address space. By
using 248 rather than 232 as the bucket size, the algorithm could probe 216 addresses
per bucket.
Using the data collected during the survey phase, weights were applied to each
bucket in the IPv6 address space based upon the number of collected IIDs that were
recorded for that bucket. The weighting calculation is expressed as w = 8n 2 k : nt ,
where w represents the weights for each bucket, n represents the number of samples in
the current bucket, k represents all of the buckets and t represents the total number of
samples. This process was also applied to the randomly generated dataset to generate
weights for that dataset.
Each experiment involved performing repeated simulations under controlled con-
ditions. This served to provide large enough samples of results for each algorithm to
account for the stochastic nature of experimental parameters. Once a simulation was
completed, the results of the simulation were recorded. This consisted of the results
being added to a pandas dataframe and then pickled and committed to a secondary
storage device (i.e. a hard disk drive) as described in Section 3.2.4.2. Once the final
simulation in the experiment was completed, a metadata file with the experimental
parameters was committed to secondary storage, and the experiment was concluded.
Each experiment also consisted of two sub-experiments (sub-experiment a and sub-
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experiment b) which modified the target dataset that the algorithm was tested against.
The sub-experiments labeled a used the randomly generated dataset of IPv6 addresses
for search operations and to generate weightings, whilst b experiments were tested
against the surveyed dataset of IPv6 addresses. All experimental conditions were con-
stant between the a and b sub-experiments other than the dataset that the subject
algorithm was tested against.
3.2.5.1 Linear search algorithm
The linear search algorithm was the subject of three independent experiments. For
each experiment, the sub-experiments a and b tested the subject algorithm against the
randomised and surveyed datasets, 100 times respectively.
1. The first experiments were conducted with the linear search algorithm starting
its search operation from the first discrete address in the target space (i.e. 0) and
then continuing to search each address until the maximum number of transmitted
probes was reached.
2. The second experiments started the search operation at a randomly chosen ad-
dress in the target address space, with the caveat that: start point+maximum probes <
264 or else start point = 264  maximum probes.
3. Finally, the third experiments used a weighted random choice to select a start
point in the address space, based upon the weighting calculation explained in
Section 3.2.5. Again this start point was required to adhere to the above con-
straint, ensuring that the start and end points lay within the bounds of the target
address space.
The experimental parameters for the linear search algorithm’s experiments are de-
tailed in Table 3.8.
3.2.5.2 Stripe search algorithm
Next, the stripe search algorithm was tested. Stripe search was the subject of two dis-
tinct experiments. For each experiment, the sub-experiments a and b tested the subject
algorithm against the randomised and surveyed datasets, respectively, 100 times.
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Table 3.8: Summary of the conditions and parameters influencing each of the linear search algorithm’s exper-
iments.
Experimental parameters Experiment number
1 2 3
Experiment codename ZeroOrigin Random WeightedRandom
Valid address datasets
tested
• 1a) Random dataset
• 1b) Surveyed dataset
• 2a) Random dataset
• 2b) Surveyed dataset
• 3a) Random dataset
• 3b) Surveyed dataset
Simulations per dataset 100 100 100
Start address selection
method
0 Randomly selected Selected using weighted
random choice
Max transmitted probes 4294967296 4294967296 4294967296
Number of bins (2n) 32 32 32
Addresses per bin (2n) 32 32 32
PRNG seed 32 bytes extracted from
/dev/urandom
32 bytes extracted from
/dev/urandom
32 bytes extracted from
/dev/urandom
A parameter was used to signify the point where the algorithm would originate and
conclude the search operation in each bin. It is important to reiterate that the size
of each bin that was chosen for the stripe search algorithm di↵ers from the standard
size used in other experiments. This decision was made in order to keep the maximum
number of transmitted probes to 232, and still probe a reasonable number of hosts per
interval. Without modifying the size of the buckets, the stripe search algorithm would
only probe one host per interval.
In the first experiment, the algorithm’s starting point was randomly generated
such that start point+ probes per interval < 2bin size or else start point = 2bin size  
probes per interval. Experiment 2 assigned a starting point of 0 to each simulation
that was conducted. The experimental parameters for the stripe search algorithm’s
experiments are detailed in Table 3.9.
3.2.5.3 Monte Carlo search algorithm
The Monte Carlo search algorithm was used in two sets of experiments. For each
experiment, the sub-experiments a and b tested the subject algorithm against the
randomised and surveyed datasets, 100 times respectively.
In the first set of experiments every target was pseudorandomly selected across the
entire space. In the second set of experiments, the address space was binned, and
a weighted choice was used to select candidate bins. Target addresses were chosen
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Table 3.9: Summary of the conditions and parameters influencing each of the stripe search algorithm’s exper-
iments.
Experimental parameters Experiment number
1 2
Experiment codename Random ZeroOrigin
Valid address datasets tested • 1a) Random dataset
• 1b) Surveyed dataset
• 2a) Random dataset
• 2b) Surveyed dataset
Simulations per dataset 100 100
Start address selection method Randomly selected 0
Max transmitted probes 4294967296 4294967296
Transmitted probes per bin 65536 65536
Number of bins (2n) 16 16
Addresses per bin (2n) 48 48
PRNG seed 32 bytes extracted from
/dev/urandom
32 bytes extracted from
/dev/urandom
pseudorandomly from the selected bin. The experimental parameters for the Monte
Carlo search algorithm’s experiments are detailed in Table 3.10.
3.2.5.4 Genetic algorithm
The GA experiments tested the genetic algorithm against the surveyed and randomised
datasets during three discrete experiments. The first experiment tested the GA against
the IPv6 address datasets using an initial population of 0’s. The second experiment
applied the GA to the IPv6 address datasets using an initial population that was
generated pseudorandomly. Finally the third experiment applied the genetic algorithm
to the IPv6 address datasets using an initial population that was generated by using a
weighted random choice based upon the frequency of buckets in the dataset.
The experimental parameters for the GA search algorithm’s experiments are de-
tailed in Table 3.11.
3.2.5.5 Pattern-based heuristic search algorithm
Next, experiments were conducted that tested the pattern-based algorithm against the
target dataset. In these experiments, each sub-experiment a and b tested the subject
algorithm against the randomised and surveyed datasets, respectively, 100 times.
The pattern-based algorithm generated the target list using a variety of approaches,
firstly searching through address :: to ::100:ffff to cover low range incremental
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Table 3.10: Summary of the conditions and parameters influencing each of the Monte Carlo search algorithm’s
experiments.
Experimental parameters Experiment number
1 2
Experiment codename Random WeightedRandom
Valid address datasets tested • 1a) Random dataset
• 1b) Surveyed dataset
• 2a) Random dataset
• 2b) Surveyed dataset
Simulations per dataset 100 100
Target address selection method Randomly selected Selected using weighted random
choice
Max transmitted probes 4294967296 4294967296
Number of bins (2n) 32 32
Addresses per bin (2n) 32 32
Number of bins to search All 1000
PRNG seed 32 bytes extracted from
/dev/urandom
32 bytes extracted from
/dev/urandom
Table 3.11: Summary of the conditions and parameters influencing each of the GA search algorithm’s experi-
ments.
Experimental parameters Experiment number
1 2 3
Experiment codename ZeroOrigin Random WeightedRandom
Valid address datasets
tested
• 1a) Random dataset
• 1b) Surveyed dataset
• 2a) Random dataset
• 2b) Surveyed dataset
• 3a) Random dataset
• 3b) Surveyed dataset
Simulations per dataset 100 100 100
Initial population selec-
tion method
Initialised to 0 Randomly selected Selected using weighted
random choice
Max transmitted probes 4294967296 4294967296 4294967296
Mutation rate 2% 2% 2%
Number of bins (2n) 32 32 32
Addresses per bin (2n) 32 32 32
Number of Generations
to breed
100000001 100000001 100000001
Number of Organisms per
Generation
100 100 100
Number of bins to search All All All
PRNG seed 4 bytes extracted from
arc4random()
4 bytes extracted from
arc4random()
4 extracted from
arc4random()
addresses.
Next, IPv4-in-IPv6 style addresses were checked. The algorithm that was used
checked every IPv4-in-IPv6 address between ::1:0:0:0 and ::255:255:255:255. The
addresses between :: and ::255:255:255 were not considered for testing through this
method for three reasons. Firstly, some of the addresses overlap with the low range
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linear search performed previously by the algorithm. Secondly, the IPv4 addresses
between 0.0.0.0 and 0.255.255.255 (0.0.0.0/8) are reserved by IANA and have
not been made available for public usage (IANA, 2014a). The act of embedding an
IPv4 address into an IPv6 address is a convenience method for administrators to aid
in transitioning to the new protocol. It is therefore unlikely that they would translate
addresses that are not allowed to be registered. Finally, and most tellingly, without
restricting the number of probes transmitted by this method, it would exceed the
maximum number of transmitted probes. Since IPv4 is a 32 bit address space, testing
the entire IPv4-in-IPv6 space would still exhaust 232 probes, which is the maximum
number of probes an experiment was allowed to deliver. It was therefore pertinent to
limit this parameter.
Next, a list of four character hexadecimal words were permuted into 16 character
words, converted from hexadecimal to integer representation, and then probed. The
starting list contained nine unique four character words, which were combined to form
17,160 unique IPv6 IIDs.
The experimental parameters for the pattern-based search algorithm’s experiments
are detailed in Table 3.10.
3.2.5.6 Adaptive heuristic search algorithm
Only a single experiment was conducted using the adaptive algorithm. The subject
algorithm was tested against the randomised (sub-experiment a) and surveyed datasets
(sub-experiment b) respectively, 100 times. The adaptive algorithm used a classification
system to determine a course of action, after the successful probing of an address.
• For addresses that were classified as ‘EUI-64’ a range of addresses were construc-
ted within the same MAC address OUI scope in such a way that
start point = n  increment range
2
(3.1)
and
end point = n+
increment range
2
(3.2)
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Table 3.12: Summary of the conditions and parameters influencing each of the pattern-based heuristic search
algorithm’s experiments.
Experimental parameters Experiment number
1
Experiment codename Pattern
Valid address datasets tested • 1a) Random dataset
• 1b) Surveyed dataset
Simulations per dataset 100
Start address selection method
Max transmitted probes 4294967296
Number of bins (2n) 32
Addresses per bin (2n) 32
Wordy address components • 0xcafe
• 0xdead
• 0xface
• 0xbeef
• 0xb00b
• 0x0000
• 0xffff
• 0x1337
• 0x0dad
Total wordy addresses constructed 17160
PRNG seed 32 bytes extracted from /dev/urandom
while
end point < max (3.3)
else
start point = 224   increment range (3.4)
and
end point = max  1 (3.5)
where n is the current target and max = 224.
• If an address was classified as ‘Incremental’ then a range calculation was used
such that
start point = n  increment range
2
(3.6)
and
end point = n+
increment range
2
(3.7)
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Table 3.13: Summary of the conditions and parameters influencing each of the Adaptive heuristic search
algorithm’s experiments.
Experimental parameters Experiment number
1
Experiment codename Adaptive
Valid address datasets tested • 1a) Random dataset
• 1b) Surveyed dataset
Simulations per dataset 100
Start address selection method
Max transmitted probes 4294967296
Number of bins (2n) 32
Addresses per bin (2n) 32
Additional range of addresses to increment 65536
Number of “public” records gathered 100
PRNG seed 32 bytes extracted from /dev/urandom
3.2.6.1 Data cleansing and validation
The data that were collected from the experimental phase of the research were cleansed
and validated prior to undertaking analysis. The raw results collected from the exper-
imentation process included a number of superfluous attributes (such as the recorded
PRNG seed and state values) these attributes were removed from the analysis dataset.
The data that were collected were validated to confirm that the data was correct
for analysis. This involved performing type checks on the data. Since the data used
large integers to represent IPv6 addresses (i.e. greater than 64 bit integers), overflow
checking was performed to ensure that the positive integers were preserved correctly
by the data storage and analysis program.
3.2.6.2 Data analysis techniques
In order to analyse the data each sub-experiment was aggregated. This meant that
the individual simulations in a sub-experiment had their results aggregated to provide
a macro summary of the sub-experiment. Analysis of the data were conducted using
the pandas Python library, and the RStudio statistical analysis program. The pandas
library provided interfaces to conduct descriptive statistics on dataframes. These in-
terfaces were used to provide descriptive statistics on each aggregated sub-experiment.
The RStudio computer program was used to analyse the dataset and conduct inferen-
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tial statistics.
The anticipated results of the experiments was primarily count data, representing
the number of successful probes delivered per simulation. Due to the nature of the
problem it was anticipated that the results would contain data that does not conform
to normal distribution, and that there would be the presence of zeroes in the data.
Because of these qualities of the expected results descriptive statistics were employed,
along with non-parametric inferential statistics. In particular the descriptive statistics
used included the mean, median, maximum and minimum values for the simulations
conducted in each sub-experiment.
For each of the primary research hypotheses inferential statistics were used. The
data were tested for normality using the Shapiro-Wilks test for normality, as is re-
commended by Montgomery (2009). Data that were discovered to be normally dis-
tributed would be tested using the one-sample and independent samples t-tests to test
the research hypotheses (Montgomery, 2009). If the data were discovered to be non-
parametric the Wilcoxon tests, including the ranked-signed test and the ranked-sum
test, were considered to be appropriate. This decision was made because the Wilcoxon
tests rely upon ranking of data, rather than a direct comparison of means (Montgomery,
2009; Corder & Foreman, 2011). All statistical testing for the study was performed at
the 95% confidence interval (i.e. ↵ = 0.05). In practice, the 95% confidence interval
means that a type I error (where the results are incorrectly classified as significant),
may be committed five times out of 100 (Sheskin, 2000).
3.3 Ethical considerations
This research did not involve any human or animal subjects, nor any private or identi-
fying data about computer systems or their users. The data gathered during the exper-
iment was fabricated by the author and gathered from real world, publicly accessible
sources.
Ethical approval for the orchestration of this research project was obtained from the
Edith Cowan University’s Ethics Approval board (valid between the 9th of January,
2012 until the 9th of January, 2015). All research undertaken in this study was done
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strictly in accordance with the ethics policy governing the approval.
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Chapter 4
Results
4.1 Surveyed dataset
The survey phase provided examples of IPv6 addresses being used in public networks
globally. These addresses served to form one of the two target networks that were
searched during the o↵-link IPv6 host enumeration experiments. The resulting dataset
of IPv6 addresses arising from the survey is referred to as the ‘surveyed dataset’. Any
figures that refer to the surveyed dataset are coloured in green. The results observed in
this phase of the research have been published in Carpene and Woodward (2014). The
survey was conducted by enumerating DNS servers for potential IPv6-enabled hosts.
Table 4.1 outlines the sources for the hostnames that were queried during the DNS
enumeration, along with the number of records each contributed to the IPv6 address
dataset. In total, 216,512 unique IPv6 addresses were gathered during the survey phase.
After the survey data was gathered some analysis was performed. During analysis
the data were transformed. First, the complete IPv6 addresses were converted into
integer values. Next the IPv6 IIDs were extracted (i.e. the 64 bit network prefix was
removed) by converting the string representation of the IPv6 address into an integer,
and then applying:
IID = IntegerIPv6Address mod 264 (4.1)
Of the 216,512 unique IPv6 addresses gathered, a total of 41,171 unique IPv6 IIDs
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were extracted. Table 4.2 shows the unique IPv6 IIDs that were gathered from each of
the survey sources. It was apparent that the majority of IIDs collected in the survey
were contained to the first 32 bits of the 64 bit address space (120,898 out of 216,512
total observed IIDs). This can be seen in Figure 4-1. There was an even distribution
of addresses over the remainder of the address space (Figure 4-1).
After classifying the surveyed data using the ANN classification system described in
Carpene et al. (IN PRESS), it was observed that approximately half of the sampled IIDs
conformed to the incremental IID construction type (displayed in Table 4.3). It was
also clear that the incremental IID category contained few unique records. Only 12.71%
of the observed Incremental/Manually assigned IIDs were unique. This indicates that
address reuse is occurring in public IPv6 networks. It was also observed that the
stochastically generated IID category exhibited almost the same amount of unique
IIDs as the Incremental IID category (18473 and 20338 respectively). These results
and further analysis have been conducted in Carpene and Woodward (2014).
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Table 4.1: Information sources used to provide domain names as the foundation of the survey. Against each
source are the total IPv6-enabled subdomains and IPv6 addresses extracted from the survey.
Source name Unique IPv6 ad-
dresses gathered
Unique IPv6 en-
abled subdomains
discovered
Description
Alexa Top one mil-
lion websites
151360 109276 The Alexa company posts a list of the
top one million websites daily. Each
subdomain in this list was queried and
the results collected (Alexa Internet,
Inc., 2014).
Unknown 61116 46063 These addresses were collected from
sources that were unrecorded at the
time the survey was conducted.
IPv6-Hosts list 4032 2176 A public information source providing
a list of commonly used internet ser-
vices and their IPv6 addresses (xslidian
& VersusClyne, 2014).
Australian Govern-
ment websites
4 4 List of Australian government subdo-
mains (Australia.gov.au, n.d.).
Total 216512 157519
Table 4.2: The results from the IPv6 survey revealing the number of unique IPv6 IIDs gathered from each
information source.
Source name IIDs Observed
Alexa Top one million websites 29231
Unknown 16560
IPv6-Hosts list 297
Australian Government websites 4
Total unique IIDs collected 41171
Total observed IIDs 216512
Table 4.3: Observed IPv6 addresses from the surveyed dataset were classified using an ANN classification
system by their construction type.
Classification type Unique IIDs Observed All observed IIDs (includ-
ing duplicates)
Incremental/Manually Assigned 20338 159939
Stochastic 18473 49967
EUI-64 2360 6606
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4.2 Randomised dataset
The randomised dataset was constructed using Python’s Mersenne Twister-based PRNG
to create 50,000 unique values between 0 and 264. These addresses served to form one of
the two target networks that were searched during the o↵-link IPv6 host enumeration
experiments. The process was as follows:
1. Generate 50,000 random address values.
2. Select a random number of addresses from the dataset (between 1 and 1000).
3. Duplicate the selected address a random number of times (between 1 and 2000).
The results for the pseudorandomly generated ‘randomised dataset’ are included
in Table 4.4. Any figures that refer to the randomised dataset are coloured in blue.
Figure 4-3 displays the distribution of the randomly generated IIDs across the top ten
observed bin numbers. The distribution of addresses over the top ten bins can be seen
to be almost even.
As with the surveyed dataset, the randomly generated dataset was classified into
three IID construction categories; Incremental/Manually assigned, EUI-64 and Stochastic
IID construction. Table 4.5 displays the results of the classification process. It has been
seen that unlike the surveyed dataset, the majority of the addresses constructed were
classified as stochastically generated. The least observed address category for the ran-
domised dataset was the incrementally or manually assigned addresses.
Table 4.4: The results from the randomly generated IPv6 dataset. The number of unique IIDs that were
generated, as well as the total number (including duplicates) are included.
Source name IIDs generated
Unique IIDs generated 50000
Total observed IIDs 482812
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4.3 Linear search
The linear search algorithm was designed to reflect the sequential search technique
that is commonly employed against IPv4 networks and resources. The experiment was
designed to test the e cacy of the algorithm within the IPv6 protocol’s address space.
The algorithm was the subject of three main experiments; the Linear-1 experiment,
which tested the algorithm with the starting point of the sequential search at the first
address in the address space (i.e. address ::); the Linear-2, which saw the algorithm
commence search operations at randomly generated starting points within the address
space; and finally the Linear-3 experiments, which saw the algorithm commence search
operations at starting points in the address space that were chosen using a weighted
random choice operation.
The Python program linear.py was used to implement the linear search algorithm.
The program was configured to deliver a maximum of 232 probes, per simulation, to
IPv6 addresses sequentially from a designated starting address. The starting addresses
varied per experiment to align with the specifications detailed above. The program was
also configured to perform 100 simulations for each sub-experiment. The outcomes of
these experiments are detailed below.
4.3.1 Experiment Linear-1: Zero-origin linear search
The zero-origin Linear-1 experiments tested the linear search algorithm against the
randomised and surveyed datasets respectively. This experiment di↵erentiated from
the other experiments involving the linear search algorithm by specifying a starting
point of address 0 (::) and searching sequentially until the conclusion point of address
4294967295 (::ffff:ffff) for each simulation conducted. As a result, for the sub-
experiments Linear-1a and Linear-1b the linear.py program was configured to run
100 simulations each applying the linear search algorithm to the subject dataset with
the starting address for each simulation’s search operation set to 0. Consequently, the
Linear-1 experiment was deterministic and completely controlled.
A pilot study was performed prior to commencing data collection for the Linear-1
experiment to test the linear search algorithm under experimental conditions. The pi-
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lot study tested the linear.py program and recorded the probing of 10,000 addresses
under the Linear-1 experimental conditions (defined in Chapter 3). A graph display-
ing the distribution of the recorded probes from the Linear-1 pilot study across the
address space is included in Figure 4-5. This graph provides an approximation for
how each simulation for the linear search algorithm probed target addresses during the
Linear-1 sub-experiments. From this figure it is evident that the algorithm probed
the addresses 0 (::) to 10000 (::2710) sequentially in linear time as expected. The
pilot study’s probe distribution aligned with the projected distribution for the linear
search algorithm.
The results for the zero-origin Linear-1a and Linear-1b sub-experiments are in-
cluded in Table 4.6. The Linear-1 experiment recorded the maximum, and minimum
mean number of successful probes for its sub-experiments across all of the experiments
conducted, at 16,284 and 0 successful probes for Linear-1b (see Figure 4-7(a)) and
Linear-1a (see Figure 4-6(a)) respectively.
Table 4.6: The descriptive statistics of the results for the Zero Origin Linear-1 experiment (sub-experiments
Linear-1a and Linear-1b).
Experimental parameters Experiment number
Linear-1a Linear-1b
Valid probes (/50000) (/41171)
Maximum 0 (0.0000%) 16284 (39.5521%)
Mean 0.00 (0.0000%) 16284.00 (39.5521%)
Minimum 0 (0.0000%) 16284 (39.5521%)
Median 0.0 16284.0
Total unique hosts dis-
covered
0 16284
Total transmitted probes
Maximum 4294967296 4294967296
Mean 4294967296.00 4294967296.00
Minimum 4294967296 4294967296
Median 4294967296.0 4294967296.0
Process time (Seconds)
Maximum 28049.57 53731.63
Mean 23758.54 50441.50
Minimum 6132.67 11165.95
As mentioned above, the Linear-1b sub-experiment successfully probed an average
of 16,284 valid hosts during the search operations. These results represent successful
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probes to 39.55% of the total valid addresses for the surveyed dataset. Since the
zero-origin search performed an exhaustive search of the first 32 bits of the address
space, all of the nodes that were discovered in the Linear-1b sub-experiment were
contained in a single bucket (bucket 0), representing the first 232 addresses in the
address space. Overall this experiment saw a total of 16,284 unique IPv6 addresses
successfully probed. These addresses were the same probed across each simulation in
the sub-experiment, meaning that those 16,284 addresses were successfully probed in
each of the simulations. Unfortunately the Linear-1a sub-experiment failed to probe
a single valid host during all 100 simulations.
To confirm that the di↵erence between the counts of the two sets were significant,
the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test was performed. The test statistic (W ) from the Wilcoxon
Rank-Sum test, comparing the Linear-1a and the sub-experiment Linear-1b was
W = 0.0. The p-value for the test was p =< 0.001 while the target ↵ value was
↵ = 0.05. The results report a significant di↵erence between the ranked means of
sub-experiment Linear-1a and sub-experiment Linear-1b. This means that for this
experiment the alternative hypothesis an be accepted (i.e. that µ > µ0). It can be
concluded that there is a statistically significant di↵erence.
The average process completion time for the Linear-1a sub-experiment was 23,758
seconds, or approximately 6.5 hours (see Figure 4-6(b)). The Linear-1b sub-experiment
saw a mean process completion time of 50,441 seconds, or approximately 14 hours (see
Figure 4-7(b)).
4.3.2 Experiment Linear-2: Stochastic linear search
The stochastic Linear-2 experiment tested the linear search algorithm against the ran-
domised and surveyed datasets in sub-experiments Linear-2a and Linear-2b respect-
ively. The addresses that served as the starting points for each simulation were ran-
domly chosen during the Linear-2 experiments. As a result, for the sub-experiments
Linear-2a and Linear-2b the linear.py program was configured to run 100 simula-
tions each applying the linear search algorithm to the subject dataset with the starting
address for each simulation’s search operation set to a randomly chosen integer between
0 and 264   1.
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A pilot study was performed prior to commencing data collection for the Linear-2
experiment to test the linear search algorithm under experimental conditions. The pilot
study for the Linear-2 experiment tested a sample of 10,000 sequential probes across
the target address space, commencing with the randomly chosen starting address of
8878645325884030976 (::7b37:48e2:0:0) and concluding at the address 8878645325884040975
(::7b37:48e2:0:270f). Figure 4-10 demonstrates the distribution of probes across the ad-
dress space over the duration of the pilot study. This graph provides an approximation
for how each simulation for the linear search algorithm probed target addresses during
the Linear-2 sub-experiments. It is evident from this graph that probing occurred in
linear time as expected.
The results for the zero-origin Linear-2a and Linear-2b sub-experiments are in-
cluded in Table 4.7. The Linear-2 experiments recorded the lowest mean number of
successful probes for its sub-experiments. Across all of the experiments conducted, 0
successful probes for Linear-2a and Linear2b were recorded. Since both of the sub-
experiments produced counts of zero, the samples of those populations were identical,
and therefore no significant di↵erence existed between the sets (i.e. µ = µ0).
Table 4.7: The descriptive statistics of the results for the Stochastic Linear-2 experiment simulations (exper-
iments Linear-2a and Linear-2b).
Experimental parameters Experiment number
Linear-2a Linear-2b
Valid probes (/50000) (/41171)
Maximum 0 (0.0000%) 0 (0.0000%)
Mean 0.00 (0.0000%) 0.00 (0.0000%)
Minimum 0 (0.0000%) 0 (0.0000%)
Median 0.0 0.0
Total unique hosts dis-
covered
0 0
Total transmitted probes
Maximum 4294967296 4294967296
Mean 4294967296.00 4294967296.00
Minimum 4294967296 4294967296
Median 4294967296.0 4294967296.0
Process time (Seconds)
Maximum 29048.67 57160.77
Mean 21119.28 54265.80
Minimum 6440.08 11347.68
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The average process completion time for the Linear-2 experiment was respectable
and similar to that of Linear-1. Linear-2a recorded a mean process completion time
of 21,119 seconds, or approximately 6 hours (see Figure 4-8(a)). The Linear-2b sub-
experiment saw a mean process completion time of 54,266 seconds, or approximately
15 hours (see Figure 4-9(a)).
4.3.3 Experiment Linear-3: Weighted linear search
The weighted Linear-3 experiment tested the linear search algorithm against the ran-
domised and surveyed datasets in sub-experiments Linear-3a and Linear-3b respect-
ively. The addresses that served as the starting points for each simulation were ran-
domly chosen during the Linear-3 experiments, using a weighted random choice. The
resulting start address was the first address of a randomly chosen bin number. This
ensured that the starting and ending addresses were on a 32 bit boundary. As a result,
for the sub-experiments Linear-3a and Linear-3b the linear.py program was con-
figured to run 100 simulations each applying the linear search algorithm to the subject
dataset with the starting address for each simulation’s search operation set to a ran-
domly chosen bin number (b) between 0 and 232 1, such that the start address (start)
was calculated to be:
start = b ⇤ 232 (4.2)
A pilot study was performed prior to commencing data collection for the Linear-3
experiment to test the linear search algorithm under experimental conditions. The
pilot study for the Linear-3 experiment tested a sample of 10,000 sequential probes
across the target address space, commencing with the randomly chosen starting ad-
dress of 281560876056576 (::1:14:0:0) and concluding at the address 281560876066575
(::1:14:0:270f). Figure 4-11 demonstrates the distribution of probes across the address
space over the duration of the pilot study. This graph provides an approximation for
how each simulation for the linear search algorithm probed target addresses during the
Linear-3 sub-experiments. Similarly to the Linear-1 and Linear-2 experiments, it
is evident from this graph that probing occurred in linear time as expected.
Each simulation probed 232 sequential addresses from a starting point selected
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through the means described above. The results for the zero-origin Linear-3a and
Linear-3b sub-experiments are included in Table 4.8. The Linear-3 experiments re-
corded the lowest mean number of successful probes for its sub-experiments. Across
all of the experiments conducted a mean of 0.49 and 8642.1 successful probes for
Linear-3a (see Figure 4-12(a)) and Linear-3b (see Figure 4-13(a)) were observed
respectively.
The results indicate that across the 100 simulations conducted for the Linear-3a
sub-experiment, a maximum of one single successful probe was recorded. The minimum
number of successful probes recorded was 0, revealing an average of 0.49 successful
probes per simulation. It was also observed that 49 unique nodes were successfully
probed across all 100 simulations. There were no common nodes probed throughout
every simulation.
Figure 4-14 lists the unique IPv6 addresses that were successfully probed through-
out the 100 simulations, chunked into 232 buckets with the top 25 observed buckets
displayed of 232 addresses. Only the top 25 buckets are included in Figure 4-14. The
frequency distribution displays an even distribution of valid probes across the address
space, indicating that at most, only a single address was detected in a bucket during
the Linear-3a sub-experiment.
By contrast, the results for the Linear-3b sub-experiment indicate that across the
100 simulations conducted, a maximum number of 16,284 successful probes observed in
a single simulation was observed. The minimum number of successful probes observed
across the simulations was 0. These results represent the third highest average number
of successful probes recorded for a sub-experiment in this research. It was observed
that 26,796 unique nodes were successfully probed across all 100 simulations. Figure 4-
15 displays the unique IPv6 addresses that were successfully probed throughout the
100 simulations, chunked into 232 buckets with the top 25 observed buckets displayed
of 232 addresses. The top 25 observed buckets are shown. The frequency distribution
displays that the majority of valid probes detected in the Linear-3b sub-experiment
were contained to the first bucket.
The results of Linear-3a and Linear-3b were compared to determine if the dif-
ference between the populations were significant. In particular whether µ > µ0. The
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Table 4.8: The descriptive statistics of the results for the Weighted Linear-3 experiment simulations (experi-
ments Linear-3a and Linear-3b).
Experimental parameters Experiment number
Linear-3a Linear-3b
Valid probes (/50000) (/41171)
Maximum 1 (0.0020%) 16284 (39.5521%)
Mean 0.49 (0.0010%) 8642.09 (20.9907%)
Minimum 0 (0.0000%) 0 (0.0000%)
Median 0.0 16284.0
Total unique hosts dis-
covered
49 26796
Total transmitted probes
Maximum 4294967296 4294967296
Mean 4294967296.00 4294967296.00
Minimum 4294967296 4294967296
Median 4294967296.0 4294967296.0
Process time (Seconds)
Maximum 139838.82 139353.21
Mean 133798.51 132887.30
Minimum 38883.56 38336.12
di↵erence between the ranked means of sub-experiment Linear-3a and sub-experiment
Linear-3b was significant with a test statistic (W ) of W = 170.0, and the p-value of
p =< 0.001. This highlights a significant di↵erence between the two groups.
The average process completion time for the Linear-3 was substantially greater
than the other two experiments involving the linear search algorithm and linear.py.
Linear-3a recorded a mean process completion time of 133,799 seconds, or approx-
imately 37 hours (see Figure 4-12(b)). The Linear-3b sub-experiment saw a mean
process completion time of 132,887 seconds, or approximately 37 hours (see Figure 4-
13(b)). The processing times for this experiment were amongst the longest recorded
times during the research.
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4.4 Stripe search
The stripe search algorithm was designed as an extension of the conventional linear
search algorithm. Rather than perform a conventional, exhaustive sequential search
(which is conventional with a linear search), the stripe search performed sequential
searches of chunks of the entire address space. The algorithm was the subject of two
main experiments; the Stripe-1, which saw the algorithm commence search operations
at randomly generated starting points within the first chunk of the address space; and
the Stripe-2 experiment, which tested the algorithm with the starting point of the
sequential search at the first address of each chunk in the address space (i.e. address
::).
The Python program stripe.py was used to implement the stripe search algorithm.
The stripe.py program was configured to deliver a maximum of 232 probes, per simu-
lation, to IPv6 addresses from a designated starting address that varied per experiment
to align with the specifications detailed above. The program was also configured to
perform 100 simulations for each sub-experiment. The outcomes of these experiments
are detailed in the following sections.
4.4.1 Experiment Stripe-1: Stochastic stripe search
The stochastic Stripe-1 experiment tested the stripe search algorithm against the
randomised and surveyed datasets in sub-experiments Stripe-1a and Stripe-1b re-
spectively. The addresses that served as the starting points for each simulation were
randomlly chosen during the Stripe-1 experiments, using a weighted random choice.
The resulting start address was the first address of a randomly chosen bin number.
This ensured that the starting and ending addresses were on a 32 bit boundary. As
a result, for the sub-experiments Stripe-1a and Stripe-1b the stripe.py program
was configured to run 100 simulations each applying the stripe search algorithm to the
subject dataset with the starting address for each simulation’s search operation set to
a randomly chosen bin number between 0 and 216   1.
A pilot study was performed prior to commencing data collection for the Stripe-1
experiment. The pilot study for the Stripe-1 experiment tested a sample of 10,000
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sequential probes across the target address space, commencing with the randomly
chosen starting address of 74174821276193 (::4376:2bdf:9a21) and concluding at the
address 2607449611673090 (::9:4376:2bdf:9e02). Figure 4-19 demonstrates the distri-
bution of probes across the address space over the duration of the pilot study. This
graph provides an approximation for how the stripe search algorithm probed target
addresses during the Stripe-1 sub-experiments. The striping nature of the algorithm
is evident in Figure 4-19.
Each simulation probed 232 addresses from a starting point selected through the
means described above. The results for the stochastic Stripe-1a and Stripe-1b sub-
experiments are included in Table 4.9. The Stripe-1 experiments recorded the lowest
mean number of successful probes for its sub-experiments. Across all of the exper-
iments conducted a mean of 0 successful probes for Stripe-1a (see Figure 4-17(a))
and Stripe-1b (see Figure 4-18(a)) were observed. This indicates that unfortunately
the Stripe-1 experiment failed to probe a single valid host. Since both of the sub-
experiments revealed counts of zero, the samples of the population were identical, and
therefore no significant di↵erence existed between the sets (i.e. µ = µ0).
Table 4.9: The descriptive statistics of the results for the Stochastic Stripe-1 experiment simulations (exper-
iments Stripe-1a and Stripe-1b).
Experimental parameters Experiment number
Stripe-1a Stripe-1b
Valid probes (/50000) (/41171)
Maximum 0 (0.0000%) 0 (0.0000%)
Mean 0.00 (0.0000%) 0.00 (0.0000%)
Minimum 0 (0.0000%) 0 (0.0000%)
Median 0.0 0.0
Total unique hosts dis-
covered
0 0
Total transmitted probes
Maximum 4294967296 4294967296
Mean 4294967296.00 4294967296.00
Minimum 4294967296 4294967296
Median 4294967296.0 4294967296.0
Process time (Seconds)
Maximum 30474.32 51639.36
Mean 25543.13 49003.80
Minimum 5322.36 10781.34
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The average process completion time for the Stripe-1 was similar to that of the
Linear-1 and Linear-2 experiments. Stripe-1a recorded a mean process completion
time of 25,543 seconds, or approximately 7 hours (see Figure 4-17(b)). The Stripe-1b
sub-experiment recorded a mean process completion time of 49,004 seconds, or approx-
imately 13.5 hours (see Figure 4-18(b)).
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4.4.2 Experiment Stripe-2: Zero-origin stripe search
The zero-origin Stripe-2 experiment tested the stripe search algorithm against the
randomised and surveyed datasets in sub-experiments Stripe-2a and Stripe-2b re-
spectively. The addresses that served as the starting points for the search operations
were set to the first address in the address space (::) for Stripe-2 experiments.
Therefore, for the sub-experiments Stripe-2a and Stripe-2b the stripe.py program
was configured to run 100 simulations each applying the stripe search algorithm to the
subject dataset with the starting address for each simulation’s search operation set to
0. Similar to Linear-1 this experiment was controlled and deterministic due to the
start address that held constant across all simulations.
A pilot study was performed prior to commencing data collection for the Stripe-2
experiment. The pilot study for the Stripe-2 experiment tested a sample of 10,000 se-
quential probes across the target address space, commencing with the randomly chosen
starting address of 0 (::) and concluding at the address (::9:0:0:3e4). Figure 4-19 demon-
strates the distribution of probes across the address space over the duration of the pilot
study. This graph provides an approximation for how each simulation for the stripe
search algorithm probed target addresses during the Stripe-2 sub-experiments. As
with the pilot study for the Stripe-1 experiment, the striping nature of the algorithm
can be seen in Figure 4-19.
As mentioned previously, 100 simulations were conducted for each of the Stripe-2a
and Stripe-2b sub-experiments. Each simulation attempted to search the address
space using 4,294,967,296 probes spread across 216 buckets (each bucket was 248 ad-
dresses wide). Although Stripe-2a did not record a single probe against a valid host,
Stripe-2b recorded one of the highest average successful probe counts across all of the
experiments conducted. During Stripe-2b an average of 4,150 successful probes per
simulation were recorded (Table 4.10). It was observed that a total of 4,150 unique
nodes were probed across all 100 simulations. These 4,150 unique nodes were probed
in every one of the 100 simulations for this sub-experiment. The breakdown of the fre-
quency of unique IPv6 addresses detected per bucket across all simulations is included
in Figure 4-20. The frequency distribution displays that the majority of valid probes
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detected in the Stripe-2b sub-experiment were contained to the first bucket.
The populations for the Stripe-2a and Stripe-2b sub-experiments were compared
using a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test to determine whether they di↵ered significantly. The
results highlighted a significant di↵erence between the two data sets at the 95% con-
fidence interval. The test statistic was W = 0.0, and the p-value was p =< 0.001 with
a target ↵ value of ↵ = 0.05.
Table 4.10: The descriptive statistics of the results for the Zero Origin Stripe-2 experiment simulations
(experiments Stripe-2a and Stripe-2b).
Experimental parameters Experiment number
Stripe-2a Stripe-2b
Valid probes (/50000) (/41171)
Maximum 0 (0.0000%) 4150 (10.0799%)
Mean 0.00 (0.0000%) 4150.00 (10.0799%)
Minimum 0 (0.0000%) 4150 (10.0799%)
Median 0.0 4150.0
Total unique hosts dis-
covered
0 4150
Total transmitted probes
Maximum 4294967296 4294967296
Mean 4294967296.00 4294967296.00
Minimum 4294967296 4294967296
Median 4294967296.0 4294967296.0
Process time (Seconds)
Maximum 45147.45 52169.45
Mean 27753.18 50041.92
Minimum 5316.17 10721.14
The average process completion times for the Stripe-2 experiment was similar
to that of the Stripe-1 experiment. Stripe-2a recorded a mean process completion
time of 27,753 seconds, or approximately 8 hours (see Figure 4-21(b)). The Stripe-2b
sub-experiment recorded a mean process completion time of 50,420 seconds, or approx-
imately 14 hours (see Figure 4-22(b)).
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4.5 Monte Carlo search
The Monte Carlo stochastic search algorithm was designed to test a uniformly dis-
tributed randoml search of the 64 bit IPv6 network address space. This technique is
commonly employed in search algorithms that are used to enumerated IPv4 networks,
however has not been applied to IPv6. The algorithm was the subject of two main
experiments; the MonteCarlo-1, which saw the algorithm search randomlly chosen ad-
dresses without influence; and the MonteCarlo-2 which influenced the selection process
by binning the address space, and then weighting the bins using a weighted random
choice.
The Python program monte_carlo.py was used to implement the Monte Carlo
stochastic search algorithm. The monte_carlo.py program was configured to deliver
a maximum of 232 probes, per simulation, to IPv6 addresses aligning with the specific-
ations detailed above. The program was also configured to perform 100 simulations for
each sub-experiment. The outcomes of these experiments are detailed below.
4.5.1 Experiment MonteCarlo-1: Stochastic Monte Carlo search
The stochastic MonteCarlo-1 experiment tested the Monte Carlo search algorithm
against the randomised and surveyed datasets in sub-experiments MonteCarlo-1a and
MonteCarlo-1b respectively. For this experiment monte_carlo.py was configured to
select target addresses through the use of a pseudorandom process. A seeded Mersenne
Twister-based PRNG was employed to generate addresses between 0 and 264   1.
This PRNG was seeded using bytes from the experimental computer’s kernel random-
generator (i.e. /dev/urandom).
A pilot study was performed for the MonteCarlo-1 experiment prior to commencing
data collection. The pilot study for the MonteCarlo-1 experiment tested a sample of
10,000 randomlly chosen probes across the target address space. Figure 4-23 demon-
strates the distribution of probes across the address space over the duration of the
pilot study. This graph provides an approximation for how each simulation for the
Monte Carlo search algorithm probed target addresses during the MonteCarlo-1 sub-
experiments. It is evident from Figure 4-23 that there are patterns in the distribution
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of probes across the address space - it is not indeterminably random, and is certainly
not cryptographically secure. For the purposes of this experiment these traits have
little impact since the aim of the experiment was to achieve a uniform distribution of
probes across the address space for which the pilot study demonstrates.
Each simulation probed 232 randomly selected addresses from a starting point selec-
ted through the means described above. The results for the stochastic MonteCarlo-1a
and MonteCarlo-1b sub-experiments are included in Table 4.11. The MonteCarlo-1
experiments recorded the lowest mean number of successful probes for its sub-experiments.
Across all of the experiments conducted a mean of 0 successful probes for MonteCarlo-1a
and MonteCarlo-1b were observed. This indicates that similar to the Linear-2 and
Stripe-1 experiments, unfortunately the MonteCarlo-1 experiment failed to probe
a single valid host. Since both of the sub-experiments revealed counts of zero, the
populations were identical, and therefore no significant di↵erence existed between the
samples (i.e. µ = µ0).
Table 4.11: The descriptive statistics of the results gathered from Stochastic Monte Carlo simulations (exper-
iments MonteCarlo-1a and MonteCarlo-1b).
Experimental parameters Experiment number
MonteCarlo-1a MonteCarlo-1b
Valid probes (/50000) (/41171)
Maximum 0 (0.0000%) 0 (0.0000%)
Mean 0.00 (0.0000%) 0.00 (0.0000%)
Minimum 0 (0.0000%) 0 (0.0000%)
Median 0.0 0.0
Total unique hosts dis-
covered
0 0
Total transmitted probes
Maximum 4294967296 4294967296
Mean 4294967296.00 4294967296.00
Minimum 4294967296 4294967296
Median 4294967296.0 4294967296.0
Process time (Seconds)
Maximum 219874.71 215418.31
Mean 175437.93 175111.66
Minimum 71295.43 71284.27
The average process completion times for the MonteCarlo-1 experiment were amongst
the highest recorded. MonteCarlo-1a recorded a mean process completion time of
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175,438 seconds, or approximately 49 hours (see Figure 4-24(a)). The MonteCarlo-1b
sub-experiment recorded a similar mean process completion time of 175,112 seconds,
or approximately 49 hours (see Figure 4-25(a)). The fluctuations that can be seen in
Figure 4-25(a) are likely due to a simulation artefact whereby the computer cluster that
was used for the experimentation was over subscribed with other tasks. Unfortunately
due to the research computer cluster being a communal resource, isolated access could
not be controlled throughout the entire experimentation process. Consequently some
of the experiments’ process times were a↵ected by the increased load.
4.5.2 Experiment MonteCarlo-2: Weighted Monte Carlo search
The weighted MonteCarlo-2 experiment tested the Monte Carlo search algorithm
against the randomised and surveyed datasets in sub-experiments MonteCarlo-2a and
MonteCarlo-2b respectively. For this experiment monte_carlo.py was configured to
select target addresses through the use of a weighted-pseudorandom choice process.
The same seeded Mersenne Twister-based PRNG was employed to generate addresses
between 0 and 264   1 was employed for this experiment as with MonteCarlo-2. This
PRNG was also seeded using bytes from the experimental computer’s kernel random-
generator (i.e. /dev/urandom). For each probe delivered, the PRNG was used to first
select a bin for which to search using a weighted choice, and then again to select a
pseudorandom address in the bin to probe. This process was described in more detail
in Chapter 3
A pilot study was performed for the MonteCarlo-2 experiment prior to commencing
data collection. The pilot study for the MonteCarlo-2 experiment tested a sample of
10,000 pseudorandomly chosen probes across the target address space. Figure 4-26
demonstrates the distribution of probes across the address space over the duration of
the pilot study. This graph provides an approximation for how each simulation for
the Monte Carlo search algorithm probed target addresses during the MonteCarlo-2
sub-experiments. Like the MonteCarlo-1 pilot study, it is evident from Figure 4-26
that there are patterns in the distribution of probes across the address space. Again,
for the purposes of this experiment these traits have little impact since the aim of this
experiment was to achieve a near-uniform distribution of probes across the address
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space for which the pilot study demonstrates.
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Each simulation probed 232 pseudorandomly selected addresses from a starting
point selected through the means described above. The results for the weighted
MonteCarlo-2a and MonteCarlo-2b sub-experiments are included in Table 4.12.
Unlike MonteCarlo-1, the MonteCarlo-2 experiment recorded successful hits in
both sub-experiments. A mean number of successful hits of 1.2 was recorded for the
MonteCarlo-2a experiment (see Figure 4-27(a)). Although the minimum recorded
successful probes during a simulation was observed to be 0, the maximum was 4.
Overall the sub-experiment recorded successful probes against 119 unique IPv6 hosts.
A histogram of the successfully probed hosts across the most observed buckets of the
address space is included in Figure 4-29. It is clear from Figure 4-29 that no more than
a single address was probed per bucket.
MonteCarlo-2b faired better, with an average number of valid probes registered at
30.42 (see Figure 4-28(a)) amongst a maximum of 45, and a minimum of 15. Overall
the MonteCarlo-2b sub-experiment observed 2,914 unique hosts on the IPv6 network,
which is amongst the highest values recorded. The distribution of observed hosts across
the bucketed address space is included in Figure 4-30. From Figure 4-30 it is clear that
the majority of the uniquely discovered hosts lie in the first bucket of the address space.
To determine whether the results of the two sub-experiments were significantly
di↵erent, the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test was applied. The test statistic was W = 0.0,
and the p-value was p =< 0.001 with a target ↵ value of ↵ = 0.05. This highlights
a significant di↵erence between the ranked means of sub-experiment MonteCarlo-2a
and sub-experiment MonteCarlo-2b.
The average process completion times for the Monte_Carlo-2 experiment were the
highest recorded, and were substantially higher than any other experiment conducted.
Monte_Carlo-2a recorded a mean process completion time of 1,038,336 seconds, or
approximately 288.5 hours (see Figure 4-24(a)). The Monte_Carlo-2b sub-experiment
recorded a similar mean process completion time of 1,318,608 seconds, or approximately
366 hours (see Figure 4-25(a)).
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Table 4.12: The descriptive statistics of the results gathered from the Weighted Monte Carlo simulations
(experiments MonteCarlo-2a and MonteCarlo-2b).
Experimental parameters Experiment number
MonteCarlo-2a MonteCarlo-2b
Valid probes (/50000) (/41171)
Maximum 4 (0.0080%) 45 (0.1093%)
Mean 1.20 (0.0024%) 30.42 (0.0739%)
Minimum 0 (0.0000%) 15 (0.0364%)
Median 1.0 30.0
Total unique hosts dis-
covered
119 2914
Total transmitted probes
Maximum 4294967296 4294967296
Mean 4294967296.00 4294967296.00
Minimum 4294967296 4294967296
Median 4294967296.0 4294967296.0
Process time (Seconds)
Maximum 1155906.63 1449487.21
Mean 1038336.41 1318608.34
Minimum 251762.16 662446.69
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4.6 GA search
The GA search algorithm was devised to test whether machine learning methods could
be applied to IPv6 host enumeration. Specifically the GA was chosen as a candidate
algorithm since it provided a means to combine clustered and randomised address gen-
eration strategies. The genetic algorithm was tested during three major experiments;
the GA-1 experiment, which tested the algorithm using an initial population devised
of zeroes; the GA-2 experiment, which tested the algorithm using a pseudorandomly
generated starting population as the basis for the genetic process, and the GA-3 exper-
iment; which used a weighted choice to generate parent pairs for selected bins in the
address space as described in Chapter 3.
The GA di↵ered from the other experiments since the experimental process involved
the use of programs written in C, rather than Python. This di↵erence is evident in
the average processing times of the simulations, which is lower on average than the
experiments involving Python programs. The C program ga was used to implement the
GA search algorithm. A wrapper program written in Python (titled ga_run.py) was
used to configure the ga program to deliver a maximum of 232 probes, per simulation,
to IPv6 addresses aligning with the specifications detailed above. ga_run.py was also
configured to perform 100 simulations for each sub-experiment. The outcomes of these
experiments are detailed below.
4.6.1 Experiment GA-1: Zero-origin GA search
The zero-origin GA-1 experiment tested the GA search algorithm against the random-
ised and surveyed datasets in sub-experiments GA-1a and GA-1b respectively. For this
experiment the ga program was configured to generate an initial population of zero-
value organisms (i.e. a population of :: value IPv6 addresses).
A pilot study was performed prior to commencing data collection for the GA-1 ex-
periment. The pilot study for the GA-1 experiment tested a sample of 10,000 generated
organisms. Figure 4-31 demonstrates the distribution of probes across the address space
over the duration of the pilot study. This graph provides an approximation for how
each simulation for the GA search algorithm probed target addresses during the GA-1
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sub-experiments. It is evident from Figure 4-31 that clusters of addresses throughout
the address space were being targeted. This behaviour was anticipated and desirable
for the operation of the search algorithm.
Each simulation probed 232 addresses from an initial population generated by the
GA search algorithm through the means described above. The results for the zero-origin
GA-1a and GA-1b sub-experiments are included in Table 4.13. The GA-1a recorded a
mean number of successful hits of 0 (see Figure 4-33(a)). The GA-1b was more successful
having recorded a mean number of successful hits of 6.95 (see Figure 4-34(a)). From
GA-1b a maximum of 12 successful hits and a minimum of 3 successful hits were recorded
across all simulations. Overall the sub-experiment recorded successful probes against
156 unique IPv6 hosts. A histogram of the successfully probed hosts across the most
observed buckets of the address space is included in Figure 4-32. It can be seen in
Figure 4-32 that the located hosts were predominantly located in the first bucket of
the address space.
The Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test was applied to the results of the GA-1a and GA-1b
sub-experiments to determine whether a there was a significant di↵erence between the
populations. This test revealed that a significant di↵erence existed between the groups,
with a test statistic of W = 0.0, and the p-value was p =< 0.001 with a target ↵ value
of ↵ = 0.05. This highlights that there was a significant di↵erence between the ranked
means of sub-experiment GA-1a and sub-experiment GA-1b.
159

Table 4.13: The descriptive statistics of the results gathered from the Zero Origin GA simulations (experiments
GA-1a and GA-1b).
Experimental parameters Experiment number
GA-1a GA-1b
Valid probes (/50000) (/41171)
Maximum 0 (0.0000%) 12 (0.0291%)
Mean 0.00 (0.0000%) 6.95 (0.0169%)
Minimum 0 (0.0000%) 3 (0.0073%)
Median 0.0 7.0
Total unique hosts dis-
covered
0 156
Total transmitted probes
Maximum 4294967296 4294967296
Mean 4294967296.00 4294967296.00
Minimum 4294967296 4294967296
Median 4294967296.0 4294967296.0
Process time (Seconds)
Maximum 14866.01 14784.47
Mean 13985.10 13910.58
Minimum 12368.09 12283.55
The average process completion times for the GA-1 experiment were amongst the
lowest recorded. GA-1a recorded a mean process completion time of 13985 seconds,
or approximately 4 hours (see Figure 4-33(b)). The GA-1b sub-experiment recorded a
similar mean process completion time of 13,910 seconds, or approximately 4 hours (see
Figure 4-34(b)).
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4.6.2 Experiment GA-2: Stochastic GA search
The stochastic GA-2 experiment tested the GA search algorithm against the random-
ised and surveyed datasets in sub-experiments GA-2a and GA-2b respectively. For this
experiment the ga program was configured to generate an initial population of pseu-
dorandomly generated organisms (i.e. a population of IPv6 addresses between 0 and
264   1).
A pilot study was performed prior to commencing data collection for the GA-2 ex-
periment. The pilot study for the GA-2 experiment tested a sample of 10,000 generated
organisms. Figure 4-35 demonstrates the distribution of probes across the address
space over the duration of the pilot study. This graph provides an approximation for
how each simulation for the GA search algorithm probed target addresses during the
GA-2 sub-experiments. Like GA-1, it is evident from Figure 4-35 that clusters of ad-
dresses throughout the address space were being targeted. This behaviour was, again,
anticipated and desirable for the operation of the search algorithm.
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Each simulation probed 232 addresses from an initial population of organisms that
were pseudorandomly generated by a PRNG. The results for the stochastic GA-2a and
GA-2b sub-experiments are included in Table 4.14. Unfortunately both sub-experiments
GA-2a and GA-2b recorded a mean number of successful hits of 0. Since both of the
sub-experiments revealed counts of zero, the samples of the populations were identical,
and therefore no significant di↵erence existed between the sets (i.e. µ = µ0).
Table 4.14: The descriptive statistics of the results gathered from Stochastic GA simulations (experiments
GA-2a and GA-2b).
Experimental parameters Experiment number
GA-2a GA-2b
Valid probes (/50000) (/41171)
Maximum 0 (0.0000%) 0 (0.0000%)
Mean 0.00 (0.0000%) 0.00 (0.0000%)
Minimum 0 (0.0000%) 0 (0.0000%)
Median 0.0 0.0
Total unique hosts dis-
covered
0 0
Total transmitted probes
Maximum 4294967296 4294967296
Mean 4294967296.00 4294967296.00
Minimum 4294967296 4294967296
Median 4294967296.0 4294967296.0
Process time (Seconds)
Maximum 14412.07 14537.89
Mean 13938.12 13924.74
Minimum 12353.20 12288.42
The average process completion times for the GA-2 experiment were very similar
to that of GA-1, and were again amongst the lowest recorded. GA-2a recorded a mean
process completion time of 13,938 seconds, or approximately 4 hours (see Figure 4-
36(a)). The GA-2b sub-experiment recorded a similar mean process completion time of
13,924 seconds, or approximately 4 hours (see Figure 4-37(a)).
4.6.3 Experiment GA-3: Weighted GA search
The weighted GA-3 experiment tested the GA search algorithm against the random-
ised and surveyed datasets in sub-experiments GA-3a and GA-3b respectively. For this
experiment the ga program was configured to generate an initial population of using
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a weighted choice process. The process resulted in a population of “parent-pair” ad-
dresses that represented the first and last addresses in selected buckets of the 64 bit
address space. This process was detailed in Chapter 3.
A pilot study was performed prior to commencing data collection for the GA-3 ex-
periment. The pilot study for the GA-3 experiment tested a sample of 10,000 generated
organisms. Figure 4-38 demonstrates the distribution of probes across the address
space over the duration of the pilot study. This graph provides an approximation
for how each simulation for the GA search algorithm probed target addresses during
the GA-3 sub-experiments. It is again evident from Figure 4-38 that clusters of ad-
dresses throughout the address space were being targeted. This behaviour was again,
anticipated and desirable for the operation of the search algorithm.
Each simulation probed 232 addresses from an initial population of organisms that
were generated. The results for the weighted GA-3a and GA-3b sub-experiments are
included in Table 4.15. Like GA-2, both sub-experiments GA-3a and GA-3b recorded a
mean number of successful hits of 0. Since both of the sub-experiments revealed counts
of zero, the samples of the populations were identical, and therefore no significant
di↵erence existed between the sets (i.e. µ = µ0).
Table 4.15: The descriptive statistics of the results gathered from Weighted GA simulations (experiments
GA-3a and GA-3b).
Experimental parameters Experiment number
GA-3a GA-3b
Valid probes (/50000) (/41171)
Maximum 0 (0.0000%) 0 (0.0000%)
Mean 0.00 (0.0000%) 0.00 (0.0000%)
Minimum 0 (0.0000%) 0 (0.0000%)
Median 0.0 0.0
Total unique hosts dis-
covered
0 0
Total transmitted probes
Maximum 4294967296 4294967296
Mean 4294967296.00 4294967296.00
Minimum 4294967296 4294967296
Median 4294967296.0 4294967296.0
Process time (Seconds)
Maximum 14032.65 13755.32
Mean 13267.52 13295.64
Minimum 11838.93 11805.93
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The average process completion times for the GA-3 experiment were very similar
to that of GA-1 and GA-2. GA-3a recorded a mean process completion time of 13,267
seconds, or approximately 3.5 hours (see Figure 4-39(a)). The GA-3b sub-experiment
recorded a similar mean process completion time of 13,295 seconds, or approximately
3.5 hours (see Figure 4-40(a)).
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4.7 Pattern-based heuristic search
The pattern-based heuristic search algorithm was designed to exploit known patterns
in common IPv6 address construction schemes. Similar search techniques have been
employed in IPv6 host enumeration tools that are publicly available. This search
algorithm tested the pattern-based search algorithm during a single experiment; the
Pattern-1. This algorithm used a deterministic approach to generating addresses for
targeting.
The pattern.py program was used to implement the pattern-based heuristic search
algorithm. The pattern.py program was configured to deliver a maximum of 232
probes, per simulation to IPv6 addresses. pattern.py was also configured to per-
form 100 simulations for each sub-experiment. The outcomes of these experiments are
detailed below.
4.7.1 Experiment Pattern-1: Pattern-based heuristic search
The Pattern-1 experiment tested the pattern-based heuristic search algorithm against
the randomised and surveyed datasets in sub-experiments Pattern-1a and Pattern-1b
respectively. For this experiment the pattern.py program was configured to generate
a sequence of addresses that abused the patterns that exist in IID creation, which are
detailed in Carpene and Woodward (2012) and Carpene and Woodward (2014). This
process is detailed in Chapter 3.
A pilot study was performed prior to commencing data collection for the Pattern-1
experiment. The pilot study for the Pattern-1 experiment tested a sample of 10,000
addresses. Figure 4-41 demonstrates the distribution of probes across the address
space over the duration of the pilot study. This graph provides an approximation
for how each simulation for the pattern-based heuristic search algorithm probed tar-
get addresses during the Pattern-1 sub-experiments. Figure 4-41 displays a visually
sequential search. The first phase of the pattern-based search involves an e↵ectively
sequential search, which align with the distribution presented in Figure 4-41.
Each simulation probed 4,284,760,840 addresses. The results for the Pattern-1a
and Pattern-1b sub-experiments are included in Table 4.16. Although Pattern-1a
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Table 4.16: The descriptive statistics of the results gathered from Pattern simulations (experiments Pattern-1a
and Pattern-1b).
Experimental parameters Experiment number
Pattern-1a Pattern-1b
Valid probes (/50000) (/41171)
Maximum 0 (0.0000%) 2543 (6.1767%)
Mean 0.00 (0.0000%) 2543.00 (6.1767%)
Minimum 0 (0.0000%) 2543 (6.1767%)
Median 0.0 2543.0
Total unique hosts dis-
covered
0 2543
Total transmitted probes
Maximum 4284760840 4284760840
Mean 4284760840.00 4284760840.00
Minimum 4284760840 4284760840
Median 4284760840.0 4284760840.0
Process time (Seconds)
Maximum 261297.31 269453.58
Mean 247140.80 250607.60
Minimum 129301.73 133509.73
performed poorly; having recorded 0 successful hits across all simulations (see Fig-
ure 4-43(a)), Pattern-1b recorded a mean number of successful hits of 2,543 successful
hits (see Figure 4-43(a)). The maximum and minimum number of successful hits for
Pattern-1b were also 2,543. The sub-experiment recorded successful probes against
2,543 unique IPv6 hosts. A histogram of the successfully probed hosts across the most
observed buckets of the address space is included in Figure 4-42. It can be seen in
Figure 4-42 that almost half of the discovered hosts were located in the first bucket of
the address space.
The results of the Pattern-1a and Pattern-1b sub-experiments were tested for
significance using a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test. This test concluded with a result of
W = 0.0, and a p-value of p =< 0.001 with a target ↵ value of ↵ = 0.05. This highlights
a significant di↵erence between the ranked means of the two sub-experiments at the 95%
confidence interval. Since Pattern-1b had a greater count of hosts discovered, it can
be concluded that Pattern-1b’s results were significantly higher than Pattern-1a’s.
The average process completion times for the Pattern-1 were amongst the highest
recorded. Pattern-1a recorded a mean process completion time of 247,141 seconds,
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or approximately 68.5 hours (see Figure 4-43(b)). The Pattern-1b sub-experiment
recorded a similar mean process completion time of 250,608 seconds, or approximately
69.5 hours (see Figure 4-44(b)).
175




4.8 Adaptive heuristic search
The adaptive heuristic search algorithm was designed explore how machine learning can
be applied to IPv6 host enumeration. This algorithm took a multi-faceted approach
to the problem, by assessing how discovered addresses have been constructed and then
targeting those address creation methods in context. This search strategy has never
been applied to the problem thus far. The adaptive search algorithm was tested during
a single experiment; the Adaptive-1.
The adaptive.py program was used to implement the adaptive heuristic search
algorithm. The adaptive.py program was configured to deliver a maximum of 232
probes, per simulation to IPv6 addresses. adaptive.py was also configured to per-
form 100 simulations for each sub-experiment. The outcomes of these experiments are
detailed below.
4.8.1 Experiment Adaptive-1: Adaptive heuristic search
The Adaptive-1 experiment tested the adaptive heuristic search algorithm against the
randomised and surveyed datasets in sub-experiments Adaptive-1a and Adaptive-1b
respectively. For this experiment the adaptive.py program was configured to generate
a sequence of addresses and probe them. This process is detailed in Chapter 3.
A pilot study was performed prior to commencing data collection for the Adaptive-1
experiment. The pilot study for the Adaptive-1 experiment tested a sample of 10,000
addresses. Figure 4-45 demonstrates the distribution of probes across the address space
over the duration of the pilot study. Figure 4-45 provides an approximation for how
each simulation for the pattern-based heuristic search algorithm probed target ad-
dresses during the Adaptive-1 sub-experiments. It can be observed from Figure 4-45
that address probing appeared to occur in batches. This was a result of the post-hit
processing operations of the adaptive search algorithm.
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The results for the Adaptive-1a and Adaptive-1b sub-experiments are included in
Table 4.17. The Adaptive-1a experiment probed an average of 6,553,701.6 addresses.
This was the lowest recorded average number of probes delivered across all experiments.
Of those transmitted probes, an average of 100 successful hits was observed. 100 unique
hosts were discovered during Adaptive-1a. A histogram of the successfully probed
hosts across the most observed buckets of the address space is included in Figure 4-46.
It can be seen in Figure 4-46 that almost half of the discovered hosts were located in
the first bucket of the address space. Figure 4-46 highlights that Adaptive-1a did not
see more than a single unique host per bucket discovered.
The Adaptive-1b experiment probed a higher average number of addresses than
Adaptive-1a, with 603,220,298 addresses being probed during this sub-experiment.
This was the second lowest recorded average number of probes delivered across all
experiments. Of those transmitted probes, an average of 10,218 successful hits was
observed. This translated to a total of 10,218 unique hosts being discovered during
Adaptive-1b. A histogram of the successfully probed hosts across the most observed
buckets of the address space is included in Figure 4-47. It can be seen in Figure 4-47
that almost half of the discovered hosts were located in the first bucket of the address
space. Figure 4-47 highlights that the majority of unique hosts discovered during
Adaptive-1b were located within the first bucket of the address space.
The Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test was used to compare the results of the Adaptive-1
for significance at the 95% confidence interval. This test revealed a significant dif-
ference between the two populations, with a test statistic of W = 0.0, and a p-value
of p =< 0.001 with a target ↵ value of ↵ = 0.05. This suggests that the results
of the Adaptive-1b sub-experiment are significantly greater than the results of the
Adaptive-1a sub-experiment .
The average process completion times for the Adaptive-1 were some of the lowest
recorded. Adaptive-1a recorded a mean process completion time of 1,678 seconds, or
approximately 0.5 hours which was the lowest recorded process time average across all
experiments conducted throughout this research (see Figure 4-48(b)). The Adaptive-1b
sub-experiment recorded a similar mean process completion time of 20,020 seconds, or
approximately 5.5 hours (see Figure 4-49(b)).
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Table 4.17: The descriptive statistics of the results gathered from Adaptive simulations (experiments
Adaptive-1a and Adaptive-1b).
Experimental parameters Experiment number
Adaptive-1a Adaptive-1b
Valid probes (/50000) (/41171)
Maximum 100 (0.2000%) 10218 (24.8184%)
Mean 100.00 (0.2000%) 10218.00 (24.8184%)
Minimum 100 (0.2000%) 10218 (24.8184%)
Median 100.0 10218.0
Total unique hosts dis-
covered
100 10218
Total transmitted probes
Maximum 6553710 603268141
Mean 6553701.60 603220298.01
Minimum 6553700 603137066
Median 6553701.0 603202603.0
Process time (Seconds)
Maximum 2004.64 37656.08
Mean 1637.65 20019.73
Minimum 186.15 2201.07
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4.9 Aggregated results
This section provides a summary of the results observed throughout all of the experi-
ments that were conducted. Figure 4-50(a) displays the average successful probes per
sub-experiment as a histogram whilst Figure 4-50(b) displays the descriptive statist-
ics of valid hits per experiment as a box and whisker plot. It is evident from the
Figure 4-50(a) that the sub-experiment with the greatest number of detected nodes
was the Linear-1b experiment. Other notable performers include the Adaptive-1b,
Linear-3b, Stripe-2b and the Pattern-1b. Figure 4-50(b) highlights that the vari-
ation between the results recorded per simulation in most of the sub-experiments was
limited. The most obvious exception to this is the Linear-3b results, which show a
stark contrast between the maximum and minimum recorded values.
Figure 4-51(a) displays the average number of delivered probes per sub-experiment
as a histogram and Figure 4-51(b) displays the descriptive statistics of the total number
of delivered probes per experiment as a box and whisker plot. Figure 4-51(a) highlights
that the majority of the simulations that were conducted delivered a similar number
of probes. The Adaptive sub-experiments were the exception, exhibiting substantially
less delivered probes on average per simulation than any of the other experiments. The
box and whisker plot for the number of probes delivered (i.e. Figure 4-51(b)) highlights
the consistency that was exhibited in delivering probes during each simulation of a sub-
experiment.
Figure 4-52(a) displays the average process completion time per sub-experiment
as a histogram and Figure 4-52(b) displays the descriptive statistics of the process
completion times per experiment as a box and whisker plot. Figure 4-52(a) highlights
the di↵erences in the process completion times for all of the sub-experiments. It is
clear from the histogram that the MonteCarlo-2 sub-experiments exhibited the highest
process times. Contrarily, the Adaptive sub-experiments recorded the lowest recorded
average process times out of all of the experiments.
To perform the required hypothesis tests for this research, the counts of the valid
hosts discovered per simulation were first tested for normality using a Shapiro-Wilks
normality test. The results of the Shapiro-Wilks test were p < 0.000 with a target
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↵ value of ↵ = 0.05, indicating that the null hypothesis for the test (that the data
are normally distributed) can be rejected with a high degree of confidence. This im-
plies that the data does not conform to normal distribution. Table 4.18 presents the
maximum, minimum and average results for the major dependent variables (number
of successful probes, number of transmitted probes, and processing time) for each of
the sub-experiments. Table 4.19 provides cumulated totals for the major dependent
variables, as well as the total number of simulations conducted, for both of the a and
b sub-experiment types.
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4.10 Research hypotheses
This section addresses the five primary research hypotheses that were defined in Chapter 1.
4.10.1 H1 : Search techniques are unable to enumerate networked
devices on 64 bit IPv6 subnetworks.
Hypothesis H1 asserted that search techniques would not be able to enumerate net-
worked devices on standard 64 bit IPv6 subnetworks. In order to test this hypothesis 24
distinct experiments were conducted against two hypothetical 64 bit IPv6 subnetworks.
The null hypothesis posed no devices would be enumerated for each search operation
(i.e. H10 : µ = µ0). The results of the experiments disproved the null hypothesis
and provided support for the alternative hypothesis that search techniques are able to
enumerate networked devices on 64 bit IPv6 subnetworks (i.e. H11 : µ > µ0).
The non-parametric One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed-Ranked Test with a target ↵
value of ↵ = 0.05. The Wilcoxon Signed-Ranked Test is appropriate for comparing
means of samples in cases where a population, or sample of a population does not
conform to a normal distribution (Corder & Foreman, 2011). The null hypothesis for
the test stated that the ranked means of the collected data were equal to 0. The
test completed with the test statistic V = 413, 600 and a p-value of p < 0.001. This
indicates that in this test the null hypothesis can be rejected with a high degree of
confidence and the alternate hypothesis that the ranked mean is greater than 0, can
be accepted. From these results it is evident that devices are able to be enumerated
on 64 bit IPv6 subnetworks using host enumeration techniques.
4.10.2 H2 : Methods that employ random sampling do not perform
better than methods that do not employ random sampling for
IPv6 host enumeration.
Hypothesis H2 asserted that search methods that employ random sampling techniques
provide no performance benefit over those that do not employ random sampling for
IPv6 host enumeration. Search methods that employ randomisation are commonplace
in IPv4 host enumeration strategies because they provide a means to distribute probing
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load across the entire address space during Internet-wide searches. Such methods had
not been tested with IPv6 host enumeration prior to this research. To address this
hypothesis the experimentation process tested algorithms with stochastic properties,
as well as those with deterministic properties.
The results of the algorithms that employed random sampling were compared to
those search algorithms that did not employ random sampling. A null hypothesis was
defined for this test that there was no significant di↵erence between the results of
the stochastic algorithms against the deterministic algorithms (i.e. H20 : µ = µ0).
The alternative hypothesis indicated that there was a di↵erence between the data in
each level, and that the deterministic algorithms performed greater than the stochastic
algorithms (i.e. H21 : µ > µ0).
The experiments that involved the use of random sampling search techniques, or
whose operations were unpredictable, and therefore were categorised as stochastic, as
well as those that involved the use of deterministic search techniques and therefore were
categorised as deterministic, are included in Table 4.20 (extracted from Chapter 3).
Table 4.20: Table of the algorithms designed for the study and their classification as stochastic or deterministic
in nature.
Stochastic Deterministic
MonteCarlo Linear
GA Stripe
Adaptive Pattern
Table 4.21 illustrates the results of the deterministic algorithms compared to the
stochastic algorithms for the randomly generated dataset. Similarly, Table 4.22 illus-
trates the results of the deterministic algorithms compared to the stochastic algorithms
for the surveyed dataset. Finally, Table 4.23 highlights the comparison between all
of the sub-experiments that utilised random sampling (i.e. the stochastic search al-
gorithms) against those that did not (i.e. the deterministic search algorithms) for both
the a and b sub-experiments.
In order to determine whether the di↵erences between the populations is statistically
significant inferential statistics were applied to:
• The results of the a sub-experiments.
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• The results of the b sub-experiments.
• The combined results of both sub-experiments (a and b).
The results were unremarkable from either the stochastic or deterministic categories
when applied to the randomly generated dataset, as is evident in Table 4.21. A visual
comparison of means for the a sub-experiments indicates that a di↵erence between the
stochastic and deterministic search algorithms is not apparent. To determine whether
there was a statistically significant di↵erence between the two groups, the one-tailed
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test was applied. The Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test is appropriate
for non-parametric hypothesis testing involving comparing two independent variables
(Corder & Foreman, 2011). This test compared the distribution of di↵erences between
the two groups, and determined whether a di↵erence existed at the 95% confidence
interval. The Wilcoxon test passed with a test statistic W = 139, 790 and a p-value
of p = 1. This indicates that there is no significant di↵erence between the stochastic
search algorithms and the deterministic search algorithms where the algorithms were
applied to the randomly generated dataset (i.e. the a sub-experiments). With this
result, there is su cient evidence to accept the null hypothesis that the results of the
deterministic group are not significantly greater than the results of the stochastic group
(i.e. that µ  µ0).
Contrarily, the comparison of the di↵erences for the b experiments indicates that
a potential di↵erence between the results of the stochastic search algorithms and the
deterministic search algorithms exists. Again, to confirm whether this di↵erence was
statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval, the one-tailed Wilcoxon Rank-
Sum test was applied. The Wilcoxon test passed with a test statistic of W = 236, 740
and a p-value of p < 0.001 highlighting that the results of the deterministic search
algorithms are significantly greater than those of the stochastic search algorithms ap-
plied to the surveyed dataset (i.e. that µ > µ0). It is possible to confidently reject the
null hypothesis in this instance and conclude that the deterministic search algorithms
performed better than the stochastic search algorithms when applied to the surveyed
dataset.
Finally the combined results of all of the deterministic search algorithms were com-
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Table 4.21: A comparison of means of successful probes, between algorithms that employed random sampling
and deterministic algorithms tested against the randomised dataset. The Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test statistic and
p-Value indicate a significant di↵erence between the populations does not exist.
Algorithm type Experiment number Successful probes
Deterministic
Linear-1a 0.00
Linear-2a 0.00
Linear-3a 0.49
Pattern-1a 0.00
Stripe-1a 0.00
Stripe-2a 0.00
Stochastic
Adaptive-1a 100.00
GA-1a 0.00
GA-2a 0.00
GA-3a 0.00
MonteCarlo-1a 0.00
MonteCarlo-2a 1.20
Test statistic 139790
p-Value 1
Table 4.22: A comparison of means of successful probes, between algorithms that employed random sampling
and deterministic algorithms tested against the surveyed dataset. The Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test statistic and
p-Value indicate a significant di↵erence between the populations is present.
Algorithm type Experiment number Successful probes
Deterministic
Linear-1b 16284.00
Linear-2b 0.00
Linear-3b 8642.09
Pattern-1b 2543.00
Stripe-1b 0.00
Stripe-2b 4150.00
Stochastic
Adaptive-1b 10218.00
GA-1b 6.95
GA-2b 0.00
GA-3b 0.00
MonteCarlo-1b 0.00
MonteCarlo-2b 30.42
Test statistic 236740
p-Value <0.001
pared against the results of the stochastic search algorithms to determine if a significant
di↵erence existed between the groups. Again, the one-tailed Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test
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was employed to test the null hypothesis that µ = µ0, and to provide support for the
alternative hypothesis that µ > µ0 and that the di↵erence was significant at the the
95% confidence interval. The Wilcoxon test passed with a test statistic ofW = 748, 720
and a p-value of p = 0.026 highlighting that the results of the deterministic search al-
gorithms are significantly greater than those of the stochastic search algorithms when
applied to the combined results of the randomised and surveyed datasets (i.e. that
µ > µ0). It is possible to confidently reject the null hypothesis in this instance and
conclude that the deterministic search algorithms performed better across all of the
experiments that were carried out.
Table 4.23: A comparison of means of successful probes between algorithms that employed random sampling,
against those that employed deterministic algorithms across both datasets. The Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test
statistic and p-Value indicate a significant di↵erence between the populations is present.
Algorithm type Experiment number Successful probes
Deterministic
Linear-1a 0.00
Linear-1b 16284.00
Linear-2a 0.00
Linear-2b 0.00
Linear-3a 0.49
Linear-3b 8642.09
Pattern-1a 0.00
Pattern-1b 2543.00
Stripe-1a 0.00
Stripe-1b 0.00
Stripe-2a 0.00
Stripe-2b 4150.00
Stochastic
Adaptive-1a 100.00
Adaptive-1b 10218.00
GA-1a 0.00
GA-1b 6.95
GA-2a 0.00
GA-2b 0.00
GA-3a 0.00
GA-3b 0.00
MonteCarlo-1a 0.00
MonteCarlo-1b 0.00
MonteCarlo-2a 1.20
MonteCarlo-2b 30.42
Test statistic 748720
p-Value 0.026
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Overall the null hypothesis for Hypothesis H2 been accepted, and it can be con-
cluded that stochastic search methods are inappropriate for o↵-link host enumeration
against 64 bit subnetworks.
4.10.3 H3 : Randomly generated interface identifiers do not a↵ect the
performance of IPv6 host enumeration search algorithms.
Hypothesis H3 asserted that networks consisting of randomly generated IPv6 IIDs
would a↵ect the performance of IPv6 host enumeration search algorithms. To address
this hypothesis, a comparison between the results of the a and b sub-experiments has
been conducted. As mentioned in Chapter 3 the a sub-experiments applied the subject
algorithm (the independent variable) against the dataset that was constructed using
pseudorandom methods. This dataset was constructed to replicate an IPv6 network
that used stochastic address generation strategies, such as the SLAAC with privacy ex-
tensions, HBAs, or CGA-based IID construction schemes. Similarly, the b experiments
tested the subject algorithm against the dataset that was gathered from real-world
survey data. This dataset was used to replicate a hypothetical network that had been
configured with a variety of address types, including incremental assignment, modified
EUI-64-based SLAAC, randomised allocation, and pattern-based configuration.
For each of the experiments conducted, the number of successful probes of all
of the sub-experiments were compared. These comparisons were conducted using an
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test, to test the H30 null hypothesis that the ranked sums were
the same for each sub-experiment (i.e. that H30 : µ = µ0). The results of the Wilcoxon
Rank-Sum test, highlighting the significance at the confidence interval of 95% (i.e. that
p < 0.05) for each experiment are included in the corresponding experiment’s results
section above, and are summarised in Table 4.24 below.
It was observed that out of the 12 major experiments conducted, only five failed to
display a significant di↵erence between the ranked sums of the a and b sub-experiments.
From this, an overall comparison of the successful probes for both groups (i.e. sub-
experiments a and b) across all of the experiments was compiled and tested. This was
performed to determine whether a significant di↵erence exists between the two groups.
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Table 4.24: Results of hypothesis testing between the a and b sub-experiment populations for each experiment
at the 95% confidence interval (i.e. ↵ = 0.05). The test statistic for the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test is included,
along with the corresponding p-value for the test.
Experiment number Test statistic p-Value
Linear-1 0 p<0001
Linear-2 2525 1
Linear-3 170 p<0001
Stripe-1 2525 1
Stripe-2 0 p<0001
MonteCarlo-1 2525 1
MonteCarlo-2 0 p<0001
GA-1 0 p<0001
GA-2 2525 1
GA-3 2525 1
Pattern-1 0 p<0001
Adaptive-1 0 p<0001
Again, the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test was chosen to test the null hypothesis that there
is no di↵erence at the confidence interval of 95% (i.e. that p < 0.05) between the
ranked sums of sub-experiments a and sub-experiments b across all of the experiments.
The results of this test concluded with a p-value of p < 0.001 and a test statistic of
W = 387541.0, indicating that the null hypothesis can be rejected and that a significant
di↵erence exists between the ranked sums of both groups. From the results it is clearly
evident that the sub-experiments that targeted the network of stochastically generated
addresses performed worse than those that targeted the network that was configured
with real-world addresses.
The null hypothesis has therefore been rejected in this case. There was a significant
di↵erence identified between the two IPv6 address datasets. The experiments that
searched the randomly allocated IPv6 address dataset performed significantly worse
those that searched the surveyed dataset. This indicates that randomly generated
addresses do negatively impact on the performance of IPv6 host enumeration search
algorithms.
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4.10.4 H4 : Search methods that employ machine learning are unable
to enumerate networked devices on 64 bit IPv6 subnetworks.
Hypothesis H4 was concerned with identifying whether machine learning algorithms
and methods could be used to enumerate devices on IPv6 subnetworks. The null
hypothesis posed that machine learning methods are unable to enumerate any devices
(i.e. H40 : µ = µ0). The results of the experiments were used to disprove the null
hypothesis and provide support for the alternate hypothesis that machine learning
search techniques are able to enumerate networked devices on 64 bit IPv6 subnetworks
(i.e. H41 : µ > µ0). In order to disprove the null hypothesis, the results from the
experiments that employed machine learning strategies, were compared against an
expected result of 0. Table 4.25 displays the search algorithms that were classified as
machine learning-based, and those that were not.
Table 4.25: Table of the algorithms designed for the study and their classification indicating whether machine
learning methods are employed or not.
Machine learning Non-machine learning
GA Linear
Adaptive Stripe
MonteCarlo
Pattern
The non-parametric One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed-Ranked Test was used to test
the hypothesis with a target ↵ value of 0.05. The null hypothesis for the test stated
that the ranked means of the collected data were equal to 0. The test completed with
the test statistic V = 45, 150 and a p-value of p < 0.001. This indicates that in this test
the null hypothesis can be rejected with a high degree of confidence and the alternate
hypothesis that the ranked mean is greater than 0, can be accepted. Based upon these
results, it can be concluded that machine learning techniques can be used to enumerate
device on IPv6 networks.
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4.10.5 H5 : Search methods that employ machine learning do not per-
form better than search methods that do not employ machine
learning for IPv6 host enumeration.
Hypothesis H5 was concerned with identifying whether machine learning algorithms
and methods could perform better than non-machine learning methods for IPv6 host
enumeration. In this context a higher number of successful probes indicates better
performance. The null hypothesis posed that machine learning methods do not perform
better than non-machine learning techniques for the task. In order to disprove the null
hypothesis, the results from the experiments that employed machine learning strategies,
were compared against those that didn’t.
Table 4.26 highlights the results of the machine learning algorithms compared
against the non-machine learning algorithms for the randomly generated dataset (i.e.
the a sub-experiments). Similarly, Table 4.27 displays the results of the machine learn-
ing algorithms compared against the non-machine learning algorithms for the surveyed
dataset (i.e. the b sub-experiments). Finally, Table 4.28 reveals the results of the ma-
chine learning algorithms compared against the non-machine learning algorithms across
all of the sub-experiments. In order to test the hypothesis and determine whether ma-
chine learning algorithms perform better than non-machine learning algorithms when
applied to IPv6 host enumeration, comparisons were made between:
• The results of the a sub-experiments.
• The results of the b sub-experiments.
• The combined results of both sub-experiments (a and b).
A visual observations of the groups for this test (available in Table 4.26) indicates
that a di↵erence between the two populations is present. In order to determine whether
the results between the identified groups di↵ered significantly at the 95% confidence
interval (i.e. p < 0.05), the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test was used. When applied to the a
sub-experiments, the Wilcoxon test passed with a test statistic of W = 181850 and a
p-value of p < 0.001 indicating that a significant di↵erence between the two populations
exists. The results for this test are included in Table 4.26.
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Comparing the results from the sub-experiments performed against the surveyed
dataset between the machine learning and non-machine learning categories reveals no
visible di↵erence between the groups. To determine whether a statistically signific-
ant di↵erence between the data exists at the 95% confidence interval (p < 0.05), the
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test was employed. This test also failed with a test statistic of
W = 129270 and a p-value of p = 1 indicating that the results of the machine learning
experiments are not significantly greater than the results of the non-machine learning
experiments.
Finally, the results of all of the sub-experiments were tested. The data that were
gathered from the sub-experiments that employed machine learning techniques, com-
pared to those that did not employ machine learning techniques were tested to determ-
ine whether a statistically significant di↵erence existed between the groups. Again, the
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test was used to determine whether the ranked sums of the two
groups were di↵erent at the 95% confidence interval (i.e. p < 0.05). The outcome of
this test again failed to highlight a significant di↵erence between the two populations,
with a test value of W = 629410 and a p-value of p = 0.776.
The tests performed against the collected data failed to reveal a significant di↵er-
ence between the results of the two independent groups; the algorithms that employed
machine learning and those that did not employ machine learning. From the results
of testing the hypothesis H5 the null hypothesis must be accepted. It can therefore
be concluded that the algorithms that employed machine learning did not provide any
performance benefit over the algorithms that did not employ machine learning for IPv6
host enumeration.
204
Table 4.26: A comparison of means of successful probes, and the successful probes to process time ratio,
between experiments that employed machine learning and non-machine learning algorithms tested against the
randomised dataset. The outcome of the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test is included, and highlights a significant
di↵erence between the two populations at the 95% confidence interval.
Algorithm type Experiment number Successful probes
Machine learning
Adaptive-1a 100.00
GA-1a 0.00
GA-2a 0.00
GA-3a 0.00
Non-Machine learning
Linear-1a 0.00
Linear-2a 0.00
Linear-3a 0.49
Pattern-1a 0.00
Stripe-1a 0.00
Stripe-2a 0.00
MonteCarlo-1a 0.00
MonteCarlo-2a 1.20
Test statistic 181850
p-Value <0.001
Table 4.27: A comparison of means of successful probes, and the successful probes to process time ratio,
between experiments that employed machine learning and non-machine learning algorithms tested against the
surveyed dataset. The outcome of the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test is included, and highlights a lack of a significant
di↵erence between the two populations at the 95% confidence interval.
Algorithm type Experiment number Successful probes
Machine learning
Adaptive-1b 10218.00
GA-1b 6.95
GA-2b 0.00
GA-3b 0.00
Non-Machine learning
Linear-1b 16284.00
Linear-2b 0.00
Linear-3b 8642.09
Pattern-1b 2543.00
Stripe-1b 0.00
Stripe-2b 4150.00
MonteCarlo-1b 0.00
MonteCarlo-2b 30.42
Test statistic 129270
p-Value 1
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Table 4.28: A comparison of means of successful probes, and the successful probes to process time ratio,
between experiments that employed machine learning and non-machine learning algorithms against the results
for both datasets. The outcome of the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test is included, and highlights a lack of a significant
di↵erence between the two populations at the 95% confidence interval.
Algorithm type Experiment number Successful probes
Machine learning
Adaptive-1a 100.00
Adaptive-1b 10218.00
GA-1a 0.00
GA-1b 6.95
GA-2a 0.00
GA-2b 0.00
GA-3a 0.00
GA-3b 0.00
Non-Machine learning
Linear-1b 16284.00
Linear-1a 0.00
Linear-2b 0.00
Linear-2a 0.00
Linear-3b 8642.09
Linear-3a 0.49
Pattern-1b 2543.00
Pattern-1a 0.00
Stripe-1b 0.00
Stripe-1a 0.00
Stripe-2b 4150.00
Stripe-2a 0.00
MonteCarlo-1a 0.00
MonteCarlo-1b 0.00
MonteCarlo-2a 1.20
MonteCarlo-2b 30.42
Test statistic 629410
p-Value 0.776
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Chapter 5
Discussion of Findings
This chapter explores the relationship between the results of the experiments carried
out in this study, the research hypotheses and the research questions. The primary
research hypotheses were first introduced in Section 1.4. The experiments described in
Chapter 3 were used to test the research hypotheses. The outcomes of the hypothesis
testing from Chapter 4 served to answer the research questions described in Section 1.3.
The implications of how these results shape the landscape about the research topic are
also discussed in this chapter.
5.1 Outcomes of the research questions
The primary research questions that guided the research project were:
RQ1 Can networking devices be enumerated on IPv6 64 bit subnetworks using host
enumeration techniques?
RQ2 Are stochastic searching methods more e cient than deterministic searching meth-
ods when enumerating IPv6 hosts within a single 64 bit subnetwork?
RQ3 Do stochastic address allocation schemes within a single 64 bit subnetwork inhibit
IPv6 host enumeration strategies?
RQ4 Can machine-learning search methods be used to enumerate devices on a 64 bit
IPv6 subnetwork?
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RQ5 Are machine-learning search methods more e cient than non-machine learning
based methods when enumerating IPv6 hosts within a single 64 bit subnetwork?
After testing the primary hypotheses of the research using the experiments outlined
in Chapter 3, the results were used to provide answers to the research questions. The
relationship between the research questions and the hypotheses is displayed in Table 5.1
Table 5.1: Table displaying the relationship between the primary research questions and the hypotheses.
Research question Corresponding hypothesis
RQ1: Can networking devices be enumerated on IPv6
64 bit subnetworks using host enumeration techniques
in a timely manner?
H1: Search techniques are unable to enumerate net-
worked devices on 64 bit IPv6 subnetworks.
RQ2: Are stochastic searching methods more e↵ective
than deterministic searching methods when enumer-
ating IPv6 hosts within a single 64 bit subnetwork?
H2: Methods that employ random sampling do not
perform better than methods that do not employ ran-
dom sampling for IPv6 host enumeration.
RQ3: Do stochastic address allocation schemes within
a single 64 bit subnetwork inhibit IPv6 host enumer-
ation strategies?
H3: Randomly generated interface identifiers do not
a↵ect the performance of IPv6 host enumeration
search algorithms.
RQ4: Can machine learning search methods be used
to enumerate devices on a 64 bit IPv6 subnetwork?
H4: Search methods that employ machine learning
are unable to enumerate networked devices on 64 bit
IPv6 subnetworks.
RQ5: Are machine learning search methods more e -
cient than non-machine learning based methods when
enumerating IPv6 hosts within a single 64 bit subnet-
work?
H5: Search methods that employ machine learning do
not perform better than search methods that do not
employ machine learning for IPv6 host enumeration.
5.1.1 RQ1 : Can networking devices be enumerated on 64 bit IPv6
subnetworks using host enumeration techniques?
The literature surrounding this topic, as discussed previously in Section 2.3, supports
the notion that IPv6’s address space is too vast to enumerate e ciently. Under RFC-
4291 (Hinden & Deering, 2006), a standard IPv6 subnetwork size is defined as being 64
bits long. This translates to over 18 quintillion unique addresses per subnet. At a rate
of 1 million packets per second, would take 584,942.42 years to exhaustively enumerate
a 64 bit subnetwork. Hypothesis H1 sought to test the notion that IPv6 networks are
not susceptible to host enumeration, and asserted that networked devices on 64 bit
IPv6 subnetworks are unable to be enumerated using search techniques. To test this
hypothesis the combined results of all 24 sub-experiments were considered in H1.
From the results of the experiments conducted, the null hypothesis for Hypothesis
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H1 was rejected at the 95% confidence interval (i.e. ↵ = 0.05), indicating that it
is possible to enumerate devices on an IPv6 subnetwork. In particular, throughout
this research it was observed that a mean of 1749 successful probes were transmitted
per sub-experiment. These results represents 3.5% of the total number of configured
nodes for the randomly generated dataset, and 4.25% of the total number of configured
nodes for the surveyed dataset. Considering the scope of the problem, these results
are remarkable, and represent a significant finding for the research. Furthermore,
the maximum number of successful probes discovered during a single simulation was
16,284 during the Linear-1b sub-experiments which represented 39.55% of the total
configured hosts on the surveyed dataset. The outcomes of the hypothesis testing high-
light that host enumeration is possible against o↵-link 64 bit IPv6 subnetworks. This
finding provides a firm foundation for the expansion of further research into potential
IPv6 host enumeration search techniques and methods, and contradicts the accepted
position that IPv6 host enumeration is futile.
According to Jara, Ladid and Skarmeta (2013) and Zanella, Bui, Castellani, Van-
gelista and Zorzi (2014), IPv6 is positioned to see significant usage in IoT systems.
IoT systems typically include a large number of network-connected sensors (in excess
of 300, according to Zanella et al. (2014)), making IPv6 an appropriate choice for net-
work level communications. O↵-link host enumeration has an impact on the security
of the connected devices in IoT systems on IPv6 networks. The ability to locate nodes
on a network exposes nodes to potential attack even with an address space as vast as
a standard IPv6 subnetwork. It has been observed that IPv6 devices are not entirely
secure from o↵-link host enumeration. Although the large address space does a↵ord
devices more protection than equivalent IPv4 networks from host enumeration, the
means by which addresses are constructed can reduce the protection significantly.
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5.1.2 RQ2 : Are stochastic searching methods more e cient than
deterministic searching methods when enumerating IPv6 hosts
within a single 64 bit subnetworks?
The literature review process revealed two major categories of search algorithms used
for conducting host enumeration in IPv4; using linear search to sequentially enumerate
the target address space, or using some randomisation function to enumerate the target
address space in a non-sequential fashion. To determine whether the approaches can
translate e↵ectively to the IPv6 address space, the outcomes of Hypothesis H2 must
be considered.
Hypothesis H2 suggested that search techniques that utilise random sampling do
not perform better than those that don’t. The null hypothesis for Hypothesis H3 was
accepted in light of the results of this research. That is to say that the results strongly
suggest that random sampling approaches are not appropriate for searching 64 bit IPv6
subnetworks. It was observed that the majority of the algorithms that depended on
random sampling failed to produce significant or meaningful results. In the majority of
the experiments, the purely stochastic methods failed to yield a single successful probe
throughout all simulations. The exception to this was the Adaptive-heuristic search
algorithm, which successfully managed to enumerate an average of 10,218 hosts from
the surveyed dataset.
The results of the sub-experiments involving the linear search algorithms against
the surveyed IPv6 dataset validate that host enumeration strategies used in the IPv4
realm are valid strategies to use against IPv6 networks. Out of all of the experiments
conducted, the linear search algorithm performed the strongest on average. This is
evidenced by the results of Linear-1b and Linear-3b, which successfully enumerated
an average of 16,284 and 8,642 nodes respectively. These results show that the linear
search strategy is still a valid enumeration strategy against IPv6 networks. The time
constraints of conducting an exhaustive search, however, need to be acknowledged. As
is suggested by the literature and supported by the results of this research, with current
computing resources, it would certainly be infeasible to conduct an exhaustive search
against an IPv6 network. Not only would it be infeasible with respect to the time
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costs associated with the exercise, an exhaustive search of the address space might not
reveal all of the hosts on the network. Hosts on a computer network may connect and
disconnect many times throughout the lifespan of a search operation.
These findings rule the Monte Carlo method out from being a candidate for IPv6
host enumeration strategies. Other strategies, such as using LCGs or generalised Feistel
algorithms (such as those employed by zmap and masscan) would not be recommended
approaches to enumerating an o↵-link, 64 bit IPv6 network. Instead it would be recom-
mended to focus on deterministic search methods (such as the Linear search or Stripe
search algorithms), or search techniques that exploit predictability or repeating pat-
terns in IPv6 addresses (such as the Pattern-based heuristic search algorithm). Despite
being classified as stochastic, the adaptive-heuristic search method performed partic-
ularly well and is a recommended candidate algorithm for usage in host enumeration
exercises.
Stochastic search methods have been used in IPv4 host enumeration strategies as
a mechanism to randomly sample the address space, as well as to distribute the load
of searching. The density of public IPv4 address allocation and usage enable random
sampling search methods to operate e↵ectively, since the majority of the relatively
small address space is utilised. The same is not true for IPv6. The public IPv6 address
space is sparsely populated when compared to IPv4’s public address space. In relation
to IPv6 search e↵orts, this research has shown random sampling to be ine↵ective. The
problem can be likened to the ”needle in a haystack” problem, except on a much larger
scale.
5.1.3 RQ3 : Do stochastic address allocation schemes within a single
64 bit subnetworks inhibit IPv6 host enumeration strategies?
Stochastically generated IIDs are a proposed solution to address the privacy issues that
have been identified with IPv6 address construction methods. In particular, perman-
ent or semi-permanent IIDs can be used to track devices even as they roam amongst
di↵erent networks. Additionally, with SLAAC generated addresses that conform to the
modified EUI-64 construction scheme, the link layer address of a device is derivable from
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the IPv6 address. Currently privacy extensions for SLAAC are recommended to mit-
igate the risk of exposing potentially identifiable information (in particular a device’s
MAC address), to the wider public Internet. Other methods of generating randomised
addresses, such as hash-based addresses, or cryptographically generated addresses, have
also been proposed to address the privacy concerns arising from deterministic address
construction schemes. Hypothesis H3 was concerned with determining whether these
proposed stochastically generated IIDs provide protection against host enumeration in
IPv6 networks.
As was expected, in light of the literature, the research failed to disprove the null
hypothesis of Hypothesis H3. The majority of experiments that targeted the network
configured with randomly generated addresses failed to yield any significant results.
The maximum number of hosts discovered on the network configured with randomly
generated addresses was 100, or 0.2% of the total configured devices on that network.
This is in contrast to 39.55% of devices that were discovered on the network that was
configured to reflect real-world addresses, which represents a significant portion of the
configured addresses. It can be concluded, therefore, that stochastic address allocations
schemes do inhibit o↵-link IPv6 host enumeration strategies.
The observations made from the research align with the available literature that
suggest that it would be di cult to locate addresses that use randomisation func-
tions to generate IIDs. Since the generation of secure addresses can be likened to a
cryptographic problem, cryptographic approaches are required to resolve it. The ap-
proaches used with HBAs and CGAs are therefore appropriate. That is provided that
the randomisation function is correctly implemented, and in the case of PRNG-based
solutions, seeded appropriately. This caveat is to reduce the opportunity for patterns,
or other deterministic features to arise from the address construction process, which
would reduce the security of the approach. This finding does reinforce the notion that
good privacy and protection from o↵-link host enumeration e↵orts can be achieved by
using stochastic means to generate IIDs. However, randomised address construction
should not be the only defence measure employed. Such an approach should be taken
as a part of a complete defence in depth strategy.
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5.1.4 RQ4 : Can machine learning search methods be used to enu-
merate devices on a 64 bit IPv6 subnetwork?
Machine learning systems have thus far not been applied to the problem of host enu-
meration, let alone specifically against IPv6 systems. This research has pioneered the
approach. The adaptive and GA algorithms used machine learning in order to influence
their search patterns, whilst the other algorithms tested did not. The adaptive search
algorithm employed a decision making system in order to critically assess each dis-
covered address and alter its search approach accordingly. Discovered addresses were
classified, and then further targets were added for searching based upon the outcome
of the classification.
The GA search algorithm used an evolutionary process to ‘breed’ potential search
candidates. Target addresses were subject to fitness testing to determine whether they
were strong candidates for further breeding. This strategy was chosen since it was
expected that the algorithm would probe addresses in clusters throughout the address
space. It was shown through the various pilot studies for the algorithm that there
was a tendency for the GA to group targets throughout the address space. Like the
adaptive search algorithm, the GA represents a novel approach to host enumeration
that had not been attempted prior to this study.
To determine whether machine learning search methods could be used to enumerate
devices on IPv6 subnetworks, Hypothesis H4 was devised and tested. Hypothesis H4
asserted that machine learning methods cannot be used to enumerate devices on IPv6
subnetworks. The test revealed that at the 95% confidence interval, the results of
the machine learning experiments were significantly greater than 0. Consequently,
the null hypothesis was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis that machine learning
search techniques could be used to enumerate devices on 64 bit IPv6 subnetworks was
accepted.
The GA performed poorly overall, successfully probing a maximum of 0 out of
50,000 nodes against the randomised dataset and a maximum of 12 out of 41,171
possible nodes to probe against the surveyed dataset (0.03% of the possible hosts on
the network). By contrast, the adaptive algorithm performed better than the majority
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of the algorithms tested, ranking second overall by average successful probes. The
algorithm successfully enumerated on average 10,218 hosts on the surveyed network
(or 24.8% of possible hosts on that network), and 100 hosts on the randomly generated
dataset (or 0.2% of possible hosts on that network).
It was observed from this research that machine learning algorithms can be used to
enumerate hosts on an IPv6 network. Machine learning approaches have been success-
fully applied to a number of computer science problems. The results of this research
highlight that machine learning techniques should be considered for further research
into emerging host enumeration algorithms.
5.1.5 RQ5 : Are machine learning searching methods more e cient
than non-machine learning based methods when enumerating
IPv6 hosts within a single 64 bit subnetworks?
To answer this research question, Hypothesis H5 was tested. Hypothesis H5 asserted
that machine learning methods were not more e↵ective than non-machine learning
methods for IPv6 host enumeration purposes. The null hypothesis for Hypothesis
H5 was accepted since there was no statistically significant di↵erence between the
algorithms that employed machine learning and those that did not employ machine
learning at the 95% confidence interval.
Although a lack of statistical di↵erence indicates that machine learning approaches
did not perform better than non-machine learning approaches during this study, there
is still potential for machine learning in IPv6 host enumeration. The adaptive search
algorithm, for example, successfully enumerated an average of 10,218 hosts across all
simulations conducted across the surveyed dataset. It also successfully enumerated an
average of 100 hosts against the randomly generated dataset. These results ranked
amongst the highest recorded results throughout the research.
The machine learning domain shows promise for host enumeration, however has
not been fully explored by this research. Further development into machine learn-
ing approaches for host enumeration is required to improve the performance of the
algorithms.
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5.2 Implications of research
This research has made a number of significant contributions to knowledge. These
contributions are noted in the coming sections.
5.2.1 Host enumeration classification framework
A classification system for host enumeration strategies was introduced in Chapter 2.
Two major categories of host enumeration were identified: active and passive enumera-
tion. Active enumeration involves strategies that involve the direct probing of systems
in order to enumerate devices. Examples of active enumeration include TCP SYN
scanning, ICMP ping sweeps, or ARP ping sweeps. Within the active enumeration
category, a five component framework for active host enumeration methods was in-
troduced. The five major components identified for active host enumeration methods
were:
• The target address space: the address(es) or range of addresses that are to be
probed during the host enumeration exercise. This forms the object of interest
for the host enumeration.
• Probe targets: The delivery addresses of the probes. Usually the same as the
target address space, but in certain situations may di↵er (e.g. when querying
IPv6 local multicast groups to enumerate o↵-link nodes, or when targeting link
layer addresses when using ARP ping to enumerate devices).
• The search algorithm: the order by which targets are probed. Typically the
search algorithm is either sequential or uses some randomisation function.
• The protocol: the protocol that is used to probe the target address(es) and
measure the response. For example TCP SYN segments, ICMPv6 echo requests,
or ARP requests.
• The probe payload: the data attached to the probe. In some cases, for vulner-
ability testing or malicious activities, payload may be included in the probe to
trigger a response on a target. As an example, the Shellshock vulnerability in
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2014 could be exploited by sending malformed Bash strings as the payload (in
particular the User Agent string) in HTTP requests. In other cases the payload
may simply be arbitrary data.
Passive enumeration involved conducting host enumeration without directly probing
the target system (i.e. the reconnaissance subject). This can be achieved through
strategies such as passive network monitoring, querying ancillary network services (e.g.
DNS, SNMP, etc.) or looking at DHCP leases or ARP/NDP tables. Within the passive
enumeration category four major components were identified:
1. The reconnaissance subject: The target of interest to the enumeration exercise.
This could be network, website, domain name, host address, etc.
2. The reconnaissance object: The system that is under observations for determining
live hosts. For example, in a DNS enumeration the DNS server being queried
would be the reconnaissance object.
3. The protocol: The protocol refers to the underlying protocol being used against
the reconnaissance object to enumerate devices. Continuing with the DNS enu-
meration example, the protocol would be the DNS protocol.
4. The payload: The information that is being examined to gain information about
the reconnaissance subject (such as enumeration of devices). For example, the
DNS requests and responses containing valid IP addresses.
5.2.2 Privacy issues with IPv6 address construction
This research highlighted potential privacy issues with IPv6 address construction that
could be used to monitor activities of device owners. The research identified that three
classes of address construction could be inferred without any context or prior knowledge
of how an address was formed. These classes were;
• EUI-64 addresses (or SLAAC addresses without privacy extensions) which in-
cluded IIDs that had undergone the modified EUI-64 process to convert a 48 bit
link-layer MAC address into a 64 bit IPv6 IID.
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• Incremental or statically assigned addresses, which included addresses that were
low range numbers, or included hexadecimal word substitution, or conformed to
an assignment policy specified by an administrator.
• Randomised addresses (or SLAAC with privacy extensions), which included ad-
dresses that have been cryptographically generated or are indistinguishably ran-
dom.
These findings were published in Carpene and Woodward (2012) and the identified
classes formed the basis for the classification system that was developed for this re-
search.
5.2.3 IPv6 address classification system
A classification system developed during the course of this study (which has been pub-
lished in Carpene et al. (IN PRESS)) provides evidence that machine learning systems,
such as ANNs and naive Bayesian classifiers, can be used to classify IPv6 address IID
construction. This classification system utilised machine learning algorithms to de-
termine whether IPv6 IIDs were constructed using modified EUI-64, a randomisation
function, or whether they had be assigned using an incremental or static addressing
scheme.
Such a classification system has potential benefits for usage, not only in IPv6 host
enumeration search strategies, but with other systems that process IP addresses, such
as IDS, IPS and security information and event management (SIEM) systems. IPv6
address classification could be used to provide metrics for detection and classification
of threat actors for alerted activity in threat detection systems.
5.2.4 IPv6 usage survey
The first phase of the research (Phase 1: Perform survey of IPv6 usage) involved a
passive host enumeration survey of public DNS services to gather IPv6 addresses. It was
revealed that despite recommendations and best practices from authorities such as the
IETF, the majority of collected addresses from public information sources conformed
to the incremental or statically assigned address class. This exercise represented novel
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research that shed light on the real-world usage habits of IPv6. The IPv6 survey
research was published in Carpene et al. (IN PRESS).
5.2.5 Significant advancements to o↵-link IPv6 host enumeration
This research marks the first empirical study conducted that tests the e cacy of various
host enumeration algorithms against IPv6 networks. The literature surrounding the
topic suggests that the address space is too vast to feasibly enumerate. However, whilst
tools have been developed for the task this marks the first formal research conducted
about the topic.
The e↵ectiveness of multiple host enumeration algorithms were compared to de-
termine which algorithms are candidates for host enumeration exercises against IPv6
networks. Algorithms that are currently employed during IPv4 host enumeration exer-
cises were tested for their e cacy in IPv6 host enumeration. An empirical comparison
and analysis of host enumeration search methods has thus far not been conducted, and
constitutes a significant contribution to knowledge from this research. This analysis
revealed that some search methods are not suited to IPv6 host enumeration. In partic-
ular, stochastic, or randomised search algorithms failed to enumerate any meaningful
quantity of hosts during the experiments. The deterministic algorithms performed
substantially better overall, implying that e↵orts should be directed towards them for
further development of search algorithms.
A number of novel approaches to searching a 64 bit IPv6 subnetwork were presented
in this research project. The adaptive heuristic host enumeration algorithm represents a
novel approach to host enumeration and a significant contribution to knowledge made
by this research. The algorithm incorporates both active and passive enumeration
strategies, as well as machine learning to improve the probability of identifying hosts.
This approach has, thus far, not been attempted as a strategy for enumeration. The
algorithm (described in Chapter 3) first conducts passive enumeration of the target
address space. The addresses that are gathered from the passive enumeration are
classified using a machine learning classification system, to determine how the address
IIDs were constructed. Based upon the classification results of each address, new
targets are computed, and compiled into the target address list, for searching.
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Additionally, the use of machine learning and decision making constructs for host
enumeration is a novel approach to the problem that was tested during this research. As
mentioned above, the adaptive heuristic search algorithm employed machine learning
in order to classify addresses, as well as to influence its search operations. A genetic
algorithm was also tested that employed machine learning. The genetic algorithm used
an evolutionary process to generate target addresses and probe them. It was discovered
that machine learning systems can be e↵ective for use in host enumeration. This
foundational research paves the way for future studies to expand upon, and improve the
applicability of machine learning search algorithms for o↵-link IPv6 host enumeration.
5.2.6 Host enumeration scenarios
In addition to the contributions to knowledge detailed above, the following real-world
applications of the research findings are presented. The findings of this research influ-
ence the approach that should be taken when applying host enumeration to real-world
IPv6 networks. The findings have identified recommended approaches for host enumer-
ation, depending on the information that is available to the initiator of the enumeration
exercise.
5.2.6.1 Blind search
In real-world scenarios actors would have access to varying amounts of information
when performing host enumeration. For example, an attacker targeting a public net-
work with disclosed public services may have access to information such as DNS records
for nodes. On the contrary, a network administrator on an entirely private network may
have no additional information available other than the protocol (e.g. IPv6 or IPv4)
that the network uses. Blind searching refers to situations where additional context or
information about the target is not available, e↵ectively leaving the agent blind.
In a situation where an actor has no prior knowledge about the target IPv6 net-
work, nor any prior information about common protocol usage (such as those tested in
stochastic settings), the linear search provides the best chance for locating networked
nodes. However, if the nodes in the search space are randomly distributed, the results
of this study show that there is e↵ectively no chance of locating such addresses. At this
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point, the actor should consider alternative avenues for locating nodes in the address
space.
5.2.6.2 Context-aware search
Context aware searching refers to situations where an actor has access to resources,
such as public DNS, for reconnaissance purposes when performing host enumeration.
Unlike blind searching, context-aware searches leverage any available information in
order to improve the probability of discovering the reconnaissance subject’s networked
devices.
It has been shown from this research that combining passive and active enumeration
strategies can produce good results from o↵-link IPv6 host enumeration exercises. The
results of the Adaptive-1 (experiments Adaptive-1a and Adaptive-1b) imply that
search methods that employ passive and active enumeration methods, in conjunction
with machine learning form a robust strategy for host enumeration.
In a real-world situation it would be recommended to incorporate passive and act-
ive methods into a host enumeration exercise in order to increase the likelihood of
discovering hosts.
5.2.7 Parallel processing
The study has also displayed the benefits of parallel processing systems in conducting
time-consuming research. Parallel processing was used successfully to conduct trials in-
volving applying di↵erent algorithms to the test datasets. By executing the simulations
for an experiment in parallel, the total cost of the time to complete the simulations
was reduced considerably.
The total processing time for the recorded search operations carried out during the
study was 387,783,500 seconds. This means that approximately 12.3 years of processing
time was consumed throughout this research. Without parallel processing capabilities
the research could not have been as extensive, since the time costs would have been
far too great to overcome.
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5.3 Critical review of the research process
This research has revealed a number of significant findings relating to IPv6 and host
enumeration. In particular o↵-link host enumeration search algorithms have been de-
vised and tested, which will pave the way for future research into host enumeration.
There are aspects of the research that would have been done di↵erently if the oppor-
tunity was presented. In particular rather than focus on the search algorithms, I would
have tested a variety of complete host enumeration strategies against live systems. Al-
though the decision was made to focus on the search algorithms it would have been
rewarding to contribute a host enumeration toolkit to the research community. In any
case converting the search algorithms that were developed for this research into live
scanning tools and testing them in a natural environment is a logical progression to
this work.
Additionally, the decision was made to utilise the Wilcoxon ranked tests to test
the research hypotheses. This decision may have a↵ected the research outcomes, since
the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranked test is 95% as e cient as the independent samples t-test
(Sheskin, 2000). If the data were normally distributed the one-sample t-test would
have been chosen over the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranked test. Likewise the independent
sample t-test would have been chosen over the Wilcoxon Ranked-Sum test. Overall,
the decision to use the Wilcoxon tests was made because the data were non-parametric
and the tests were deemed appropriate.
Another decision that was made that may have a↵ected the research process was
the decision to use Python to create the experimental computer programs. This de-
cision was made early on in the research process, since it was simple to realise the
algorithms designed for the experiments into Python code. Throughout the pilot stud-
ies the Python programs performed acceptably. It wasn’t until testing with the actual
experimental parameters (such as 232 probes to transmit) that the extent of the time
costs became apparent. Even considering the programs were executed on parallel sys-
tems some of the experiments took weeks to complete. The process completion times
were also potentially impacted by the load on the clustered computer system. Large
di↵erences between the maximum and minimum processing times of simulations were
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evident in the results. It is likely that these di↵erences arose from variations in the
number of tasks being concurrently performed on the clustered computer system. In
the future I would more carefully manage the performance of the system conducting
the experiments, to ensure that there is no impact on the results.
If I had to perform the research again, I would have chosen to prototype the design
of the algorithms using Python, and then use a lower level language such as C or Julia to
write all of the programs for conducting the actual research. I would be more mindful
of the limitations of a programming language or other materials, when conducting
research in the future.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Research overview
This thesis sought to identify appropriate algorithms to use in IPv6 host enumeration
search strategies. The research also included testing and validating existing techniques
for host enumeration for their applicability to IPv6 host enumeration. The testing
included techniques that are used against the IPv4 and IPv6 protocols. In particular,
this research was concerned with identifying e↵ective search methods for enumerating
an o↵-link 64 bit subnetwork. Appropriate strategies for performing host enumeration
have been established for application to IPv4 networks (both on and o↵-link), as well as
on-link enumeration for IPv6 networks. This research topic was identified in Chapter 1,
where it was explained that while there are appropriate and accepted methods for on-
link host enumeration against IPv6 networks, the same cannot be said for o↵-link
enumeration.
6.1.1 Host enumeration problem space
The literature surrounding the topic has suggested that the address space is too vast to
conventionally search using exhaustive methods. The results of this research support,
and provide evidence for this claim. It is, with current computational resources, it
is too expensive to conduct an exhaustive enumeration of an IPv6 network. Due to
these assertions, little attention has been paid to o↵-link IPv6 host enumeration in the
literature.
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Whilst three major categories of search techniques have been presented for o↵-
link IPv6 host enumeration, no reported testing has been conducted to determine the
e cacy of said techniques. These three categories of search algorithm are; linear (se-
quential) search, randomisation functions, and pattern-heuristic searching. The linear
search technique is commonly used with IPv4 host enumeration tools, and has also
been applied to IPv6 host enumeration tools. Randomisation techniques have also
been used in IPv4. However, tools that support randomised search in IPv6 are not
available. Finally, pattern-heuristics rely on techniques that exploit predictable ele-
ments of the IPv6 addressing schemes (such as low range incremental assignments, or
hexadecimal word injection) to target predictable addresses. Even though these meth-
ods have been inferred from available tools designed to perform the host enumeration
task, little information is available that has undergone peer review.
6.1.2 Method and procedure
The study was conducted in five phases. First, a passive host enumeration survey was
conducted into the usage habits of IPv6 in real-world scenarios. A DNS enumeration
exercise was chosen to conduct the survey. The results were then used to determine the
types of algorithms that could be developed and applied to the search problem. The
survey phase also provided the IPv6 addresses that formed the target network devices
for search experiments.
Second, the subject host discovery algorithms were generated. A total of six unique
algorithms were chosen as the subjects of the controlled, laboratory-based experiments.
These algorithms were the; linear search; Stripe search; Monte Carlo search; Pattern-
based heuristic search; Adaptive heuristic search; and GA search algorithms. These
algorithms were designed to perform searches of the target address space in varied
ways.
Third, the experiments were developed. The experimental process and accompa-
nying computer programs were constructed in this phase. The experiments consisted
of testing a search algorithm against two IPv6 address datasets. Because of this,
each experiment was split into two sub-experiments (an a and b sub-experiment) that
tested the subject algorithm against the randomly generated and surveyed IPv6 ad-
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dress datasets respectively. The research assumed testing against two target 64 bit
IPv6 subnetworks; one where nodes were configured with addresses that were allocated
at random, and one where nodes were configured with addresses that were allocated
to resemble real world addressing schemes. As such, each experiment was performed
against two datasets of valid addresses, one generated stochastically and one generated
from the survey phase of the study.
Fourth, the experiments were performed. Each experiment was run on a cluster of
computing devices that shared processing resources. The computer programs written
in phase 3 were executed in parallel on the computer cluster. The parameters used to
control each sub-experiment are detailed in Chapter 3.
Finally the results were gathered from the experiments and analysed. The inform-
ation gained from the analysis served to provide the answers to the research questions,
as well as suggest further recommendations in light of the study.
6.2 Major conclusions and implications of research
6.2.1 Can networking devices be enumerated on 64 bit IPv6 subnet-
works using techniques?
The consensus across the literature is that o↵-link enumeration is not feasible to conduct
against IPv6 networks. According to Hinden and Deering (2006), a standard IPv6
subnetwork should be 64 bits long, leaving 64 bits for possible host addresses. At a
rate of 1,000,000 generic probes per second, an exhaustive enumeration of a 64 bit
subnetwork would take 584,942.42 years. It has been suggested that IPv6 networks are
not susceptible to o↵-link host enumeration. In contrast on-link enumeration can be
achieved with little di culty in IPv6 due to link-local discovery techniques involving
multicast groups. Whilst the research supports that an exhaustive enumeration is
infeasible, it has been demonstrated that devices on IPv6 networks can be enumerated
by o↵-link actors.
It was observed that if hosts within an IPv6 subnetwork have been configured
using pattern-based, or wordy IPv6 addresses, some degree of host enumeration can
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be successfully employed. Likewise, if the address space uses low range incremental
interface identifiers, there is little di↵erence between performing host discovery against
an IPv6 network and an IPv4 network. O↵-link IPv6 host enumeration is possible and
viable. However, this research has shown that it is not as comprehensive as it can be
against IPv4 networks. It is expected that deterministic methods of host configuration
will become increasingly less common as the security and privacy issues associated with
such methods are exposed.
6.2.2 Are stochastic searching methods more e cient than determ-
inistic searching methods when enumerating IPv6 hosts within
a single 64 bit subnetworks?
IPv4 host enumeration strategies often employ randomisation functions to achieve an
even distribution of probes across the entire address space. Randomisation and per-
mutation functions attempt to prevent overloading distant networks that are spatially
close together. The e↵ectiveness and applicability for the usage of target randomisa-
tion functions in IPv6 host enumeration strategies was tested and validated. It was
observed that overall the randomisation functions failed to produce any meaningful
results, and therefore the stochastic methods of searching were not appropriate for
the problem. The deterministic methods performed better overall, and are therefore
the recommended approach to developing host enumeration search algorithms for IPv6
searching.
6.2.3 Do stochastic address allocation schemes within a single 64 bit
subnetworks inhibit IPv6 host enumeration strategies?
IPv6 introduces a number of address allocation schemes designed to create high en-
tropy host addresses for IPv6 devices. These schemes, including privacy extensions for
SLAAC, hash-based addresses and CGAs, aim to protect hosts from host enumeration
attempts, as well as prevent the personally identifiable information from being leaked
through IPv6 addresses. This security through obscurity measure is claimed to improve
the privacy of users and devices since they are less susceptible to active o↵-link enu-
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meration. This research validated these claims by testing the o↵-link host enumeration
search algorithms against two networks, one which was configured using high entropy
IIDs, and one that used IIDs gathered in a passive enumeration exercise, represent-
ative of the common usage of the protocol. The results of the experiments indicate
that the high entropy addresses provide significant protection from active o↵-link host
enumeration.
It is the recommendation of this thesis that operating systems adopt high entropy
addressing as the primary means for allocating IPv6 IIDs, rather than using modified
EUI-64 IIDs, or sequential addressing. Having IIDs distributed randomly throughout
the address space complicates host enumeration to the point of infeasibility, and the
protection it o↵ers is not insignificant. However, for network administrators there is a
requirement to ensure that adequate inventory is maintained. This means that systems
like DNS, IP address management systems and, if required, DHCPv6 servers must be
su ciently utilised. This will assist in easing the administrative burden of locating
devices with semi-permanent or even permanent high entropy addresses on an IPv6
network.
6.2.4 Can machine learning search methods be used to enumerate
devices on a 64 bit IPv6 subnetwork?
Machine learning techniques have, thus far, not been applied to the problem of host
enumeration. This research sought to determine whether machine learning techniques
could be successfully applied to the problem. The research tested a GA as well as
a decision system that utilised artificial neural networks, in an e↵ort to answer the
research question.
It was discovered that machine learning systems can be e↵ective at enumerating
hosts on IPv6 networks, and that they are also e↵ective at classifying IIDs based
upon how they were constructed. The adaptive heuristic algorithm performed better
than almost all of the other algorithms tested, and highlights that machine learning
systems can be used successfully in host enumeration search algorithms. The GA did
not perform so admirably, and it was concluded that the approach is inappropriate for
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search operations without significant changes.
6.2.5 Are machine learning searching methods more e cient than
non-machine learning based methods when enumerating IPv6
hosts within a single 64 bit subnetworks?
Although machine learning-based search algorithms were able to enumerate devices
on o↵-link IPv6 subnetworks, the algorithms that did not employ machine learning
performed better overall. It was concluded that non-machine learning search algorithms
are a more appropriate choice for most IPv6 host enumeration scenarios. Despite this
finding the adaptive heuristic search algorithm did perform remarkably well.
Further research is required to improve the performance of machine learning search
methods for o↵-link IPv6 host enumeration. Particular focus on the GA may aid in
improving the search algorithm’s ability to locate nodes in known-unknown situations.
6.3 Recommendations and future research
From the findings, it is recommended that network administrators wishing to pro-
tect their networked devices from unsolicited o↵-link IPv6 host enumeration attempts
should make use of high entropy (randomly generated or CGA-based) IPv6 addresses.
These addresses o↵er the most security against host enumeration attempts, as evid-
enced by the results of this research.
Additionally, the usage of IPv4-in-IPv6 style addresses, incremental IIDs, wordy
addresses, or other predictable address construction methods greatly increases suscept-
ibility to o↵-link IPv6 host enumeration e↵orts. For administrators who wish to ensure
their devices can be enumerated through host enumeration methods it is recommended
that predictable address construction means are used.
Although it was not addressed specifically in this research, it is important to note
that one can maintain a high degree of privacy and mitigate host enumeration tech-
niques with a combination of high entropy IID assignments, and a su cient IP address
management system, in addition to proper DNS management.
Future research could see the algorithms tested in this research employed against
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live networked devices in a field experiment. Section 3.2 explained why lab experiments
were chosen to over field or natural experiments for this study. Now that the algorithms
have been developed and tested in a purely controlled environment, the natural pro-
gression is to test their e↵ectiveness in an uncontrolled, live environment. In particular,
the adaptive, pattern-based heuristic, stripe search and linear search algorithms have
shown great potential as candidates for real-world testing.
These algorithms could be used to aid in similar research e↵orts such as ‘Internet
Census 2012’ (2013) and Heidemann et al. (2008) as well as provide a means for con-
ducting vulnerability assessments of Internet-based devices in a similar vein to Heninger
et al. (2012) and Durumeric et al. (2014).
This research also succeeded in providing a sample of a small scale passive host
enumeration of IPv6 addresses using a DNS enumeration. This research can be of use
in determining how IPv6 is being utilised in the real world by agents that provide
public services. The DNS enumeration is expected to be expanded, and form part of
ongoing longitudinal research into IPv6 usage patterns. The machine learning address
classification system will play an important role in future studies of this nature.
In addition, the IID classification system developed for this research may aid in
defensive detection systems such as IDSs or SIEMs. Such systems could employ the
technology to assess the address construction class of the actor that activities originate
from. This data could assist in providing insight into how threat actors are utilising
IPv6 for malicious purposes, and therefore improve detection and response strategies
for such events.
Similarly, another potential avenue for research that has arisen from this study
is to consider the host enumeration attempts from the destination’s perspective, and
determine the search method that is being employed. This research could aid in the
early detection and prevention of malicious tra c entering a network. The research
data could also be used to determine whether there are other search strategies being
employed in the real world that have yet to be published.
Finally, passive enumeration strategies are an area of potential future research for
IPv6 systems. There is an abundance of information that can be correlated from
passive monitoring of network transmissions. When combined with active enumeration,
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a comprehensive enumeration strategy may be achievable against IPv6 networks.
6.4 Final thoughts
This thesis has demonstrated that host enumeration is possible in IPv6 networks. It is
not safe to assume that deploying IPv6 provides inherent protection against IPv6 host
enumeration exercises, especially in critical systems.
The best search algorithms to use are the Linear search, Adaptive search, Pattern
search and Stripe search algorithms. These algorithms produced the most positive
results, and performed better than the other algorithms that were tested. Further
improvements to the fitness function and operations of the GA could see that as another
viable alternative. However, it did not perform well during this research.
IPv6 is an emerging technology and one that has the potential to shape the land-
scape of network communications for many years to come. More research is required
to ensure this protocol meets the needs of its users.
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Glossary
ANN Artificial neural network. A type of machine learning system that simulates the
human brain. 49, 50, 51, 85, 110
ARP Address Resolution Protocol. A network-layer discovery protocol used within
IPv4 to resolve link-layer addresses. 4, 13, 26, 36, 37, 38, 39, 44, 45
BYOD Bring your own device. A policy relating to the use of arbitrary unmanaged
personal devices on corporate networks. 3
CGA Cryptographically Generated Address. A method for generating IPv6 addresses
with cryptographic properties that is defined in RFC-3972 (Aura, 2005). CGAs
use a portion of the host’s public key to enable the addresses to be authenticated
by other devices. 23, 25, 72, 200, 212, 226
DNS Domain name system. A system used to map IP numbers to host names. 37,
42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 70, 71, 109, 224, 228, 229
GA Genetic algorithm. An evolutionary computing algorithm that simulates biolo-
gical evolutionary processes. xvii, 77, 91, 101, 102, 158, 159, 163, 167, 169, 213,
224, 227, 228, 230
HBA Hash-Based Address. A method for generating IPv6 addresses with crypto-
graphic properties that is defined in RFC-5535 (Bagnulo, 2009). HBAs apply a
cryptographic hashing function to generate a visually random address. 25, 200,
212
241
host enumeration The act of locating active nodes on a computer network. 1, 52,
223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230
ICMPv4 Internet Control Message Protocol version 4. A messaging protocol used
within IPv4 for communications at TCP/IP layer 2 and OSI layer 3. 40
ICMPv6 Internet Control Message Protocol version 6. A messaging protocol used
heavily within IPv6 for communications at TCP/IP layer 2 and OSI layer 3. 4,
40, 41, 58
IID Interface Identifier. The host portion of an IPv6 address. According to RFC-4291
(Hinden & Deering, 2006), the IID should be 64 bits long. xi, xii, xv, xviii, 17,
20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 36, 49, 50, 51, 57, 80, 85, 89, 109, 110, 113, 130, 132, 142, 156,
157, 162, 173, 177, 184, 185, 200, 211, 212, 216, 217, 218, 226, 227, 228, 229
IoT Internet of Things. An emerging technology that involves autonomous machine-
to-machine communications. 3
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4. An OSI layer 3, TCP/IP Layer 2 networking pro-
tocol. IPv4 uses 32 bits to address network nodes. i, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, 15, 16,
18, 20, 21, 26, 28, 29, 31, 33, 34, 38, 40, 44, 45, 46, 47, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 223,
225, 226
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6. An OSI layer 3, TCP/IP Layer 2 networking pro-
tocol. IPv6 uses 128 bits to address network nodes. i, ii, vii, viii, xi, xvii, 1, 2, 4,
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223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230
NAT Network Address Translation. A mechanism to map many network addresses to
one or many network addresses. Prominently used with IPv4 to prevent exhaus-
tion of the address space resources. 1, 58
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NDP Neighbour Discovery Protocol. IPv6’s discovery protocol used to enable com-
munications between IPv6 enabled devices. 36, 39
NIQ Node Information Query. An ICMP message type that requests information from
another IP enabled device.. 37, 41
SLAAC Stateless Address Auto-configuration. A method defined in RFC-2462 (Thom-
son & Narten, 1998) for devices to generate their own unique IPv6 addresses
statelessly. 22, 23, 24, 57, 58, 200, 211, 216, 217
subnetwork An IP network that has been divided. The term is used interchangeably
with subnet. 1, 14, 17, 20, 26, 38, 40, 47, 56, 223, 225
VA Vulnerability assessment. A VA is used to assess a system for vulnerabilities to
threats. i, 2, 3, 41, 52, 53, 54
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